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Introduction
In 1905, the same year which saw the publication of Max Weber’s The 
Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Willa Gather published her first collection 
of short stories entitled The Troll Garden, a volume of seven stories which includes 
“The Garden Lodge,” “Flavia and Her Artists,” and her perhaps best known short story, 
“Paul’s Case.” The following year would see Gather give up her teaching job in 
Pittsburgh and accept S. S. McClure’s offer of a position at his magazine in New York. 
In Gather’s second collection of stories, which includes some revised stories from The 
Troll Garden, entitled Youth and the Bright Medusa. Gather alludes to life in the still 
uncommercialized, bohemian Washington Square,* what Gather’s lifelong companion 
Edith Lewis calls “the rather poetic mood of those days before the automobile, the 
radio, the moving picture—and before the two wars.”  ^ However, Gather’s position at 
McClure’s magazine, a notorious muckraking journal, consisted almost entirely of 
reading stories submitted in the hopes of commercial success, without the “devotion” to 
art that Gather all her life avowed. “In reading manuscripts submitted to me,” Gather
* Walter Tittle writes about Greenwich Village in 1925 in a way which confirms 
Gather’s own observations: “One does not need to be old to remember when its 
streets were quiet, but now it is the haunt of Bohemianism, Incorporated, where 
from humble beginnings that were more sincere have risen myriad dance-halls, 
taxi-stands, tea-shops, theaters, and cabarets with convert charges and like 
ostentations that promise soon to rival Broadway. Persevere still farther west, and 
one is rewarded. This modem commerce has not yet obliterated all of the former 
charm. The crooked streets again resume their quiet, and an Old World touch is 
contributed by occasional lingering architectural fragments of Georgian flavor. In 
this pleasant back-water I found the dwelling of Willa Sibert Gather.” (Excerpted 
from Genturv Magazine. July 1925). Reprinted in Wasserman, 103.
 ^From the introduction to Willa Gather Living, by Edith Lewis (New York: Alfred 
A. Knopf, 1953). xi-xviii.
says in a 1921 interview, “I found that 95 per cent of them were written for the sake of 
the writer—never for the sake of the material. The writer wanted to express his clever 
ideas, his wit, his observations. Almost never did I find a manuscript that was written 
because a writer loved his subject so much he had to write about it.” As a result. Gather 
claims that she began to have a “definite idea about writing,” that one “must know his 
subject with an understanding that passes understanding—like the babe knows its own 
mother’s breast.” ^
While Gather’s early work, including most of the stories in The Troll 
Garden, has often been criticized (significantly by the author herself) as not “true” 
to her best writing, “superficial,” and even in Gather’s own estimation somewhat 
more like the manuscripts she read at McGlure’s. nevertheless these stories from 
what is often termed her “Jamesian period” all in some way deal interestingly with 
the dilemmas of the artist and the aesthete in the modem world of industrial 
capitalism, with conflicts concerning the advent of individualism and consumer 
culture, and with the available choices for individuals who search for alternatives to 
the flattened experience of an increasingly rationalized world. These concerns are 
articulated in the contemporary American intellectual culture of Gather’s early 
years in Pittsburgh and New York. The resultant intellectual and scholarly 
conversations revolving around such issues were available to Gather in salons such 
as the one held at the Fields’ house in Boston (where she met Sarah Ome Jewett 
and Henry James, among many others), the various writers she would have come
 ^From an interview with Eve Mahony in the Omaha World-Herald. 27 November 
1921. Reprinted in Wasserman.
into contact with in her editorial position, and the reading she was so fond of 
indulging in whenever possible.
While critics have often broken Gather’s career into various “phases” or 
cycles,I see concerns in her work that begin in The Troll Garden and which persist 
well into her later career. Gather, like many of her contemporaries, felt great 
ambivalence towards the advent of modernity, specifically the production of wealth 
for its own sake (understood as “progress”), the new “leisure class” (famously 
identified by Thorstein Veblen in 1899), widespread bureaucratized education, and 
the enormous availability of consumer goods. The cultural mood at the turn into 
the new century is one of doubt and uncertainty, with an accompanying sense that 
modem life has become what historian T. J. Jackson Lears calls in his hook No 
Place of Grace: Antimodemism and the Transformation of American Gulture: 
1880-1920. “inauthentic,” “overcivilized,” and “unreal.” One subject with which 
Gather becomes particularly acquainted “with an understanding that passes 
understanding” is the sense that modem life is intmding upon art and the artist in 
unacceptable ways, challenging the potential for art to reenchant bourgeois 
experience in a world faced with the collision of Enlightenment principles and 
growing modemist doubt conceming the practical effects of these principles after
For an account of various critical positions on Gather, including H. L. Mencken 
and Garl Van Doren, see the “Introduction” to John J. Murphy’s Gritical Essavs on 
Willa Gather. Boston: Hall and Go., 1984. Perhaps the first to divide Gather’s 
career into such phases was Fred Pattee in 1930 in The New American Literature. 
followed by a comprehensive study of Gather’s career in Maxwell Geismar’s The 
Last of the Provincials in 1947 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Go.) which appeared the 
year of Gather’s death. The debate continues, centered on Gather’s place within 
Modemism and regionalism.
the second Industrial Revolution. The ethos at the turn of the century as Gather 
begins her public career in fiction is one which has been characterized by her 
contemporaries as one of unprecedented greed and unusual psychic and spiritual 
uncertainty. Lears argues that, as a result, many long for a return to premodem 
forms of psychic, spiritual, artistic, or newer psychological or therapeutic cultural 
forms to fill what seemed to he an expanding void as modernity demanded more of 
individuals and offered them less sense of solidity. Lears chronicles these 
responses which can he found again and again in the fictional production, the 
poetry, the plastic arts, and the spiritual and psychological theories and practices of 
the period.
“Antimodem” culture, as Lears describes this reaction to incipient modemity, 
is an inherently ambivalent response, relying as it does on progressive “modem” 
rhetoric while at the same time protesting the effects of modemity. Lears is not 
referring to literary Modemism per se, though that is often “antimodem” in its 
response, but to a broader reaction that includes artistic response. Lears’ term 
“antimodemism” can be a bit misleading, since it sounds unambiguous. But Lears 
uses the term to mean an inherently ambivalent reaction to modemity. The term is 
especially appropriate for my purposes, since Gather herself has come to be seen more 
recently as a literary Modemist; and while Gather does not celebrate modemity she 
does participate in modernist experimentation with form. And Gather, particularly 
through her ambivalent depictions of the celebrity artist and the dandy figure, attempts 
to mediate the contradictory impulses she feels towards modem consumer culture.
The term “antimodemist” therefore is most usefully read as both “anti” and 
“modem”: not an “either/or” but rather an “also/and.” Lears’ thesis suggests a way 
of reading contradictions I find in Gather’s early fiction. Like the antimodemists 
Lears examines, Gather, while believing in and advocating “progress” and the 
abundance it represented, also remained suspicious of excesses of wealth and the 
hedonism that it represented; in other words, the very forces of progress which 
advance modemity might also bring about unwanted effects that could endanger the 
moral fabric of the republic. This is described by Lears as the vestiges of 
“republican moralism,” and the tension between these fears and the hopes 
progressive rhetoric inflamed is at the very root of antimodemist response. Lears’ 
notion of antimodemism is a complex mix of faith in the myths of America (in the 
work ethic, in positivistic science and progress, in technological achievement, all 
based on Enlightenment values) with the simultaneous fear of the hedonistic excess 
such material and technological progress might entail. While Lears’ notion is a 
more general description of an attitude of anxiety towards modemity, found in all 
cultural, psychological, and spiritual realms, Gather’s antimodemism manifests 
itself in her aesthetic, and most especially in the tension revolving around her 
figures of modemity, the celebrity artist and the dandy. Gather’s antimodem 
reaction is also inherently ambivalent, mixed as it is with the still largely 
unconscious acceptance of “progressive” rhetoric and commitments, and these 
same commitments lend Gather’s early fiction its often irresolvable tension.
Gather creates her early fiction in this culture of contradiction: an America 
both entranced by and fearful of what the second Industrial Revolution has
wrought. Gather’s early fiction is never explored by Lears, nor does he examine the 
celebrity artist figure as a figure of mediation among competing antimodem 
impulses. But Gather’s earliest fiction fits within the “antimodem” responses to the 
culture of contradictions in fin de siècle America which Lears describes. Gather’s 
fiction is particularly striking in its overt critique of the individualistic, self-seeking 
hedonism of consumer culture and the debasement of art within that increasingly 
materialistic milieu. Rather than protesting modemity through manifestos, or 
through establishing a movements to resist some particular effect of modemity, or 
through an advocacy of militarism and the reassertion of the strenuous life, all 
contemporary altematives to modemity available at the fin de siècle, Gather instead 
uses art itself to critique the position of art in consumer culture, art which will itself 
be subject to market forces. In Gather’s fiction, the forceful collision of competing 
antimodem impulses is located within the most basic of her commitments: her 
commitment to individual achievement, particularly the potential for achievement 
in art. It is this commitment, to an American individualism and the work ethic, 
which ultimately subverts her protest to modem, consumer culture.
As an artist. Gather maintains a belief in “inherent, individual beauty” and 
the ability of the artist to communicate these “immediate impressions.”  ^ Yet 
Gather is also subject to the claims of the historical moment, to the pressure on the 
artist to produce, to participate in the work ethic to survive and to succeed. Her 
battle with modemity’s forces revolves around the issue of the consumption and
 ^This is just one example of Gather’s aesthetic rhetoric, found in her preface to 
“The Best Stories of Sarah Ome Jewett.” Willa Gather on Writing: Gritical Studies 
on Writing as an Art. Forward by Stephen Tennant. Lincoln: Bison Books, 1988.
production of art within the progressive culture — itself committed to the Protestant 
work ethic and to the creation of a consumer culture to further the aims of 
modernity’s most unique contribution: high finance capitalism, and, what Alan 
Trachtenberg has called in his book by the same name, “the incorporation of 
America.”
To claim that Gather’s aesthetic is “antimodemist” is also to claim that she is 
both suspicious of modemity and, in a particularly American way, also committed to 
many of the ideals which advance modemity — specifically the radical individualism 
which is both to some extent produced by but certainly cmcial to the success of 
consumer culture. In addition. Gather, like many other literary Modemists, will 
protest the effects of modemity using new “modemist” techniques, and will also 
actively manage the image and marketing of her own works. This further complicates 
her relationship to modemity, as she must negotiate consumer culture in order to find 
success as an artist. Her antimodem impulse to critique the crass consumption of art, 
and to critique what often passes for art, collides with her need to produce art which 
will find an audience, as well as with her need to keep an artistic realm available as a 
separate sphere, a place safe from what Max Weber termed the “disenchantment” of 
everyday life: the result of the rationalization and control of people’s lives in order to 
increase productivity and profit.
Antimodemist artists and cultural critics express the contradictions swirling 
around notions of progress and individual autonomous achievement by at once 
accepting and rejecting modemity and its effects. But Gather’s concems, while 
rooted in the same cultural dilemmas as those which Lears’ chronicles, have been
misread. In order to fully understand the contradictions in Gather’s work it is 
crucial to avoid oversimplifying her antimodem response; it is not simple 
conservative escapism or a refusal to confront the political, economic, and social 
conditions of her time, not a simple flight from modemity into art, as many critics 
have argued.® This is despite the fact that some of her own remarks conceming art 
and writing seem to suggest this position. But, read carefully, there is in Gather’s 
own articulation of her aesthetic an ongoing element of protest, particularly through 
what I term her “sensational” aesthetic and her revaluing of a particular type of 
realism. Gather’s attempts to find a solution to the contradictory impulses and dual 
commitments she has are centered in two figures which can be found recurring 
throughout her early fiction: the celebrity artist and the dandy.
In order to read Gather effectively, to understand her ambivalence and 
contradictions, both her more theoretical statements and her fiction must be read as 
overdetermined responses to the overdetermined culture of antimodemism. Lears’ 
description of antimodem reaction as both protest and accommodation to modemity 
is extraordinarily useful therefore, accounting as it does for what one critic termed 
Gather’s “failure of technique” in her early work. This “failure” however is actually 
Gather’s attempt to come to terms with the “antimodem impulse” Lears describes, 
and her earliest fiction represents her genuine conflicting commitments. This notion 
of antimodemism points to the critical distinction between Gather as a conservative. 
Episcopalian, Republican, literary figure intent on fleeing modemity — intent upon
® See editor John J. Murphy’s “Introduction” to Gritical Essavs on Willa Gather 
(Boston: O.K. Hall, 1984) for a detailed and useful account of the debates 
surrounding Gather’s early fiction and its critical reception.
stubbornly reasserting tradition for tradition’s sake, and Gather as an astute critic of 
American culture — prescient, engaged, and forward rather than simply backward 
looking. Gather’s complex antimodemism leads me to call Gather a “radically 
conservative” critic of her American situation as she maintains commitments to 
particular strands of modem ideology while protesting the effects of them.
This project examines various strategies of Gather’s radically conservative, 
antimodem aesthetic which, each in their way, attempt to come to terms with issues of 
personal authenticity, the artist, and the place of art in consumer culture, as well as the 
potential for the individual imagination in modem life under pressure from the 
American Protestant work ethic as described by Max Weber. The celebrity artist and 
the dandy are each figurative attempts to mediate the forces of progress, 
individualism, and modemity with an aesthetic realm outside modem market 
pressures. Gather’s antimodem response, her accommodation to and protest of 
modemity, is most obvious in these two figures, which she reconfigures in nearly 
each one of her earliest stories in order to illuminate another aspect of modemity’s 
effects on art and the artist.
Weber, Gather’s contemporary, was one of the most salient cultural critics 
to describe the ambivalence present in fin de siècle American culture. The 
controversy over his theories of cultural formations continues even today, but there 
is no doubt as to his influence on many fields of study: sociology, history, religion, 
psychology and economics, just to name a few. The concems which occupied 
Weber are found in his most famous work The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of 
Ganitalism. which charts the contradictions within the American ideology of
progress and obsession with wealth, figured by Weber as “vocation.” These are the 
same concems found in Gather’s earliest work. The early stories are urban in setting 
as opposed to her later more rural and “regional” works, and are concerned with 
class and status as well as with the spiritual lack which often accompanies material 
or artistic success. Like Weber, Gather attempts to locate the notion of “vocation” 
in American culture, and posits a separate aesthetic sphere safe from the 
marketplace, which Weber termed “aesthetic culture.” Gather remains committed 
to the notion of vocation which Weber identified in American progressive ideology, 
but, unlike Weber, locates it within the realm of artistic success.
Gather is also known to have read widely in contemporary philosophy 
(William James and Henri Bergson were favorites), and she was intellectually 
active all her life. She had particular interests in German and French literary and 
musical culture, and read and admired, among others, both Flaubert and Balzac; 
these influences on her writing have been well documented by other critics’. She 
also read Russian literature, including and especially Tolstoi, whose impact on 
Gather’s depiction of work may be seen, for example, in a later story like 
“Neighbour Rosicky” or her novels set in Nebraska. The socio-historical as well as 
aesthetic ethos informing the production of her work can be traced through the 
contemporary writers whom she read, of course. Yet, as the variety of her reading 
in the abbreviated list above suggests, the period was complex; and while I am 
certainly not claiming that Gather, or any author, expresses the specific cultural.
’ Susan Rosowski, for instance, gives a nice account of Gather’s documented 
influences in her introduction to The Vovage Perilous, also cited below.
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historical moment through an overt adaptation of theory into her fiction, there are 
elements of Gather’s fictional presentation which can only be accounted for through 
an examination of the critical and aesthetic conditions which contributed to and 
surrounded her own experience.
Gather would not, for example, have had direct access to Weber’s The 
Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Gapitalism, because it had not yet been translated, 
but the ideas he addressed were the same ones often dramatized or discussed in 
other authors and their fiction: for instance, the concern over the effects of high 
finance capitalism, advertising, the place of art in modem culture, the collision of 
the work ethic with artistic impulse, all of which can be read in Dreiser, Wharton, 
Grane, and James, to list only a few of Gather’s American contemporaries. The 
concems to which Weber responded as a result of his visit to America in 1904 were 
certainly widespread. Gritics have also, for instance, long accounted for some of 
Gather’s nonlinear stracture in terms of her acquaintance with and adherence to 
certain notions of Bergsonian time. But there are other strains of philosophy and 
cultural criticism with which she was acquainted, as well as ideas in circulation 
such as Weber’s or Thorstein Veblen’s with which she may have had no formal 
contact but which are nevertheless relevant to a more complete discussion of her 
work.
In this project I examine three of Gather’s early stories and the relevance of 
Weber’s observations of American culture to them. In chapter one I look at “The 
Garden Lodge” and Gather’s character of bourgeois success, as well as a brief 
examination of the celebrity artist figure. In chapter two I also read Gather’s
11
concems using Thorstein Veblen’s The Theory of the Leisure Class, published in 
1899, in which he outlines his notion of “conspicuous consumption.” Using Pierre 
Bourdieu’s ideas of “distinction” and the acquisition of cultural capital, I augment 
Veblen and Weber’s ideas though an examination of Gather’s self-made bourgeois 
character, her figure of ascetic rationalism, her nouveau-riche character, and, finally 
in chapters three and four, her figure of the dandy. Throughout the project, in 
addition to relying on Lears’ basic thesis of antimodemism, I interpret Gather’s 
response through another set of useful ideas from Mikhail Bakhtin.
Bakhtin offers a provocative notion of how artists express the historical, 
technological and cultural issues of their time in a short essay he wrote in 1919, 
entitled “Art and Answerability.” Bakhtin’s notion of what his translator and editor 
Michael Holquist terms “the struggle to effect a whole out of the potential chaos of 
parts”(xxiii), which partially defines Bakhtin’s theory of architectonics, suggests a 
method of reading Gather’s ambivalence as she responds to modemity. “What 
counts” in this stmggle, Holquist claims in his useful gloss of Bakhtin, is not the 
simple oppositional categories (self/other, space/time; or for example, in Gather’s 
case, the oppositions I identify between individualism/ ethical responsibility, the 
sphere of art/commodity culture, or her republican moralist fears of excess/her 
advocacy of progress), but the “architectonics goveming relations between them ..
. the simultaneity that makes it logical to treat these concepts together.” Holquist 
continues, claiming that even in Bakhtin’s early writings:
the point is that Bakhtin honors both things and the relations 
between them — one cannot be understood without the other. The
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resulting simultaneity is not a private either/or. but an inclusive 
also/and. In other words, the logic of Bakhtin’s simultaneity is— 
dialogic, (xxxiii)
I am interested in how Gather demands to be read over against some of her 
own theoretical statements regarding the production of art, and how the 
contradictions, the “either/or” in her fiction, demand to be read as “also/and”; in 
other words, I am interested in the “dialogic” nature of her early fiction — in its 
antimodem quality of both protest to and accommodation to modemity and her 
particular strategies for mediating her conflicting commitments. Holquist makes 
the additional point that “it is only slightly less vital to keep in mind that 
architectonics is intended to describe an activitv: the relations it orders are always 
in a state of dynamic tension” (xxiii). This tension is at play in Gather’s variety of 
representations and faceted examinations of the issues of consumerism, the 
celebrity artist, the American work ethic and ascetic rationalism, and the effects of 
progressive ideology and radical individualism. Gather, in her attempt to transcend 
ideology, to separate her “art” from what she termed “economics,” nonetheless 
interacts with the material of her art, creating a fascinating array of approaches to 
complex issues in what Bakhtin calls, in “Art and Answerability,” “an excess of 
seeing.” This nuanced array may be seen in her varied treatment of the same issue 
in the stories she collected for The Troll Garden. Far from being a search for 
“unity” of style or discourse, as Bakhtin describes the search for unity in language 
in The Dialogic Imagination. Gather’s fiction is part of the conversation which 
“lives, as it were, on the boundary between its own context and another, alien,
13
context” (284). Gather’s fiction responds to the “social heteroglossia,” described by 
Bakhtin in his “Discourse in the Novel,” by creating a multiplicity of responses, 
refracting the issues and problems of modemity and antimodem response, and in 
accordance with Bakhtin’s claim, “the social atmosphere of the word, the 
atmosphere that surrounds the object, makes the facets of the image sparkle” (277).
I hope to account for some of the contradictions and tensions within 
Gather’s earliest fiction by examining the cultural moment and how it impacted 
Gather’s active, perspectival depiction of the age. Gather’s multiplicity of 
approaches to the dominant themes in her early work indicates her artistic “excess 
of seeing,” a Bakhtinian idea which Holquist explains usefully:
The general aesthetic Bakhtin provides is grounded in the primal 
condition that holds for all perception of any kind, a condition that 
might be called the first law of human perception: whatever is 
perceived can be perceived only from a uniquely situated place in 
the overall stmcture of possible points of view. The enabling 
condition for having a point of view on anything is to be able to 
“see” and one can see only from a particular place. The a priori from 
which the rest of Bakhtin’s thought flows is the assumption that 
each of us occupies a situation in existence that, for the time we 
occupy such space, is ours and ours alone: what I see is not the same 
as what anyone else sees. Perception, how I “see” the world, is 
always refracted, as it were, through the optic of my uniqueness.
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Bakhtin calls this uniqueness of vision my “excess of seeing” insofar 
as it is defined by the ability I have to see things others do not. (xxv) 
Gather’s “refraction” of the issues surrounding the production of her writing 
constitute her excess of seeing and in the sheer complexity of her response and 
attention to possibility the reader may feel what Susan Rosowski has termed a “lack 
of conviction”* rather than an overdetermined and incisive critique of simultaneous, 
pressing concems. This project is concerned to outline Gather’s convictions, which 
I find to be strong but inherently dialogic. Gather’s dialogic artistic response itself 
“answers” the socio-historical dialogic questions in the culture in which she writes.
Lest Bakhtin’s idea of perspective seem obvious to those who do not 
subscribe to the “death of the subject” it is important to understand, as Holquist 
explains, that Bakhtin also posits that you also see what I cannot, and therefore the 
“uniqueness of the self’ depends upon the “necessity of the other” (xxv). For 
complex refraction of experience to take place there must be what Gather herself 
termed a unity of art and life, where “literalness ceases to be literalness,” as she 
asserts in “The Novel Démeublé.” Gather’s perception depends upon the ability to 
discern the other through what she calls “sympathy”— and it is through sympathy 
that the artist can “see” from more than one perspective, the “necessity of the other” 
becomes the prerequisite for art as an answer to the multiplicity of questions, for 
the refraction of experience.
* Susan J. Rosowski. The Vovage Perilous: Willa Gather’s Romanticism. Lincoln: 
Nebraska UP. When Rosowski discusses the early works she asks what 
“distinguishes them from the mature fiction? The first impulse — to cite technical 
skill — doesn’t take us very far, for Gather’s technique in these stories is often 
quite good. What is missing instead, I believe, is conviction”(29).
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“It is this very personal quality of perception, a vivid and intensely personal 
experience of life, which make a ‘style,’” Gather claims in Not Under Fortv. in an 
essay on Sarah Ome Jewett (95). But Bakhtin, in “Art and Answerability,” claims 
that “When a human being is in art, he is not in life, and conversely. There is no 
unity between them and no inner interpenetration within the unity of an individual 
person.” He asks:
what guarantees the inner connection of the constituent elements of a 
person? Only the unity of answerability. I have to answer with my 
own life for what I have experienced and understood in art.
[emphasis mine] so that everything I have experienced and 
understood would not remain ineffectual in my life. But 
answerability entails guilt, or liability to blame. It is not only mutual 
answerability that art and life must assume, but also mutual liability 
to blame. The poet must remember that it is his poetry which hears 
the guilt for the vulgar prose of life, whereas the man of everyday 
life ought to know that the fruitlessness of art is due to his 
willingness to be unexacting and to the unseriousness of the 
concems in his life. The individual must become answerable through 
and through: all of his constituent moments must not only fit next to 
each other in the temporal sequence of his life, but must also 
interpenetrate each other in the unity of guilt and answerability .. 
• ( 2)
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Gather, as if in response to Bakhtin’s concems, maintains that “it is a common 
fallacy” that an artist can use his “imagination” upon subject matter to produce 
strong feeling. “The tmth is” she claims, “that by such a process (which is not 
imaginative at all!) he can at best produce only a brilliant sham, which, like a badly 
built and pretentious house, looks poor and shabby in a few years.” She continues, 
If he achieves anything noble, anything enduring, it must be by 
giving himself absolutely to his material. And this gift of sympathy 
is his great gift; it is the fine thing in him that along can make his 
work fine. He fades away into the land and people of his heart, he 
dies of love only to be bom again. The artist spends a lifetime in 
loving the things that haunt him . . .  (79-80)
Gather here formulates, in 1922, just the idea Bakhtin articulated in 1919. The 
claims of art as answerability require the unity of “life” with art, artist with other, to 
take “the vulgar prose of life” and tum it into something “noble.” Bakhtin speaks 
in similar terms to Gather’s claim about imagination when he claims that: 
Inspiration that ignores life and is itself ignored by life is not 
inspiration but a state of possession . . .  it is certainly easier to create 
without answering for life, and easier to live without any 
consideration for art. Art and life are not one, but they must become 
united in myself— in the unity of my answerability. (2)^
 ^In an unpublished fragment which has been entitled “Light on Adobe 
Walls,” Gather writes of “the limits of inspiration” or “possession” in art:
No art can do anything at all with great natural forces or great 
elemental emotions. No poet can write of love, hate, jealousy. He
17
As Gather writes, the artist must give him or herself “absolutely to his material,” “to 
die of love only to be bom again,” and, one can translate this into Bakhtinian terms 
of “answerablity.”
Ronald Schleifer, in his book, Modemism and Time: The Logic of 
Abundance in Literature. Science, and Culture 1880-1930. describes answerability 
as the aesthetic response that “allow[s] the political/economic/technological culture 
in which they emerge to ‘coalesce’ as living events which themselves call for a 
response . . Furthermore:
Answerability is predicated on the aesthetic possibility of grasping 
phenomena whole, momentarily, in order to render a judgment and, 
as Benjamin says, by means of their temporally enlarged wholeness 
to “redeem” them. As such, art is not simply a reflex of techno­
political culture; it momentarily and repeatedly coalesces such 
culture into something to be comprehended, evaluated and valued . . .  
(21-22).
In her essay on Katherine Mansfield, in Willa Gather on Writing: Critical Studies 
on Writing as an Art, Gather describes the first-rate artist as possessing “the thing 
that is his very own, his timbre, this cannot be defined or explained any more than 
the quality of a beautiful speaking voice can be” (108), which can be seen as the
can only touch these things as they affect the people in his drama 
and his story . .. Art is a concrete and personal and rather childish 
thing after all — no matter what people do to graft it into science 
and make it sociological and psychological; it is no good at all 
unless it is let alone to be itself. . .  (124-25)
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expression of the artist’s own “excess of seeing.” In “The Novel Démeuhlé”
Gather discusses Tolstoi’s depiction of the “material things” of life, “always so 
much a part of the emotions of the people that they are perfectly synthesized; they 
seem to exist,” she claims, “not so much in the author’s mind, as in the emotional 
penumbra of the characters themselves. When it is fused like this, literalness ceases 
to be literalness — it is merely part of the experience” (40). Here Gather seems to 
he describing the process of “coalescence,” the aesthetic answer to material reality, 
fusing “life” with “art.” Gather continues, as if prefiguring Bakhtin’s notion of 
answerability in art;
If the novel is a form of imaginative art, it cannot be at the same 
time be a vivid and brilliant form of journalism. Out of the teeming, 
gleaming stream of the present it must select the eternal material of 
art. There are hopeful signs that some of the younger writers are 
trying to break away from mere verisimilitude, and, following the 
development of modem painting, to interpret imaginatively the 
material and social investiture of their characters; to present their 
scene by suggestion rather than by enumeration. (40)
Importantly, Gather accounts for the artist’s vision, the fusing of art with life 
that transcends the literal, within the ambivalent relations between persons. Gather 
goes on to describe the life of the family, and in so doing describes the response of 
the artist in terms which suggest her “answerability” to art and experience, to “life” 
as the “tragic necessity” of relationship between artist and other:
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One realizes that even in harmonious families there is this 
double life: the group life, which the one we can observe in our 
neighbour’s household, and, underneath, another — secret and 
passionate and intense — which is the real life that stamps the faces 
and gives character to the voices of our friends. Always in his mind 
each member of these social units is escaping, running away, trying 
to break the net which circumstances and his own affections have 
woven about him. One realizes that human relationships are the 
tragic necessity of human life; that they can never be wholly 
satisfactory, that every ego is half the time greedily seeking them, 
and half the time pulling away from them. In those simple 
relationships of loving husband and wife, affectionate sisters, 
children and grandmother, there are innumerable shades of 
sweetness and anguish which make up the pattern of our lives day 
by day, though they are not down in the list of subjects from which 
the conventional novelist works. (109-10)
Gather was no “conventional novelist,” as any superficial look at a novel 
such as Mv Antonia or Death Comes for the Archbishop will show. Gather’s 
“answerability” to life is fearless in its willingness to offer the contradictions of life 
in her art, the “shades of sweetness and anguish” that make up relationships and 
inform her artistic excess of seeing. Gather’s answerability in art relies on the 
process of “simplification,” but also, as she writes in the preface to Jewett’s stories, 
on the “gift of sympathy” (51). While always quick to maintain that art was indeed
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a form (a complicated form) of “escape,” that art and religion have more in 
common than “art and economics,” and while maintaining the possibility of art 
remaining safely separate from “life” in this sense. Gather nonetheless actively 
“answers” the impact of the modalities of modem life through her complex 
aesthetic response.
Hers is a response which is not simply contradictory, but ambivalent as a 
result of its dual commitments: to individualistic artistic achievement which 
incorporates the American work ethic and can thus achieve a measure of “success,” 
and, simultaneously, to the preservation of an artistic sphere, safe from the demands 
of modernity and the coiruption of the marketplace. Each of the chapters in this 
project will examine Gather’s varying strategies of coping with these contradictions 
within her own ideology of art.
Gather’s earliest fiction seems a complex “answer” to Weber’s analysis of 
what he terms the “spirit” of the age: the ethos of a new type of capitalism, and the 
incumbent problems for the individual he defines and analyzes. The interpretation 
of Weber’s ideas and the resulting historical thesis regarding antimodem reaction as 
found more recently in Jackson Lears’ study is extraordinarily useful in accounting 
for some of the crosscurrents, ambiguity, and contradictions within Gather’s earliest 
work, which many times seem an almost obvious “coalescence,” as Schleifer uses 
the idea, of many of the ideas put forth by cultural critics. Gather, like such 
observers of American culture as Weber and Veblen, identified a sense of loss and 
uncertainty accompanying the shift in priorities within American culture 
occasioned by the advent of modem consumerism. This antimodemist content of
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Gather’s work has often been either ignored, oversimplified, or misrepresented by 
critics of her work. Instead of reading Gather’s work as her answerability, the unity 
of “life” with “art” through her aesthetic expression, many critics have chosen to 
focus on Gather’s narratives (especially her “regionalist” work, later in her career) 
as a kind of romantic “escape” from life. This critical response hears only one part 
of her answer to modernity.
After turning first, then, in chapter one, to the story “The Garden Lodge,” in 
order to examine how Gather “answers” the lack of intense, authentic experience in 
modem bourgeois culture through her positing of a separate realm of visionary 
imagination, outside the conscious, rationalized ethic of self-control described by 
Weber and represented in the character of Garoline Noble, I further investigate 
how she uses the trope of the celebrity artist to locate such a space outside 
“rationalized” modem life. In “The Garden Lodge” Gather challenges what she 
calls the “system and discipline” of modem bourgeois life with the experience of 
artistic vision and imagination. “The Garden Lodge” dramatizes Weber’s notion of 
rationalization, the pressures of modemity on the individual and the imagination, 
and Gather’s own resistance to such pressures through her depiction of the search 
for individual, authentic, intense experience as Lears describes it.
While both chapters one and two examine Gather and her work as a 
Bakhtinian “answer” to the ambivalent ethos of the period which Weber identifies, 
they also examine the residual possibility for art’s existence in a protected separate 
sphere which Gather locates outside American capitalist culture, especially in an 
idealized, preindustrial European bohemianism, indicating her conviction that art
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retains an element of potential protest to the American elision of art and work.
(This suggestion seems particularly strong given her choice of epigraph from 
Rossetti’s “Goblin Market,” a short reading of which is also included here).
“The Garden Lodge” offers the celebrity artist as a mediating figure of 
accommodation to the pressures of modemity intruding upon the sphere of art 
postulated by Weber, containing antimodem ambivalence within an elision of the 
American work ethic and artistic development. But “Flavia and Her Artists” does 
more: it offers yet another altemative to the rationalized bourgeois existence 
represented by Flavia’s rise from working-class status to nouveau-riche: it posits an 
ascetic rationalism to both the crass celebrity culture of the “artists” in Flavia’s 
collection, and to Flavia’s acquisitive instinct itself. Using Veblen’s notion of 
conspicuous consumption to examine Flavia’s behavior and the consequences for 
art under these conditions. Gather’s antimodem ambivalence towards consumer 
culture can more easily be located in the figure of ascetic rationalism, represented 
by Arthur Hamilton, Flavia’s husband. In “Flavia and Her Artists,” Gather further 
suggests, as Pierre Bourdieu does, that consumption can include the acquisition of 
aesthetic experience in addition to material objects. This type of consumption 
contributes to the cultural capital of the aspiring bourgeoisie (what Veblen termed 
the “leisure class”). Gather’s depiction of the consumption of aesthetic experience 
shows the dearth of available authentic experience for the bourgeoisie, the modem 
hedonism of consumer culture, Gather’s ambivalence towards American radical 
individualism, and the problem of aesthetics in nascent modem consumer culture. I 
also use Weber’s “disenchantment thesis” in order to more fully account for
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Gather’s ambivalence towards the celebrity artist in this story. Gather’s story 
suggests Weber’s notion of personal redemption through art, but as augmented 
through Veblen’s ideas on conspicuous consumption, reputability, pecuniary ability 
and predatory behavior which locates such “redemption” outside the purely 
individual, spiritual, or therapeutic levels and place it within the issue of class.
While vividly depicting such ideas through her story. Gather nevertheless 
maintains a commitment to republican ideals in her “ascetic rationalism,” located in 
one character, Arthur Hamilton, Flavia’s husband, further betraying her republican 
suspicion of the culture of consumption and the individualism which informs it, as 
well as her ambivalence towards the European, Amoldian view of culture and the 
class which supports it. I therefore examine the inherent dialogic, contradictory 
tensions between antimodem residual strains of ascetic rationalism and 
conspicuous consumption based on hedonistic, status seeking individualism. I also 
read this story against other, oversimplified readings which validate Gather’s 
antimodem conservatism but ignore her antimodemist critique; misunderstanding 
or misreading the contradictions within her early work, such readings often cite a 
“failure of technique” or “lack of conviction” instead of reading the crosscurrents 
of antimodem reaction as the partly reactionary but radical critique of modemity 
that they are.
Each of these are issues which will preoccupy Gather throughout her long 
career, and as the effects of modemity increase and multiply, her aesthetic answer 
will dynamically change. But even years after The Troll Garden, one sees the 
protest to modemity in Gather’s traditional conservative depictions of meaningful
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work, and in her need to loeate meaning within relationship, though she does not 
deny the modernist alienation present in the culture and even depicts it graphically 
(in My Mortal Enemy for example). However, one also continues to see her 
alternate commitment to radical individualism and aesthetieism, which ultimately 
functions as an accommodation to modemity. The dialogic, ambivalent answer 
Gather gives to antimodem sentiment present within the fin de siècle has seemed to 
critics reactionary, antiprogressive, and elitist, particularly in the 1930s. But as 
early as 1947, the year in which Gather died, belle-lettrist critics had noted the 
conflict in most of Gather’s works between the individual seeking meaning through 
art and the moral stmggle to maintain “values” in light of modemity’s pressures. 
Maxwell Geisman called Gather “one of the most complex, if not difficult and 
contradictory, minds in our letters” in his 1947 book, The Last of the Provincials. 
Despite attempts to position Gather’s contradictions within literary movements (i.e. 
Romanticism, realism, or Modemism) or to account for them in terms of flaws in 
her “technique,” usually in readings of the novels, or to account for inconsistencies 
or contradictions in terms of gender or queer theory. Gather’s work still resists easy 
categorization. Indeed this problem has generated much criticism in itself. My 
contention here is that Gather’s “contradictory mind” is informed by the 
antimodem ambivalence present in the fin de siècle: the necessity to both protest 
the conditions of modemity after the second Industrial Revolution and to 
accommodate to its demands. But while these contradictions are themes that have
James McFarlane contends in his essay “The Mind of Modemism” that this 
ambivalence is an essential part of modemism. And yet, the term “ambivalence” is
25
been noted in her later work, they have generally been attributed to her need to 
“escape” rather than to confront modem life, and thus have not been fully identified 
or satisfactorily accounted for, especially in their earliest, latent form s/' Gather, 
far from attempting an escape from modem life, answers the challenges modemity 
is mounting to art as a separate, safe altemative to commercial, consumer capitalist 
culture and the bourgeois individualism that informs it. Nowhere is this more 
evident than in the short story “Paul’s Case,” which is the focus of chapters three 
and four of this project.
While critiquing bourgeois values associated with American culture and the 
cultural elite, thus resisting modemity in specific ways. Gather also betrays an odd 
ambivalence towards the role of the artist, and even toward that figure of self- 
seeking, radical individualism, the consumer. Chapter three examines modemity 
through Paterian notions of aesthetic experience and Gather’s interpretation of this
“less than satisfactory. Strictly,” McFarlane says, “our dictionaries lack the word 
which would embrace all the diverse ways of interconnecting opposites and 
contraries and contradictions, which would gather within one semantic category 
such notions as polarity and dualism and dialectic and schizophrenia and synthesis 
and ambivalence, which would admit the simple oxymoron as well as the 
Aristotelian idea that ‘the highest harmony springs from opposites’, and which 
would mn right through to the sophistications of Freudian and Jungian psychology. 
What is distinctive—and difficult — about the Modemist mode is that it seems to 
demand the reconciliation of two distinct ways of reconciling contradictions, ways 
which in themselves are also contrary” (87).
"  Indeed, as early as 1924, Lloyd Morris argues in the North American Review 
that Gather had “failed to discover a national faith or destiny in contemporary 
America,” and one Nation reviewer regarded the early stories as “an American 
debate between body and soul on the questionable compatibility of American ideals 
and the development of the artist” (Murphy 5). However most critics, with a few 
notable exceptions, continued to claim that Gather was either simply “nostalgic” or 
“escapist,” particularly in the 1930s. See Murphy’s “Introduction” for an account of 
this critical debate.
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aesthetieism. The first section of chapter three outlines Gather’s “sensational 
aesthetie,” an interpretation of Paterian and Fordian impressionism and her 
commitment to a “bodily” art. While this seems to stand in eontrast to both 
consumer culture and the Victorian ethos of ascetic rationalism, therefore aeting as 
a protest of Weberian rationalization of modem life, nevertheless in her 
commitment to art as a quasi-religious ideal, in an attempt to transmute aseetie 
rationalism rather than to fully rejeet it. Gather effectively affirms an artistic 
asceticism found first in Flaubert and also later in many antimodem movements. In 
this section I examine aesthetieism’s fiuitfulness as an altemative antimodem 
strategy, raising the question of whether it functions as accommodation to or 
protest of the conditions of modemity. Also, I look at the unique history of 
aesthetieism in America and attempt to place Gather within this tradition.
In the next section of chapter three I outline the problem with Gather’s 
theory of art as pleasure. Gather’s antimodem stance contains within it the inherent 
contradiction modem aesthetieism cannot avoid: the radical individualism which 
undergirds American consumer culture and the opposition between “art” and “life” 
which Gather at once rejected and claimed must exist, and which her ascetic view 
of art attempts to contain. The chapter primarily uses “Paul’s Gase” to examine 
these issues as well as to examine Gather’s technique of impressionism.
Ghapter four is also in two sections, both of which deal with modemity as 
defined in previous ehapters but which also introduce Baudelaire’s reaction to 
modemity as prototype for Gather’s ultimate yet uneasy strategy for 
accommodation to it: the dandy. In this chapter I examine the issues of class, work,
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and modem education within American culture and how they impact Gather’s 
inflection of the dandy figure. “Paul’s Case” is the most noted of the stories from 
The Troll Garden, and was reprinted again in a later collection after Gather edited 
it. This story epitomizes each of the issues at stake in my previous three chapters, 
and offers the clearest picture of fin de siècle antimodem ambivalence and Gather’s 
continued responses to it. Walter Benjamin (another of Gather’s contemporaries) 
offers an analysis of the dandy or flâneur which helps account for Paul’s dandyism 
in its Americanized form: an expression of high capitalism and the modem 
individual under conditions quite different from Baudelaire’s or Wilde’s historical 
moments.
Part of chapter four examines the elision of religious duty with desires for 
conformity and success present at the turn of the century in republican moralist 
visions of individual autonomy, and the residual strains of the Victorian ethos of 
self- repression as over against the emergent bourgeois consumerism which 
informs Paul’s rebellion. This section is a close reading of “Paul’s Gase” in order to 
demonstrate Gather’s concems and how Gather highlights them in this particular 
text through her expression and critique of American consumer culture and her 
response to them through the figure of the dandy.
The second section of chapter four examines Paul as flâneur and dandy and 
uses Benjamin’s views on Baudelaire to help account for the differences within the 
later, American dandy figure of Gather and that of Baudelaire and other European, 
decadent figures such as Wilde, Gide, and others. It is in “Paul’s Gase” that Gather 
asserts most strongly the lost potential of art to reenchant everyday life; Gather’s
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story is about the confusion of art with icons of success and cultural capital, and the 
consumer with the aesthete. Her depiction of the contradictions modem capitalist 
culture imposes on the realm of art is brilliant, unshrinking, and even bratal. 
Gather’s attempt to mediate the demands of consumer, market-driven aesthetic 
culture with the very real lack of authenticity present in modem culture through the 
figure of the dandy is, while impossible and irresolvable, nevertheless prescient, 
incisive, and, ultimately, tragic. Gather’s earliest fiction presents the available 
altematives at the fin de siècle, but shows each to be overdetermined, full of 
“sweetness and anguish,” and finally, endlessly refractable; there are no genuinely 
viable altematives as market consumerism and finance capitalism strip art of 
subversive potential. Gather leaves the reader with the dilemma of American 
culture under capitalism — the cultural contradictions, the unfulfilled hopes, and 
the irresolvable tensions — and with her dialogic, antimodem aesthetic answer.
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Chapter One Antimodern Alternatives in the New Century: Art, Authenticity 
and “the nothingness o f system and discipline. ”
Part I. Introduction. Rhetorics ofmodemity and the question of “devotion.”
In 1905, Max Weber described “modemity” as the deepening of a 
fundamental conflict of values. In an essay entitled “The mle of man over man; 
politics, power and legitimation,” Peter Lassman claims that this notion of modemity 
is cmcial to understanding Weber, who felt it “the fate of modem man to live with a 
‘polytheism’ of conflicting values”(98). The cultural effects of a new form of 
advanced capitalism, and the ethos which informs it, including that known as “the 
Protestant ethic,” are concomitant with modemity in Weber’s analysis. The 
systematized rationalization of individual lives for “maximum productivity” and 
“personal achievement” as one necessary response to finance capitalism epitomizes 
modemity for Weber. This new form of capitalism, according to Weber, is 
characterized by the rational organization of enterprise through a new, thoroughgoing 
bureaucratization process which by the fin de siècle had tumed the pursuit of wealth 
into an end in itself. In fact, Weber claims, “the capitalistic system so needs this 
devotion to the calling of making money”— a calling which essentially derives from 
the antimaterialist notion of “vocation” formerly associated with religious belief— 
that “it no longer needs the support of any religious forces, and feels the attempts of 
religion to influence economic life, in so far as they can still be felt at all, to be as 
much an unjustified interference as its regulation by the State” (72).
Weber toured America in 1904 and came away convinced that America 
exemplified modemity both in its degree of efficiency in aggressively accumulating
30
wealth and in its success in internalizing rational standards for such efficiency in 
Americans’ personal lives. In his essay “The Spirit of Capitalism,” contained within 
The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Weber begins by quoting Benjamin 
Franklin’s aphorisms at some length and then noting Kumberger’s satire of Franklin 
in his Picture of American Culture. Franklin’s admonitions concerning the handling 
of money are, according to Kumberger, “the supposed confession of faith of the 
Yankee.” After this observation, Weber continues:
That this is the spirit of capitalism which here speaks in characteristic 
fashion, no one will doubt. . .  The peculiarity of this philosophy of 
avarice appears to be the ideal of the honest man of recognized credit, 
and above all the idea of a duty of the individual toward the increase of 
his capital, which is assumed as an end in itself. Truly what is here 
preached is not simply a means of making one’s way in the world, but 
a peculiar ethic. The infraction of its rules is treated not as foolishness 
but as forgetfulness of duty. It is not mere business astuteness . .  .it is 
an ethos. This is the quality which interests us. (51)
Reading Cather’s early work through Weber’s definition of modemity, 
particularly his observation that it is the “deepening” of conflicting values, and the ethos 
which accompanies it, is one way of accounting for contradictions within stories such as 
“The Garden Lodge.” In this story in particular. Gather overtly addresses the problem 
which Weber first described as the hallmark of modemity: rationalization, and its 
practical effects — “the systematic organization” of an individual’s life for “maximum 
personal achievement.” Cather’s story, much as Weber’s analysis does, also
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foregrounds the question of “devotion”— both her protest and aecommodation to 
modemity are figured through “devotion” to art, but also to success.
This section of this chapter contains a discussion of Weber’s analysis of 
American modem culture and the contradictions he noted within it as well as the 
relevant antimodemist reactions which Lears has described. In the second section of 
this chapter I then utilize each of these social analysts’ and historians’ ideas in order to 
read Gather’s Bakhtinian answer to modemity in “The Garden Lodge.” Cather’s story 
exhibits many of the same conflicting values and contradictory impulses that Weber 
described and answers those conflicts through what Lears has described as antimodem 
response. I outline Lears’ notion of antimodem response and Weber’s arguments in 
more detail before tuming to the story, in which Gather both positively and negatively 
depicts her character’s success, and in which she both asserts and denies the altemative 
possibility of a separate sphere of art. In doing so. Gather answers both the modem 
cultural need for authenticity and “real” experience which Lears describes as one 
bourgeois reaction to modemity, and the commitment she maintains to progressive 
values. The sense of “spiritual” lack and the subsequent need for “authentic” or 
reinvigorated experience within the rising bourgeois class which Lears describes is 
especially significant in interpreting Gather’s antimodem answer in her early fiction. 
Since “The Garden Lodge” is both an example of how Gather posits the challenges 
raised by modem rationalization and, simultaneously, one antimodem response to such 
challenges, it is critical to see how Weber’s notion of “devotion” relates to the modem 
process of rationalization, and to the sense of “unreality” which Lears identifies and 
which Gather eloquently confronts in her story.
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Weber claims that the internalization of notions of “vocation” and “devotion” 
and the self-repression required to fulfill the duties associated with bureaucratized labor 
are the result of shifting social structures which have become necessary in the face of 
an industrial and increasingly bureaucratized finance capitalism, itself derived from 
principles of scientific progress and positivistic science. Weber termed the personal 
internalization of “system” an “ascetic orientation,” but in the concluding section of 
The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism declares that “modem culture” will 
replace this ethos with the “purely mundane passions” associated with the pursuit of 
wealth; namely, hedonism, consumption, and greed (182). Cather’s early fiction is 
produced just at the time modem culture and its “mundane passions” collides with 
ascetic rationalism. Her early fiction is an attempt to answer this conflict of values, in 
the Bakhtinian sense outlined in the introduction to this project, by a process which 
vacillates between protest and accommodation to modem forms.
Weber remained fascinated by the dynamic of ascetic rationalism which he 
saw, particularly in America in 1904, as still informing notions and values of 
individualism and worldly accomplishment and noted the notion of “duty” or 
“calling,” originally associated with spiritual vocation, which still “prowls about in 
our lives like the ghost of dead religious beliefs” (182). But the “purely mundane” 
passions — to accumulate wealth, to succeed in the American dream —  do not fill the 
space of religious belief, however much they fuel the drive to succeed. Ascetic 
rationalism becomes less and less associated with self-denial in the service of a 
greater good, and more and more subject to “bureaucratized processes of 
rationalization”; that is, self-denial ultimately serves the ends of finance capitalism. It
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is important in order to follow Weber’s rather complex argument to understand that 
acetic rationalism was essentially a religious form in its earliest stages, but the 
religious or spiritual component has been overwhelmed by the forces of 
bureaucratized and finance capitalism and have therefore been coopted for another 
use.
One of the hallmarks of modemity in Weber’s thinking is what he terms 
“rationalization” — what Lawrence Scaff glosses in an essay on Weber as “the 
increasing dominance of abstract cognitive processes.” It is most important to 
understand that this process was seen as permeating all facets of everyday life. Scaff 
elaborates:
Rationalization can thus include pervasive features of modem life such 
as standardization, commodification, measurement in terms of 
efficiency, cost-benefit analysis, legalistic administrative procedures, 
and bureaucratic coordination and mle. The last of these features — 
the tendency toward “bureaucratization” in public affairs, which 
Weber tends to characterize as “inescapable” and an “objectification 
of mind” — therefore becomes an exceptionally obvious example of a 
more general deep-rooted cultural development. (104-05)
For labor to unwittingly conspire in the accumulation of capital and wealth, the 
ascetic impulse must be hamessed and manipulated. The notion of duty or calling 
serves this purpose. Weber writes that at the tum into the twentieth-century:
Man is dominated by the making of money, by acquisition as the 
ultimate purpose of his life. Economic acquisition is no longer
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subordinated to man as the means or the satisfaction of his material 
needs . . .  At the same time it expresses a type of feeling which is 
closely connected with certain religious ideas...  The earning of 
money within the modem economic order is, so long as it is done 
legally, the result and the expression of virtue and proficiency in a 
calling; and this virtue and proficiency are, as it is now not difficult to 
see, the real Alpha and Omega of Franklin’s ethic . . .  .(53-4)
This helps to explain the language which Weber uses to describe modem culture: 
religious allusions to “devotion,” to “preaching” and to “calling” have become part of 
capitalist rhetoric, ideology and practice.
The contradictions Weber identified, which mix the ascetic notion of duty 
with the aggressive pursuit of wealth, what Daniel Bell has called “the cultural 
contradictions of capitalism,” are manifest in Cather’s early stories, which often look 
to art and the artist as at least potential altematives to what Weber terms “the 
reduction of the world to a disenchanted object.” The “close connection” of this 
sense of duty or calling to “certain religious ideas” and feelings, figured in Weber as 
an “ultimate purpose in life,” connotes the lack of spiritual purpose elsewhere in 
modem life. T. J. Jackson Lears has identified the longing for a reinvigoration of 
experience as one antimodem reaction to the hyperrationalization of modem life, 
particularly in the bourgeois American culture which Weber described. The spiritual 
lack in the culture is at least partially the impetus for antimodem reactions. I discuss 
this aspect of Lears’ argument in more detail here, before tuming back to Weber’s
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argument, because it has a peculiarly important place in Cather’s early work, and in 
particular “The Garden Lodge.”
In order to more fully understand the sense of loss and uncertainty within 
bourgeois life at the end of the Victorian period, just as the second Industrial 
Revolution gains momentum and industrial capitalism begins to give way to high 
finance capitalism and the consolidation of wealth in the hands of a very few 
institutions, I rely here on a basic account of the growth of radical individualism as 
theorized by Lears. Though I return to this in more depth in chapter three, here it is 
enough to note how Lears traces the shift in American thought from its origins in 
republican moralism, dependent upon Whig historiography — itself suspicious of the 
progress and success that was seen to have brought down empires, and thus required 
“moral certainty and martial force” to resist corruption and irresponsibility (27) — to 
a more internalized superego, which takes hold in the place of a stem Calvinism on 
the decline (32). As the work ethic is legitimated both through and despite its 
Calvinist origins, as morality is shifted from external authority (which is under siege 
in the late Victorian period) to a more internalized and individuated conscience, the 
responsibility of an individual’s success or failure is shifted onto the autonomous self. 
This has the effect of making the individual paradoxically more vulnerable to doubts 
concerning his or her own efficacy in the world and in moral decisions, all the while 
demanding more from the individual in terms of “success” and self-determination.
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While the pervasive rhetoric* at the end of the nineteenth century still 
advanced the firm belief in the strength and autonomy of the individual — useful in 
arguments for “progress” and in justifying massive accumulations of wealth by 
individuals — by the height of the second Industrial Revolution, with the emergence 
of a national market economy dominated by bureaucratic corporations, according to 
Lears “the bourgeois ideal of the independent self seemed barely tenable” (32). In 
addition, new theories of evolutionary biology, Freudian psychology, and a decline in 
spiritual authority increase the burden on the individual, while at the same time 
creating more uncertainty. There are new factors (such as the theorization of the 
unconscious) being identified outside the individual’s control while, simultaneously, 
the individual is forced to accept more responsibility for the outcome of his own life, 
no longer able to rely on traditional structures of belief which accounted for class or 
station and are no longer available to hold the larger community responsible to the 
individual. As a result, the modem individual is confronted with contradiction and 
uncertainty. The notion of the independent self is asked to carry more individual 
responsibility, as is evident in the American myths of the “self-made man” and 
theories of scientific “progress.”
' See Lears, chapter one, for detailed discussion of this phenomenon. For instance, 
Lears claims: “Late-nineteenth-century enthusiasm for material progress is difficult 
to chart because it was omnipresent and often implicit in the emergent modem 
culture. It united businessmen, politicians, ministers, joumalists—all the stout 
thought-leaders of the urban bourgeoisie. Even many labor leaders, socialists, and 
dissident farmers accepted the progressive faith: they attacked the maldistribution of 
wealth, not the fundamental beneficence of economic growth; they accepted the 
conventional link between technological development and national greatness. 
Americans who despised the steel magnate Andrew Camegie would have echoed his 
claim in Triumphant Democracv (1886): ‘The old nations of the earth creep on at a 
snail’s pace; the Republic thunders past with the msh of the express.’”(8)
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Therefore, as Lears explains:
As new theories in sociology and psychology gave scientific sanction 
to the notion of an overcivilized, diminished human personality, the 
bourgeois vision of individual autonomy began to seem sharply 
circumscribed. And if autonomy was circumscribed, personal moral 
responsibility was undermined as well. Familiar ideas of character and 
will were shaken by the triumph of organized capitalism. (32)
This haunting anxiety that the power of the individual might indeed be illusory results 
in what Nietzsche had called “weightlessness,” “marked,” as Lears notes, “by hazy 
moral distinctions and vague spiritual commitments,” and, according to Lears, 
“gradually personal identity itself came to seem problematic.” He continues:
For many, individual identities began to seem fragmented, diffuse, 
perhaps even unreal. A weightless culture of material comfort and 
spiritual blandness was breeding weightless persons who longed for 
intense experience to give some definition, some distinct outline and 
substance to their vaporous lives. This sense of unreality has become 
part of the hidden agenda of modernization. Throughout the twentieth 
century, a recoil from the artificial, overcivilized qualities of modem 
existence has sparked a wide variety of quests for more intense 
experience, ranging from the fascist fascination with violence and 
death, to the cults of emotional spontaneity of avant garde artists to 
popular therapies stressing instinctual liberation. Antimodem
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impulses, too, were rooted in longings to recapture an elusive “real 
life” in a culture evaporating into unreality. (32)
Weber himself identified the tendency to idealize the sphere of art as a 
separate sphere safe from the intrusions of modemity and postulated an “aesthetic 
culture” as one reaction to modemity. Lears’ identification of a sense of “unreality” 
in modem life and his positing of antimodem reaction as attempted amelioration of 
that anxiety can be seen manifested in flights into an “aesthetic culture,” which 
Weber described as a culture of “feeling, emotion, authenticity, self-expression and 
interiority” (Scaff 105). Indeed, Lears delineates various forms of artistic cultural 
responses to hyperrationalization, including some fictional production. But, while 
Lears traces fin de siècle antimodem reaction through cultural forms such as 
architecture, militarism, therapeutic culture, and artistic forms, other than Henry 
Adams he does not read the contemporary writers.
Cather’s early stories, perhaps because they differ at least on the surface from 
her later writing, have not had much critical attention. It is precisely, I think, because 
their antimodemist quality is so strong but so difficult to interpret that critics have not 
quite known how to approach them. Both Lears and Weber help to make sense of the 
contradictory quality of the early stories, and it is this antimodem quality which 
makes the early stories so intriguing. What seems more “antimodemist” in Cather’s 
later work, and more obviously so (here I am thinking of her more traditional 
depiction of land, work, family, and community present in a short story like 
“Neighbour Rosicky”) is, while more subtle, first identifiable in her early work. The 
antimodem qualities in the cultural responses which Lears identifies can be found in
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any number of fiction writers at the tum of the century, but Cather’s earliest fiction 
seems to be a prime candidate for such exploration, particularly in light of the 
language she uses in some of the stories. In her critique for instance of “system and 
discipline” in “The Garden Lodge,” or her reference to characters in the story as 
“rather ascetic,” one begins to sense the ethos of the period to which she responds, 
and the concems at stake in Cather’s antimodem response, concems which Weber 
articulates in the language of what he called the “historical sciences.”
In his essay entitled “Weber on the cultural situation of the modem age,”
Scaff has identified what he calls Weber’s “Five theses about modemity.” Scaff 
claims:
It is to Weber’s credit that he realized that challenges to the “organic” 
cycle of life and its sense of “wholeness” can lead to a search for 
altematives, for counter-cultural routes of escape from the iron cage of 
modem forms. Such challenges, acutely perceived by Tolstoy and 
Dostoevsky, tend to result especially in the tum to what we can call 
“aesthetic modemity.” At one level Weber set out to understand the 
conditions generating this kind of search. At another he wanted to 
trace the paths followed by social groups and individuals in their 
confrontations with the mechanization of life. (103)
Gather, in the early stories, often seems to posit an “aesthetic modemity” as a 
“protected sphere,” separate from modem processes of rationalization and 
objectification. Present in Weber’s analysis, in Cather’s fiction one also finds 
tensions between what Scaff identifies as “the morality of self-control and the
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morality of self-gratification, between aesthetic culture and social modemity, between 
pessimism about cultural development and affirmation of modem culture and its 
‘goods,’” oppositional forces which Weber himself identified as continually and 
dynamically shaping modem experience (102). Lears claims, as I discuss in my 
Introduction to this project, that just such contradictory feelings are the impetus of 
antimodem responses. I argue here that Cather’s art is her attempt at an uneasy 
resolution o f— an “answer” to — exactly these contradictions and tensions. Cather’s 
antimodem literary response is her “answerability” to the social, historical and 
technological challenges of modemity, her “confrontation” with the “mechanization 
of life” and rationalization which Weber first identified in 1905, the year The Troll 
Garden was published.
Cather, like Weher, depicts rationalization as “inescapable.” For instance, in 
“The Garden Lodge” Cather posits Caroline Noble’s bourgeois success and self­
repression against the possibility for authentic experience suggested by the actual 
presence of the artist (Raymond d’Esquerré) in the garden lodge; but she makes it 
clear that the hegemony of such rationalization of individual life remains undeniable 
— the story ends with Caroline’s continued and deliberate self-repression. While 
Cather objects to the “system and discipline” to which Caroline subjects herself and 
clearly figures the emptiness accompanying it, she retains an ambivalence towards 
“success” and “progress” that subverts her protest of this aspect of modemity. This 
same ambivalence can be read in other of her early stories, and perhaps especially in 
“Paul’s Case” (which I examine in detail in chapter four). Scaff explains that the
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inescapable hegemony of repression and rationalization is a quality of Weber’s 
“pessimistic” analysis as well:
The peculiar feature of modemity is that it does not tend toward a new 
unity. Modemity has two sides: material progress, but also the 
manipulation of subjectivity and individual choices, which subverts 
the achievements and spiritual basis of modemity itself. In Weber’s 
usage, “modemity” contains the idea of “progress” through production 
and accumulation of wealth and the mastery of nature (that is, “social 
modemity”), as well as the idea of emancipating the rational subject. 
The nature of specifically modem culture is to subvert not only the 
traditional or pre-modem, but also those accomplishments that come to 
characterize “modem culture” itself. The difficulty, however, is that 
one aspect of modemity eventually comes into conflict with the other: 
the conditions for subjective freedom mn up against the conditions for 
objective control, such that “modemity” as a general socio-cultural 
phenomenon comes to be divided against itself. (103-04)
It is such a division or inherent contradiction that Cather attempts to mediate in many 
of her early stories, and, as my reading of “The Garden Lodge” will show, the 
divisions are often contained within one character, in addition to being distributed 
among characters. Cather’s lens is a refractive one, which, like modemity itself, 
resists a “new unity” of commitment to either pure subjective freedom or objective 
control through ascetic rationalism.
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Cather’s stories are part of the antimodem reaction at the tum into the 
twentieth-century, and, in “The Garden Lodge,” specifically to what Lears has 
identified as a sense of loss of authenticity among the bourgeoisie; but at least three 
of Cather’s early stories, “The Garden Lodge,” “Flavia and her Artists,” and “Paul’s 
Case,” while addressing that sense of loss, also address the lower middle classes 
which are in some cases beginning to benefit from “progressive” ideology. Some of 
Cather’s early characters, like Caroline in “The Garden Lodge,” are moving into a 
higher socio-economic class, are, in fact, becoming the nouveau-riche. Cather in fact 
depicts “success” in “The Garden Lodge” as Caroline’s embourgeoisement, her self- 
determined movement from lower-middle-class immigrant to first generation 
nouveau-riche. In each of the stories I examine in this project the tensions between 
class status and aesthetic experience or artistic expression are exhibited but find 
different modes of expression.
While critiquing bourgeois values associated with American culture and the 
cultural elite, thus protesting modemity in specific ways, Cather also betrays an odd 
ambivalence towards the role of the antibourgeois artist, and even toward that figure 
of self-seeking, radical individualism, the modem consumer. Cather’s often ironic 
depiction of the longing for authentic experience common among the emerging 
bourgeoisie in America at the tum of the century, and her surprisingly ambivalent 
stance towards the artist in an increasingly commodified culture, are usefully 
illuminated by Weber and by Thorstein Veblen, and their respective explications and 
critiques of early twentieth-century art and consumer culture. I tum to Veblen’s and 
Weber’s thoughts on class and consumption in more depth in chapter two.
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However, here I first examine Lears’ more recent account of antimodem 
impulses in the fin de siècle culture as an extraordinarily useful lens through which to 
view Gather’s conservatism but also the radical protest which accompanies it.
Gather’s resistance to modernity can be accounted for partially through Lears’ notion 
of antimodemism and the responses he traces. Gather’s specific response is best read 
in the context of other antimodem strategies available at the tum of the century, many 
of which, as Lears argues, also fimction as both protest and accommodation to the 
forces of modem “progress.” Antimodem responses often tum to the past for 
inspirational altematives to modemity, but in doing so also unwittingly reinforce the 
very progressive and Enlightenment values which inform modemization.
Lears’ reading of this moment in American culture — still informed by 
Victorian notions of self-determination and propriety but increasingly mixed with 
doubts conceming “progress” — rests on historical scholarship which underscores the 
ambivalence present in many different venues at this particular moment of American 
culture. For Lears, antimodem response represents an attempted flight from 
modemity while at the same time championing — or at least unwittingly reinforcing 
— beliefs in progress and individualism which are inherent in the American work 
ethic. These same beliefs are arguably implicit in an ideology of manifest destiny and 
national identity.^
 ^See Walter Benn Michaels for a discussion of the later Gather’s “nativism,” which 
he associates with William Garlos Williams’ notion of modemism articulated in 
1929. Michaels reads Gather’s Death Gomes for the Archbishop and argues that 
Gather’s modemism resembles Williams’s in that “Williams’s modemism is 
inextricably connected not exactly to American nationalism but, more precisely, to 
American nativism, the conversion of national identity to racial identity” which takes
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In order to understand how Gather’s own antimodem aesthetic answers the 
ambivalent cultural moment, it is useful to first look at Lears’ description of the “the 
antimodem impulse,” which:
stemmed from revulsion against the process of rationalization first 
described by Max Weber — the systematic organization of economic 
life for maximum productivity and of individual life for maximum 
personal achievement; the drive for efficient control of nature under 
the banner of improving human welfare; the reduction of the world to 
a disenchanted object to be manipulated by rational technique. (7) 
Antimodemism is foremost a revolt against the effects derived from scientific 
positivism (some of which are listed above), against the banality of an eviscerated 
Protestantism, and a protest against what Gather terms, in “Paul’s Gase,” “the 
homilies by which the world is mn” (189), the “progressive rhetoric” of the period 
which promises individual achievement and autonomy, but which is also suspicious 
of “excess” and hedonism. The early stories, as a result of Gather’s own ambivalence 
toward the notion of progress, often exhibit something pervasive in all her work, 
including the later novels: an ambivalence toward radical individualism — which is 
where I locate the basis of what I call her sensational aesthetic (examined in chapter 
three), but which is also at the basis of much of her irony. Gather has often been
on the task of fostering “among the native-bom a proper appreciation of their own 
Americanness” after “giving up the impossible task of tuming aliens into 
Americans” (39). “American Modemism and the Poetics of Identity.” 
Modemism/Modemitv 1.1 (1994): 38-56. In this light, I think Gather’s earliest 
collection of stories may be read as her attempt to define more precisely what it 
means to be “American.”
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lauded for her faith in American bourgeois individualism: for instance, in a 1942 
Sewanee Review article George White called her “Emersonian” because she had 
“described in permanent brilliance the importance of the affirmative, intelligent 
individual”; Alfred Kazin termed Gather a “spiritual aristocrat with democratic 
marmers,” whose characters were safe from the ravages of the industrial world.^ 
However, she has also been vilified for her “escapism” into art (most notably in the 
famous Granville Hicks essay of the 1930s) and her “abandonment of the middle 
class” (as Newton Arvin of the New Republic put it in 1932)/ These contradictory 
assertions in her critical reception reflect the ambivalence actualized in Gather’s 
work.
In 1905, in “The Garden Lodge” for instance. Gather connects individualism 
with the ascendant leisure class through the figure of Weber’s “ascetic rationalism,” 
the self-made, self-repressed individual who nonetheless exhibits what Lears terms 
“vague longings” for authentic and intense experience. For Gather, authentic 
experience is identical with artistic experience. Gather’s positive depiction of her 
character’s “success” is real, but in typical anti-modem fashion. Gather also details 
the lack of authentic experience through Garoline’s longing for “real life” as she 
realizes that “success” is not enough. In other stories. Gather will depict success 
differently, but she is never as obvious in her ambivalence towards success and the 
notion of “devotion” as she is in “The Garden Lodge.”
 ^George White, “Willa Gather.” Sewanee Review 40 (1942): 18-25. Alfred Kazin, 
On Native Grounds. New York: Harcourt, Brace. 1942. 247-57.
'‘Granville Hicks, “Gase Against Willa Gather.” English Journal 22 (1933): 703-10.
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Gather’s depiction of bourgeois longing and success is more than modernist 
irony, though that is present, and it is also more than a vague emotional ambivalence; 
most importantly, the stories I examine here answer to two very different strands of 
strong belief and commitment. Gather, like the antimodemists whom Lears describes, 
is tom between the strong American commitment to the ideal of unlimited individual 
potential, figured by both Weber and Gather as “devotion” — an outgrowth of the 
“work ethic” — and the fears of what individualistic success might mean for the 
republic. Therefore, while maintaining progressive hopes. Gather is also committed 
to the necessity to protest the excess of modem consumer culture which threatens the 
protected space of aesthetic culture. Both commitments are, however, based upon a 
basic adherence to the notion of radical individualism.
It is the underlying commitment to radical individualism which, in America, is 
elided with the work ethic and “devotion” to the calling Weber described, which 
accounts for why Gather, in “The Garden Lodge,” figures artistic antibourgeois culture 
as negative. That is to say, the possibility for an artist devoted to art outside the 
American work ethic is a doomed one, and thus any potential art has for subverting 
modem culture is itself subverted by the necessity of the work ethic. The fundamental 
conflict between art and success is figured in Gather’s fiction, and especially in “The 
Garden Lodge,” as a premodem ethos against the modem. The only figure of possible 
subversion of bourgeois modernity — in “The Garden Lodge” this is Garoline Noble’s 
father, a first generation immigrant composer — is presented as holding premodem 
values outside the work ethic, and as European, not American, in origin. But he is also
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figured as a failure, spending his days in “pitiful devotion to the labour that brought 
him only disappointment” while “neglecting his duties” (31).
The figure of the celebrity, the “successful” artist, on the other hand, is 
suggested as a form of mediation between modem consumer culture and aesthetic 
culture, and Gather’s attempt to mediate these forces results in what Lears terms an 
“accommodation” to modemity. Though figured as a separate sphere, the place of art 
and the artist in modem consumer culture has already been intmded upon by Gather’s 
basic commitment to radical individualism and the American work ethic. The 
celebrity’s very success means that the separate sphere has been breached by consumer 
culture and that art has lost any meaningful potential for subversion of such culture.
And the “failure” and questionable work ethic of the antibourgeois artist in American 
culture betrays Gather’s commitment to progressive values which themselves work to 
subvert her protest to modemity and consumer culture. The story raises the question of 
the place of art and the artist in modem consumer culture, and the place and function of 
the imagination which informs art and authentic experience. The question of devotion 
therefore becomes one she must continually work to answer.
While Gather never seems willing to relinquish the potential of the individual, 
the modem effects of individualism are problematic, and this is manifest in her 
ambivalence towards the self-made figures of the celebrity artist and the American 
aesthete (a particularly ambiguous, dandy figure). While suggesting an accommodation 
to modemity through the celebrity. Gather’s fiction nevertheless suggests a further 
ambivalence towards even this figure. For instance, in “The Garden Lodge,” 
d’Esquerre, the celebrity, is actually unavailable — except in Garoline’s imagination
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and memory —  by the time the story takes place. He, like Caroline’s father, is 
European and his name is actually a fictional one, since no such name exists in French 
the suggestion is that it is a pseudonym. In separating the celebrity from American 
culture, with the exception of his ability to bring in profits for the Metropolitan opera 
company. Gather betrays her ambivalence towards this figure while still presenting him 
as a (potential) mediation between modemity and art. In other of her early stories. 
Gather presents the celebrity figure as harassed by the public (“Scandal”), exploited by 
her family (“The Diamond Mine”), or in danger of compromising her reputation, but 
her view towards the celebrity artist is always a problematic one, suggesting Gather’s 
own ambivalence towards the marriage of success with art, the ascetic with the 
aesthetic realms of modem culture.
Additionally, Gather’s anxiety towards the rising class which Thorstein 
Veblen named “the leisure class,” and the individualism which undergirds this class 
may be found in nearly every one of her earliest stories, at least in part in her need to 
create a separate space — or the illusion of a separate space — for the artist. The 
complex portrayal of the figure of the artist, particularly the celebrity artist, and the 
pecuniary relationships figured between the leisure class and the celebrity artist 
underscore Gather’s concems regarding the consumer culture which is evolving and 
threatening the realm of art. The celebrity also however represents the successful 
execution of the American work ethic and Gather’s continued belief in progressive 
individualistic achievement, functioning as a kind of Weberian “ideal type” in 
bourgeois imagination. In “The Garden Lodge” the celebrity artist, represented by 
d ’Esquerre the opera singer, and the anxiety-ridden, self-made, bourgeois,
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represented by the main character, Caroline, share one thing in common: their 
commitment to the work ethic. However, the celebrity artist in this story 
simultaneously represents an ideal which is suggested and elided with the visionary, 
artistic realm outside rationalized existence; but, in this story, this ideal is available 
only through the imagination to the bourgeois imagination.
In many of Gather’s other early stories the celebrity is all too available to the 
vagaries of modem consumer culture. In “The Garden Lodge” the celebrity artist 
figure, while suggesting the possibility of the marriage between the self-made 
individual and the realm of imagination, points to a recurring theme to which Gather 
will return many times, but he is not actually physically present or available in reality.
In “The Garden Lodge,” while suggesting the celebrity artist as a potential 
antimodem answer, yet confining him to either the garden lodge or to Europe, and 
thus to Garoline’s imagination, Gather is primarily interested in defining the 
limitations of “success” and representing the sense of loss incumbent on the modem 
individual who relies on progressive rhetoric for meaning. Another way of saying 
this is that in “The Garden Lodge,” Gather poses the question to which the celebrity 
artist in this story, as well as in her other stories, may be an answer. The ideal type of 
artist mixed with “devotion” is, for the bourgeois consumer, a nicely packaged 
antimodem accommodation to modemity. But, in “The Garden Lodge,” Gather keeps 
him available only to the imagination.
However, Gather strongly and unambiguously represents the self-repressive 
aspect of industrial modemity — suggested by Weber in his “rationalization thesis” of 
individual life. She does this through many of her early characters, and most particularly
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in the figure of Caroline. Unlike the question of the celebrity and the separate sphere, 
Gather is quite clear about her stance toward modernity’s “systematic organization” of 
individual life “for maximum personal achievement” in and through her bourgeois, self- 
made character. The type of rationalization of individual life which Caroline represents 
is, as Lears argues, wholly dependent on the discipline of the will. Gather is not only 
clear about the potential for individualistic success but is clear about the results as well. 
Gather uses the figure of the self-made individual to show the resultant social and 
personal tensions arising from this “ascetic” discipline — the repression of instinct, 
passion and imagination through an exercise of the will — in order to achieve “success.” 
Since success in this story is quite simply depicted as the achievement of Garoline’s 
embourgeoisement, then besides positing art as a complex and potentially subversive 
alternative response to modem eulture (and the ethic of individualism which informs it), 
Gather implicitly confronts issues of class which arise from the American obsession with 
individualism. And Gather clearly points to the negative repercussions of such an 
obsession.
The figure of the artist, while maintaining a subversive and alternative potential to 
the American ethic of success, is not however a simple figure of protest to modemity, in 
either Gather’s other stories or in “The Garden Lodge.” While this figure suggests the 
ideal marriage of aesthetic culture with ascetic culture — the artist with the self-made 
man — the celebrity also highlights the market forces involved in the very production of 
the celebrity artist. His success, while a result of the work ethic and ascetic rationalism, 
also depends upon forces of modemity of which Gather is critical: specifically, modemity 
in the form of consumer culture. In fact, it is the complexity of Gather’s representations
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of this celebrity figure and his or her relation to consumer culture in her earliest stories 
which calls attention to her antimodem ambivalence. The multiple and faceted view of 
the celebrity artist in a variety of her early stories reveals the complexity of the 
antimodem situation of art and the artist under modemity.
Clearly, Gather’s depiction of the artist as celebritv raises many questions 
which are not easily resolved but point to at least two different strains of commitment 
in Gather’s aesthetic which I first mentioned above: the first, her commitment to 
residual strains of what Lears’ terms “republican moralist beliefs” — fears for the 
republic —contained within the rhetoric of “progress” and accompanying notions 
conceming duty, control of the will, and self-denial which are the basis of the work 
ethic and individualistic success. These are the notions whieh also inform Weber’s 
notion of the American “Protestant ethic,” and the contradictions within this rhetoric 
are those which Lears points to as the basis of antimodem response. The second is 
Gather’s commitment to an altemative artistic sphere such as the one Weber 
postulated: his “aesthetic culture,” outside this rationalistic ethic of self-control and 
ascetic rationalism. In this sphere, located outside consumer culture and market 
forces, the potential for idealism, imagination, and self-expression rather than self- 
denial retains a subversive potential.
Both positions, contradictory though they are, imply a broader but problematic 
shared commitment to the modem notion of the autonomous self and the American 
ethic of individualism, both of which are products of and forces which perpetuate and 
accelerate modemity. Each of Gather’s antimodem commitments, while potentially 
contributing to the advancement of modemity (especially as it manifests as
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consumerist culture), also contains within it seeds of protest against American 
modemity, against the “ghost” that prowls insistent on material gain and the quest for 
wealth and self-aggrandizement through it.
As Weber noted in the concluding section of The Protestant Ethic and the 
Spirit of Capitalism, “the modem capitalist economy now rests on mechanical rather 
than moral or ‘spiritual’ foundations” (181-82). Weber theorized that the new 
“aesthetic culture” was in the ascendant, and that this culture of feeling, emotion, 
authenticity, self-expression and interiority described above was one response to the 
“mechanical” foundations of rationalized culture. Clearly, the bourgeoisie most 
strongly pursue this aesthetic culture, even though effects of it (such as what Lears 
terms “therapeutic culture”) may manifest in all classes, and eventually come to 
inform the ideology of even the lower working classes. While Weber acknowledges 
that the bourgeoisie preceded the advent of the new form of capitalism, in America 
one result of the rationalization supporting such capitalism is an “expectation of profit 
by the utilization of opportunities for exchange” and of “forever renewed profit, by 
means of continuous, rational, capitalistic enterprise” (17). The rationalization of 
labor which Weber postulates as the precondition for such profit creates new classes 
of managers, accountants, and bureaucrats who, in many cases, become nouveau- 
riche. It is this class which feels most intensely the lack of spiritual grounding and 
the emptiness of the “purely mundane” beneath the quest for wealth. Even those who 
are not so fortunate as to rise to this class at least obtain a level of material comfort 
and security unknown to their forebears. Only those who were in a condition of 
relative leisure and material comfort were afflicted with the anxiety Lears describes
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as part of their reaction to the “overcivilized” and “unreal” modem world. In 
Gather’s “The Garden Lodge,” it is only after the main character achieves her own 
embourgeoisement, which Gather defines as “success,” that her self-doubt, emptiness 
and sense of unreality rise to consciousness. Gather will have her character tum to 
the sphere of art to achieve release from this sense of unreality and anxiety, and it is 
in this search for authenticity that I locate Gather’s protest to rationalization.
Weber also theorized that “modemity is characterized above all by the 
increasing dominance of a specific kind of rationalism which must be understood in 
terms of means-ends categories,” an increasing “dominance of abstract cognitive 
processes,” an “objectification of mind” which is responsible for the “disenchantment 
of the world” and the loss of a “sacred sense of wholeness.” By 1905, in Weber’s 
analysis, art no longer functions in a protected sphere from this rationalistic, 
instrumental modemity (Scaff 104-05). Aesthetic culture however represents an 
attempt to reenchant modem life. The figure of the celebrity artist, representative of 
aesthetic culture, represents the intrasion of modemity into this projected sphere of 
art. Through the proscription by advertising and through his definition by consumer 
culture, the celebrity artist cannot remain outside modemity, and his art cannot 
redeem him from the vagaries of rationalized, bureaucratized and mechanical 
existence. Therefore, Gather’s celebrity artist, while suggesting an altemative sphere 
outside rationalized existence and the potential for art to provide authentic 
experience, is already colored by modem accommodation since the celebrity depends 
upon consumer culture for his very existence. The celebrity artist becomes then an 
ambiguous figure of both accommodation to modemity and a protest against elements
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of it. The figure of the celebrity is one to which Gather returns again and again in 
order to make peace with the loss of an autonomous artistic sphere and with the 
pressures of modemity, most especially the Weberian process of rationalization of 
individual life.^ But Gather’s attempt at protest to commodity culture is undercut 
before she even begins by her fundamental commitment to individualist, progressive 
values which define her as a radically conservative antimoderaist.
Therefore, an examination of Gather’s antimodemism must begin with her 
careful depiction of modem individualism and success through the processes of 
personal rationalization and the American work ethic. I am interested first in 
identifying how Gather’s ambivalence informs her antimodem answer to the 
questions modemity poses within itself. Her character’s subsequent sense of the 
“unreality” of her personal existence calls attention to the tensions within the culture, 
to the same contradictions Weber described as tensions between the “morality of self- 
control” and the “morality of self-gratification,” as well as between “aesthetic 
culture” and “social modemity.” Scaff s identification of these recurrent themes in 
his reading of Weber’s ideas augments the tensions within antimodem culture which 
Lears has described. Gather, in clearly representing the bourgeois longing for 
authentic and intense experience, calls attention to her ambivalence regarding 
rationalistic success. The need for authenticity, which Gather locates in an idealized 
sphere of art and imagination, refracts the tension within the culture. In the next
 ^In 1952 Howard Mumford Jones, in The Bright Medusa, claims that one of 
Gather’s themes is the “necessary accommodation” of the artist in a world committed 
to things other than the pursuit of beauty. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press,
1952). Jones had also refuted the “escapist” label in 1938 in an essay “The Novels of 
Willa Gather,” Saturdav Review of Literature, 18 (August 6, 1938): 3-4, 16.
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section I examine some of the strategies which inform Gather’s complex, antimodem 
response in “The Garden Lodge.”
Part II. The dialectic of aesthetic modemity: “vague longing” and the price of “cold 
calculation” in “The Garden Lodge.”
Gather’s story “The Garden Lodge” suggests a separate space for artistic 
vision and elides that space with the possibility of authentic experience by removing 
it from the everyday bourgeois experience of Garoline Noble. Garoline has spent 
many aftemoons in the garden lodge before the story begins, accompanying the 
visiting celebrity artist on the piano, as a kind of respite from her duties as wife and 
society matron. Garoline’s husband, a power in Wall Street, would like to tear the 
lodge down to replace it with a more public place for entertaining. The lodge, at the 
center of the garden, is a sequestered place which Gather identifies with Garoline’s 
psyche: “Her garden, indeed, had become quite a part of her; a sort of beautiful 
adjunct, like gowns or jewels” (34). The story begins after the artist has left, and 
Gather depicts the turbulence within Garoline’s psyche as she spends the night in the 
garden lodge confronting her repressed passion for d’Esquerre. The “plot” of the 
story is quite straightforward and centers around one night in the lodge after Gather 
gives the background of d’Esquerré’s visit: a short account of the time they spent 
together with Garoline accompanying him on the piano in the aftemoons in the lodge, 
Garoline’s upbringing in a poor family devoted to her father’s art, her self-determined 
rise to success, and her state of mind after the artist leaves. On the surface it would 
seem that Garoline’s principle dilemma is whether or not to acquiesce to her
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husband’s wishes to tear down the lodge, but the story is about what the lodge 
represents. To be more precise, the story is really about what Caroline’s decision 
concerning the lodge represents.
After her anguished night alone in the lodge, Caroline’s mind is made up: 
Cather writes that she will continue to hold to “the middle course” by not allowing 
her passion or sentiment to overtake her reasoned self-denial. “If she was apt to 
regard with distrust everything which inclined toward extravagance, it was not 
because she was unacquainted with other standards”— Caroline had grown up in 
poverty and had determinedly committed herself to success and the ascetic 
rationalism required for it. Having learned self-denial and self-repression as a result 
of her upbringing, she has used those same strategies to acquire the things she lacked 
as a child. By eschewing “sentimentality” she had enabled herself to sacrifice for her 
later success. And therefore, even now, she goes along with her husband’s plan to 
replace the lodge, the one thing she has ever allowed herself (privately) to be 
“sentimental” about, with a more public space for entertaining.
Caroline’s state of mind is figured through Cather’s description of nature 
throughout the story. The “presaging storm” out over the Sound, just as Caroline 
enters the lodge at night, mirrors Caroline’s state of mind which is restless and about 
to break from its quiet bourgeois complacency. On this night, two weeks after 
d’Esquerré’s departure, Caroline cannot sleep. “The night was close and warm, 
presaging storm. The wind had fallen and the water slept, fixed and motionless as the 
sand. She rose and thrust her feet into slippers and putting a dressing-gown over her 
shoulders opened the door of her husband’s room; he was sleeping soundly” (35).
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The subtly eroticized language of the passage suggests that perhaps Caroline’s 
husband has denied her his sexual attention, and so Caroline left his room and stepped 
outside, moving towards the lodge in the garden as an altemative to returning to her 
own bed. “The scent of the June roses was heavy in the still a i r . . .  Heat-lightening 
flashed continuously from the bank of clouds that had gathered over the sea . . .  
Caroline had the key of the lodge, and the door creaked as she opened it.” The 
sensual moment is “heavy” with scent, with expectancy, with the “closeness” of the 
“storm” to come. Inside, she sees the room, “radiant with the moonlight which 
streamed through the bow window.” Even the “tall candlesticks, the picture frames 
and white casts [stood] out as clearly in the half-light as did the sycamores and black 
poplars of the garden against the still, expectant night sky” (35). The familiar space 
takes on an unfamiliarity at night, and the familiar objects become visible and 
identifiable only when illumined by a different light. Her physical movement into the 
lodge suggests her movement into another “expectant” psychic space. Cather further 
suggests that the still, dark space is “feminine” (lit only by moonlight), perhaps even 
passive in its expectancy. This is a realm with which Caroline is unfamiliar, having 
been self-fashioned, deliberately self-made and even, according to her friends, 
“calculating” and “hard” in her success, “paramountly cool-headed, slow of impulse, 
and disgustingly practical, ” always having herself “so provokingly well in hand” 
(30). Her unconscious, psychic realm so far has been successfully repressed and 
unexplored. Her very movement from the safe, bourgeois familiar space of the house 
out into the lodge during the night is suggestive of a daring and improprietous move 
(Caroline is terrified lest she wake the servants in the morning); as she opens the door
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to the lodge Caroline also opens the door to the unknown, her own repressed psychic 
space. The repression of the unconscious, of that which the will can only hope to 
dominate, is important given that Caroline prides herself on her ability to repress parts 
of herself in order to live a “well-ordered life.” And in order to see now, in this 
space, Caroline has to adjust her vision.
Caroline, always envied and resented by her friends for her good fortune and 
her ability to “cold-bloodedly set about complying with the demands of life and 
making her position comfortable and masterful,” has not, up to now, allowed herself 
any of the “sentimentality” that she has towards the lodge. She is rather baffled by 
this, though her husband finds it amusing. Feeling, “sentimentality,” is either 
“allowed” or is not, but is subject to the power of the individual will. Strong emotion 
and passion here are contrasted with the rational self which functions consciously in 
the light of day. Cather writes:
Women who did not get through life so well as Caroline, who could 
not make such good terms either with fortune or their husbands, who 
did not find their health so unfailingly good, or hold their looks so 
well, or manage their children so easily, or give such distinction to all 
they did, were fond of stamping Caroline as a materialist and called 
her hard. (31)
Cather also says that “The impression of cold calculation . . .  was far from a false 
one,” that Caroline had “made herself what she was” and the most sentiment she had 
ever allowed herself was to keep the garden lodge, surrounded by the garden in 
“impassioned bloom,” from being tom down after the singer had left. Cather's tone
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in this passage suggests an ironic and typically modem position towards those who 
have called Caroline “hard” and a “materialist” for making herself comfortable, 
suggesting that she has every right to have done so, and that she is to be commended 
for her strength of character and will. However, Cather will quickly complicate this 
impression. Caroline’s “cold calculation” will soon give her trouble, as she comes 
face to face with the “impassioned bloom” which she experiences despite her will to 
repress it. This wrenching experience of repressed but undeniable desire is the price 
she has had to pay for her success in such a “rationalized” existence.
Alone in the lodge at night where she spent time in the artistic sphere (in 
hours of practice with d’Esquerre), yet no longer on guard against any impropriety, 
Caroline is confronted with “a maze of memories”:
where there was neither path, nor clue, nor any hope of finality. She 
had, she realized, defeated a lifelong regimen; completely confounded 
herself by falling unaware and incontinently into that luxury of revery 
which, even as a little girl, she had so determinedly denied herself; she 
had been developing with alarming celerity that part of one which sets 
up an idol and that part of one which bows down and worships it. (35) 
Her self-repression is here elided with the clarity and “finality” of the “lifelong 
regimen” of the American work ethic, the pursuit of “success” which Caroline’s 
marriage to her Wall Street husband marks, and is contrasted with the “maze” of 
idealistic and vague longings. The notion of the will having been “defeated,” of 
Caroline having “fallen unaware,” suggests the assertion of the unconscious, of a
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force outside rational control that is powerful and dangerous in its subversive 
potential.
Cather will explain how Caroline arrived at her decision to follow such a clear 
and rational “path,” and in doing so will oppose it to the altemative path of the 
bohemian artist who has access to the unconscious, the irrational, the imagination, 
and further, freedom from the American work ethic. While Caroline’s passion is 
aroused through d’Esquerre, it is not simply for him, or even the idea of him, but for 
the things she feels her father and mother threw their lives away to pursue, ideas 
which she would like to associate with his success as an artist and which she has so 
far successfully repressed and consciously rejected. Caroline’s longing is however 
not mere sentimentality or nostalgia for an idealized past; Caroline remains singularly 
unsentimental regarding her childhood. What Caroline senses is the genuine loss of 
authentic, intense experience itself, identified for her with a passionate devotion to art 
and ideas and the realm of the imagination. Cather describes Caroline’s childhood 
home life:
The house had served its time at the shrine of idealism; vague, 
distressing, unsatisfied yearnings had brought it low enough. Her 
mother, thirty years before, had eloped and left Germany with her 
music teacher, to give herself over to life-long, drudging bondage at 
the kitchen range. Ever since Caroline could remember, the law in the 
house had been a sort of mystic worship of things distant, intangible 
and unattainable. The family had lived in successive ebullitions of 
generous enthusiasm, in talk of masters and masterpieces, only to
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come down to the cold facts in the case; to boiled mutton and to the 
neeessity of tuming the dining-room carpet. All these emotional 
pyrotechnics had ended in petty jealousies, in neglected duties and in 
cowardly fear of the little grocer on the comer. (32)
Caroline’s childhood, despite her own predilections, was in fact lived in devotion to 
an altemative set of values which were in direct opposition to the American work 
ethic and its commitment to success. Gather’s tone in this passage seems to suggest 
contempt for this altemative, antibourgeois life devoted to art and ideas; however, 
Caroline’s disenchantment with her bourgeois success points as well to Gather’s 
critique of modem notions of success. Gather’s depiction of Garoline’s very real lack 
of authentic and meaningful experience, an authenticity which Garoline’s parents had 
and which Garoline eventually admits, is itself a “ghost” that haunts the story, the 
“shadows of reality” with which Garoline must eventually contend.
Gather locates antimodem ambivalence towards the ethic of progress and 
individualistic success in Garoline’s experience in the lodge: her self-doubt, her sense 
of loss, her vague longing which is a mirror image of that which pervaded her 
childhood. Instead of the longing for conformity and for material comfort, Garoline 
now experiences the loss of idealism she previously rejected in her childhood. In her 
twenties, Garoline resolved to take her life in hand, and in order to do this felt she 
must reject idealism, enthusiasm, passion, or any “vague, distressing” illusions and 
must instead tum her attentions to the “cold facts” deliberately; therefore she 
committed herself quite consciously to the rational, systematic organization of her 
own life in the face of her parents’ idealism:
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From her childhood she had hated it, that humiliating and uncertain 
existence, with its glib tongue and empty pockets, its poetic ideals and 
sordid realities, its indolence and poverty tricked out in paper roses. 
Even as a little girl, when vague dreams beset her, when she wanted to 
lie late in bed and commune with visions, or to leap and sing because 
the sooty little trees along the street were putting out their first pale 
leaves in the sunshine, she would clench her hands and go to help her 
mother sponge the spots from her father’s waistcoat. . .  (33)
Cather tells us that it is “with the strength of her will” that Caroline “gave herself a 
chance,” never letting herself “look further than a step ahead,” taking on the 
management of the household after her indigent brother’s suicide and her mother’s 
subsequent death. She herself then took on piano students, and doggedly got musical 
engagements to make money, and finally, at twenty-four, she married Howard Noble, 
a widower of forty and a “power in Wall Street.” “Then she relaxed a little, feeling 
that there was a barrier to be counted upon between her and that world of visions and 
quagmires and failure” (34).
Hoping to divest herself of uncertainty and threatening artistic, idealistic, 
“vague” longings, and identifying “the world of visions” with “quagmires and failure,” 
Caroline literally weds herself to practical Wall Street dreams of success. But at this 
point, the artist as celebrity intervenes and breaches the safe “barrier” of her successful 
embourgeoisement. Cather suggests that the lodge, before d’Esquerré’s arrival, had 
been a place of bourgeois dalliance with art as entertainment, but that the lodge had 
never been the staging site for any real devotion to art. Her friends’ perspective seems
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to indicate that Caroline does not really appreciate the artist: “Of course it would be 
she, always mistress of herself in any situation, she who would never be lifted one inch 
from the ground by it, and who would go on superintending her gardeners and 
workmen as usual, it would be she who got him” (30). Caroline’s society friends are 
envious that Caroline “got” the French artist, given that she is “the mistress of herself 
in any situation,” yet nothing seems to have prepared Caroline for the effect someone 
devoted to both art and success would have on her.
Caroline had been married six years, Cather tells us, when she came to the 
lodge to “think it all over,” since
d’Esquerre was a man to reckon with. Caroline did not deceive herself 
now upon that score. She admitted it humbly enough, and since she 
had said good-bye to him she had not been free for a moment from the 
sense of his formidable power. It formed the undercurrent of her 
consciousness; whatever she might be doing or thinking, it went on, 
involuntarily, like her breathing; sometimes welling up until suddenly 
she found herself suffocating. There was a moment of this to-night, 
and Caroline rose and stood shuddering, looking about her in the blue 
duskiness of the silent room. She had not been here at night before, 
and the spirit of the place seemed more troubled and insistent than ever 
it had been in the quiet of the aftemoons. (36)
The “still, expectant” night sky, the troubled spirit of the night, the danger of 
suffocation from the unconscious desire, the shuddering in the face of silence, all 
indicate that what is involuntary or uncontrollable is outside the conscious will.
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Caroline had visited the lodge during the light of day, in the full expectation that art 
was an addendum to her bourgeois experience, not a threat. She had never been there 
at night to confront “the spirit of the place,” “troubled” but also “insistent.” The 
idealism of a separate artistic sphere intruding on the conscious, well-ordered 
bourgeois mind is a striking image. Cather clearly intertwines the realm of art with 
desire and presents both as potentially subversive to rationalized life.
Despite the assertions of Susan Rosowski who claims that at the end Caroline 
“recovered her balance” when she decided to tear down the garden lodge after her 
night there, this is not a story about the merits of bourgeois values or even the 
assertion of conventional values, such as marriage. Rosowski says, “The story ends 
with relief that by recalling the human bonds of love, Caroline Noble had saved 
herself.” Rosowski reads this as a story about resisting the temptations of sexual or 
romantic passion; I read it as a much more complex and ambivalent story about the 
dangers of a particular kind of passion that has very little to do with sexual or 
romantic love, even less to do with “recovering balance,” and still less with “saving 
herself.” In fact, the story is about the dangers of such “balance” and Caroline does 
not so much “save” herself as lose herself in her renewed commitment to repress her 
own experience of that which lies outside conscious control.
This is a story about an altogether different sort of passion and the subversion 
of a different set of rules than those that govern marriage or conventional 
relationships. What Cather describes is the collision of two world views: the first is 
represented in Caroline’s decision to commit herself to success, to deal with the “cold 
facts” of life instead of the vague longings which her family of artists represents.
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Paradoxically, by wedding her dreams to Wall Street notions of success and the 
American work ethic, thus rejecting the idealism of her father and his household, 
Caroline can nevertheless still imagine that art is available as a separate sphere, 
should she choose to visit it; that art is still protected from the influences of 
modemity and therefore remains available to feed her hunger for intense “authentic” 
experience. Art, in other words, still retains the possibility of protest to the 
“overcivilized,” rationalized Weberian ethos of the spirit of capitalism.
But though art offers access to the imagination, it also implicitly offers a 
critique of bourgeois comfort. If Caroline literally follows her father and brother into 
an idealistic pursuit of art she will all too quickly discover the price one pays as an 
artist in the modem world. By distancing herself from their idealism she protects for 
herself a vision of aesthetic culture free from the “cold facts” and is free to pursue her 
own success while safely containing such visions in the imagination. Her father’s life 
and his devotion to art and the access to imagination it offers is the opposing world 
view to the rationalized, pragmatic, successful approach to the modem world, the 
“lifelong regimen” Caroline has followed in order to distance herself from the 
emptiness at her core, which itself is represented in Caroline’s personal history. But 
her rejection of her idealistic inheritance from her father (his commitment to art 
which rejects the accompanying American ascetic work ethic) allows her to maintain 
an imaginative space for an idealized sphere of art nonetheless.
On the other hand, the altemative Cather writes into the story, as in so many 
of her stories, is the celebrity artist figure. This, as I’ve argued, represents the 
accommodation of “art” to modemity. Cather uses the character of d’Esquerre as a
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mediating figure. Rosowski has argued that d’Esquerré tempts Caroline’s “womanish 
desires” and that he is the “source” of her “beautiful illusion;” that the celebrity 
triggers a romantic reaction in Caroline. A more careful reading however suggests 
that the “temptation,” such as it may be, is to an antibourgeois position, outside the 
rationalized, ordered life, the path of “finality” that Caroline has chosen. Further, the 
“source” of Caroline’s “illusions” is within herself; the source, to the extent it comes 
from without, is from her father and her childhood. Cather is quite clear about this 
later in the story, as I show.
D’Esquerré does offer a temptation of another kind than the “romantic” one 
Rosowski posits however: the vision or modernist illusion that art can happily 
accommodate consumer culture. Caroline comes face to face with her own wish to 
combine art and idealistic longing with material success in the garden lodge. It is 
only in confronting the truth about such an illusory and potentially mediating figure, 
and the light it throws on her own life and the position she has taken, that brings 
about her crisis: the sense that her modem life has become “unreal.” It is only to this 
extent that d’Esquerré precipitates Caroline’s crisis, not in his tempting her 
“womanish desires.”
The confrontation of opposing approaches to modem life takes place in the 
liminal space between the conscious and the unconscious mind, while Caroline 
spends a restless night in the lodge. Caroline cannot afford “the luxury of revery” 
since it “completely confounds” her and flies in the face of all she has devoted herself 
to up to this point, leaving her faced with “neither path” nor “finality.” Her 
commitments are challenged, her moral base, as Lears has observed as a common
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stance among the bourgeoisie late in the nineteenth-century, is as vague as her 
longings.
Initially, Cather seems to depict the American dream of success positively, 
finally realized after many years through Caroline’s fortitude and single-minded work 
ethic: through her adherence to what Lears calls the “evasive banality” of the modem 
cultural rhetoric of the period. Faced with the disillusionment wrought by 
industrialization and what Weber calls the disenchantment of modem life, the clichés 
abound: work hard, succeed, pull yourself up by your own bootstraps, keep your nose 
to the grindstone. Caroline precisely represents Weber’s ethic of “rationalization,” 
what he described as the systematic organization of individual life for maximum 
personal achievement. But Cather qualifies the opposition, the “either/or,” of 
“success/separate sphere of art” by presenting the mediating altemative of the 
celebrity artist. This figure represents the marriage of success and art, an 
accommodation to the pressures of modemity on the sphere of art. Not wanting to 
reject the republican moralism she has inherited, clinging to the American belief in 
individualism yet acutely aware of the problems such a position implies, Cather 
recognizes the loss of authentic and intense experience in modem life and therefore 
postulates an artist who has combined the best of both altematives. While admitting 
that something is missing in successful, bourgeois life, Cather is unwilling to 
relinquish the figure of successful individualism, the self-made individual, and 
represents this through the celebrity artist. In an attempt to locate a synthesis of art 
with its inherent potential for protest against the conditions of modemity, Cather will
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again and again turn to the figure of the successful artist as a mediating figure of both 
residual protest and accommodation to the evolving myth of the self-made individual.
Gather attempts a synthesis of work and art in this story and throughout this 
collection which she named The Troll Garden, which bears an inscription from 
Christina Rossetti’s “Goblin Market.” The epigraph to the collection reads:
We must not look at Goblin men,
We must not buy their fruits;
Who knows upon what soil they fed 
Their hungry, thirsty roots?
Gather, in her use of the figure of the celebrity, must acknowledge and wrestle with 
the market forces accompanying the modernization of the artist and the artistic 
sphere. In Gather’s early fiction, each story refracts the questions of the “fruits” of art 
in the marketplace, and with each question. Gather “answers” differently though 
always maintaining her dual antimodem commitments.
In “The Garden Lodge” Gather acknowledges the limits of her mediating 
figure in at least two ways: through the reassertion of the European, Old World ideals 
of Caroline’s childhood home — with its devotion to art rather than the marketplace, 
where Caroline’s tme “roots” are located; and through the dangers a celebrity like 
d’Esquerré represents to bourgeois safety and complacency, despite his adherence to 
the work ethic and progressive rhetoric. The effect which d’Esquerré has on Caroline 
during her night in the lodge as she confronts her repressed desire represents art’s 
subversive access to the power of the imagination which, however bought and paid 
for, still retains a subtle but potential danger to bourgeois complacency. It is only
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when Caroline lets herself feel the uncertainty, the “vague longings” she has so long 
repressed, that she knows the “nothingness of system and discipline,” that she realizes 
her “happy, well-ordered life was not enough” (40).
The artistic ideal that Caroline grew up with is associated with the absence of 
an American work ethic, which the bourgeoisie define as a kind of self-indulgence, 
and, as such, through their antimodem, residual republican moralism, find suspect. 
They suspect art for its implicit, antibourgeois critique. And yet while Caroline’s 
class is suspicious it is also ambivalent towards the role of art, as Caroline is despite 
her conscious will to reject it as anything more than a vehicle to a comfortable living. 
This is at least in part because the new leisure class or nouveau-riche, of which 
Caroline is a part, covet art for its potential as “cultural capital,” to use Pierre 
Bourdieu’s term, as something to grant legitimacy to their rising status; in associating 
themselves, in Amoldian fashion, with a cultural elite, they hope to claim more power 
as a class. I examine this concomitantly with Veblen’s notion of conspicuous 
consumption in the next chapter, but Cather alludes to this in “The Garden Lodge” as 
well as in “Flavia and Her Artists.”
But the bourgeoisie also covet art, as Weber’s thesis suggests, for its potential 
to help in a reenchantment of everyday life, as a sort of antidote to their own self- 
repressive daily life. It is this aspect of art that Cather is most concerned with in “The 
Garden Lodge.” This is the “vague longing” Caroline experiences in that “moment 
between world and world, when, neither asleep nor awake, she felt her dream grow 
thin, melting away from her, felt the warmth under her heart growing cold.
Something seemed to slip from the clinging hold of her arms . . . ” (40). The
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pessimism of Weber towards the inevitability of rationalization seems to permeate 
this passage. Cather, while showing Caroline’s grief at her lost dream and empty life, 
nevertheless has her turn, the next morning, to rationalization and self-repression.
The ability of art to reenchant bourgeois life is diminished, having been replaced by 
the “mundane passions” Weber identified as informing modem consumer culture.
The celebrity artist, a figure with whom Cather wrestles in many of her early 
stories, most often represents a type of accommodation to rather than protest against 
modem culture, rich in its notions of how to achieve success. The celebrity is a 
combination of art and the American work ethic — and the success it promises — a 
figure of accommodation to modem culture. But though Cather posits this 
compromise, she remains uncomfortable with it, since for her it also represents the 
antithesis of the republican tradition of moralism which is suspicious of too much 
success and the indolence and self-indulgence, the “excess,” which often follows.
The celebrity, with his ties to consumer culture, can represent for the republican 
moralist both the cooption of art by the nouveau-riche class and the triumph of radical 
individualism and hedonistic consumerism that class itself signifies — a challenge to 
both exclusive cultural elitism, and to fears for the republic which inform 
conservative antimodemists. It is in this particular way that Cather seems to me to be 
a radically conservative antimodemist. While rejecting the forms of modemity in 
much the same ways theorists such as Adomo and Benjamin do later in the century 
— thus radically challenging the roots of modemity’s consumer culture — Cather 
also retains her belief in humanistic individualism and the potential for progress, the 
legacy of the Enlightenment. Attendant upon this ideology is the American work
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ethic, and Cather continually asserts this in her dogmatic statements in her own 
commentary on writing and artists, insisting upon a total devotion to art that amounts 
to “vocation.”
While the celebrity in Gather’s writings marks the triumph of the work ethic, 
he or she also simultaneously represents the Whiggish fear of too much success, 
leading to a new kind of indolence, in a new form — a consumer culture which 
expects to purchase authentic experience. I believe it is this, rather than a simple 
romanticism (as Rosowski argues), which is the basis for her choice of epigraph to 
The Troll Garden. In Rossetti’s poem, the goblins seduce Laura with advertising and 
their constant aggressive exhortation to “Come buy, come buy,” as if the purchase of 
sublime experience and happiness is possible. The fruit of course turns out to offer 
illicit pleasures that quickly turn to a kind of poisoning, as most addictions do. 
Rossetti, in an antimodem move, rejects this early form of seductive advertising 
culture, preferring instead the earlier forms of direct trade, the earlier and more 
medieval forms of capitalism advocated by the Morris school and chronicled by 
Weber as those forms preexisting bureaucratized capitalism. Clearly the goblins 
promise more than they deliver, or, rather, deliver other than what is promised 
through their advertising. Advertising is depicted as lying or, at the very least, half- 
tmths and certainly dangerous. The goblins know full well that consumption will 
lead to an insatiable desire which has killed before and will kill again. One result of 
the consumption of their “evil fruits” is the addiction to consumption itself, and the 
lack of any accompanying nourishment from the fruit.
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In my reading of “The Goblin Market” (and for my purposes here I am forced 
to ignore the obvious allusions to homosexuality and to prostitution) I am struck by 
the ambiguous portrayal of the antidote. What is it exactly that makes it work? 
Rossetti seems to suggest that the antidote is much more than the juice of the fruits 
themselves (though the juices do ultimately work like an antivenom). I argue that 
Lizzie’s ability to reject the goblins’ exhortations to indiscriminately consume is 
significant in giving the juice its antidotal power. It is at least partly Lizzie’s ability 
to resist the goblin’s advertising and their literally violent pressure on her to consume 
which affords her the power to save her sister (Lizzie, unlike her sister Laura, knows 
enough to cover her eyes, to “not peep at goblin men”). It is only when Lizzie insists 
that her penny be returned to her if they won’t abide by the rules of fair trade, if they 
won’t allow her consumption on her own terms (i.e., to buy and then to take the fruits 
away with her, rather than have them forced on her for consumption against her will, 
on the spot), that the goblins become surly and violent, “Grunting and snarling” and 
physically attacking her.
What the goblins want is for Lizzie to not only buy, to give them her money in 
trade, but to consume the fruit so that she will become hypnotized and unconscious of 
what is happening to her. They claim “Such fruits as these/ No man can carry; / Half 
their bloom would fly, / Half their dew would dry, / Half their flavour would pass 
by.” Like all good advertisers, they say “consume now,” “it’s your last chance,” “you 
need it now,” “you can’t afford to wait.” Part of the “magic” of advertising is to 
affect the will, to affect the unconscious, and to effectively strip the buyer of the real 
power of choice. The goblins want Lizzie to become addicted to consumption like
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her sister, who is dying from withdrawal. It is Lizzie’s ability to resist consuming the 
fruit that finally redeems her sister, that in effect turns the venomous juices into an 
antivenom.
Lizzie “night and moming/Caught the goblins’ cry: / ‘Come buy our orchard 
fruits, /Come buy, come buy ”(1515), but nevertheless sees through their promises 
by being always “Mindful of Jeanie” “in her grave” who “fell sick and died” for “joys 
brides hope to have.” The allusion here is clearly erotic: consumption promises a 
dangerous and illicit ecstasy. The goblins’ cry and their banal but detailed 
descriptions of their wares are quoted at length throughout the poem, and are 
highlighted as if Rossetti wants her reader to understand the seductive significance of 
their words as advertisements.
After her successful resistance, though she has been molested and beaten, 
Lizzie hears “her penny jingle/Bouncing in her purse, / Its bounce was music to her 
ear.” I believe it is Laura’s insistence on her own power to decide what she will buy 
or not buy, her insistence on fair trade, her ability to spend only out of need and for a 
good cause, and most importantly, her resistance to the lure of immediate 
consumption, which ultimately gives her power over the goblins and proves the key 
to her sister’s recovery. It is, in fact, Lizzie’s resistance to nascent consumer culture, 
in the mid-nineteenth century in accordance with the pre-Raphaelites’ rejection of 
mass marketing and mass production, which allows Laura’s resurrection outside 
market forces and the marketplace itself. That Cather chose a section of this poem for 
her epigraph to this collection of stories deliberately points to her concerns regarding 
the modem culture of consumption and its “roots.”
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Lears traces many antimodemists’ reactions such as Morris and the pre- 
Raphaelite movement, Yeats, and later in America, Frank Lloyd Wright, to the 
political and economic anxieties provoked by modem capitalism. The longings for 
intense, altemative experience found in various forms of antimodem protest also 
inform Gather’s early characters in their search for artistic transcendent experience. 
For Cather, as for the pre-Raphaelites and many other later antimodemists, including 
such literary Modemists (who, of course, protest Modemity using modem forms) as 
different as Yeats or Eliot, art is the most authentic experience available, and thus art 
retains the possibility of protest against modem culture. This is at least partly 
because work itself has been stripped of meaning as it becomes more and more 
subject to rationalized, bureaucratized control.
But art in its most authentic form, for Cather, is also a form of productive 
work; i.e., a manifestation of the American work ethic, a “devotion” and a “vocation,’ 
and thus becomes a form of accommodation to modemity, undermining its own 
subversive capacity. One other interesting point to note in Rossetti’s poem is that 
Laura, in her misery over the lack of fruit to consume after becoming addicted to 
consumption itself, is incapable of work:
She no more swept the house.
Tended the fowls or cows.
Fetched honey, kneaded cakes of wheat.
Brought water from the brook:
But sat down listless in the chimney-nook 
And would not eat. (295-98)
75
While Rossetti seems to equate work with meaning (in the Romantic sense 
Goethe first articulated), Cather continues to assert the American work ethic as 
vocation in her collection of stories. While Morris and the pre-Raphaelites saw art 
and work as meaningful, it was situated outside the American work ethic, outside 
rationalized and bureaucratized systems, and was deliberately modeled on premodem 
forms (the Medieval guild for example). Gather’s adherence to the work ethic which 
Weber described betrays her antimodem sense that modem life holds other kinds of 
dangers in addition to those attendant on consumption — that art will become just 
another commodity, and will lose its redemptive power as vocation.
The fact that Laura finds real nourishment unappealing once she has leamed 
to “consume” suggests that a capacity for authentic experience is lost as market forces 
and values are intemalized, much in the way Weber suggested that systematic 
rationalization becomes intemalized in everyday life. As bureaucratization begins to 
affect the management of individual lives outside the workplace, so advertising 
affects the personal desire of the consumer. Caroline, in Gather’s story, has leamed 
to consume as well, trading in her “tumed dresses” and “improvised hats” for the 
monied existence her Wall Street husband can provide. In doing so, she has rejected 
the artistic visions and commitment to art that is her inheritance from her father. The 
lodge in the garden represents the locked portion of Caroline’s unconscious life, 
which she unwittingly unlocks in the middle of the night, and her experience there of 
the idealism and imaginative visions that she has repressed for fear of their effects on 
her will to succeed threaten her bourgeois commitments. These “visions” exist 
outside the rationalistic ethic of success. Once Caroline’s desire is ignited, her lack of
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authentic experience is exposed and her compensatory, rationalistic drive to succeed 
is made vulnerable to doubt and scrutiny. But while Cather portrays Caroline’s 
“materialism” as empty, she simultaneously cautions against an idealistic 
sentimentality which has no pragmatic use.
Caroline’s lifelong dilemma is that of a disenfranchised woman in pursuit of 
security, but from a class which can hardly be named. Her father, an immigrant from 
Germany, is, while an educated musician, neither professional, since he is not 
connected with any institution and earns no salary, nor is he a proprietor, and thus 
does not fit into any traditional, identifiable class. Caroline’s father also has what he 
sees as a vocation, a pure devotion to art, but it is not geared towards success in the 
American bourgeois sense. Like many Americans of this period, and in keeping with 
the rhetoric of the time, Caroline’s family, first generation Americans, will seem to 
determine its own class status. Cather’s early writings, in keeping with the American 
myth of individualism which prevails over all circumstances, insist on this open- 
endedness of class determination and status while simultaneously fiercely 
maintaining the limitations of class in determining meaning for an individual’s life.
In typical antimodem fashion, Cather shows that class will determine the limits of an 
individual’s happiness, and yet, tme to the tradition of American individualism, it is 
up to the individual to determine his or her own class station. This leaves the 
responsibility for personal morality and individual happiness squarely on the 
autonomous individual’s shoulders, relieving any outside forces of moral 
responsibility towards the individual.
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One way in which Cather asserts the power of the individual against class 
determination is to associate Caroline’s bourgeois, successful status with an 
accompanying emptiness but also to look at the role of the antibourgeois artist, 
Caroline’s father, critically as well. Again, this is clearly a sign of her ambivalence 
toward individualism, and Lears’ explanation of antimodemism helps to clarify the 
motivation behind it. Caroline’s father took on music students, but “neglected his 
duties to write orchestral compositions for which the world seemed to have no 
especial need” (31). Cather’s tone betrays the republican moralists’ fear of idleness 
and their suspicion of self-indulgence, of an art for which the world “seemed to have 
no especial need.” As Cather lists the “duties which he neglected” she seems to 
underscore the differences in Caroline’s father’s attitude toward work from the 
American work ethic: illustrated somewhat ironically by the European d’Esquerré, 
the “successful” celebrity artist but also by Caroline and her husband’s ascetic 
rationalism. Cather continues her description of Caroline’s father and his work: 
his spirit was warped by bitter vindictiveness and puerile self- 
commiseration, and he spent his days in scorn of the labour that 
brought him bread and in pitiful devotion to the labour that brought 
him only disappointment, writing interminable scores which demanded 
of the orchestra everything under heaven except a melody. (31)
Clearly it is not the devotion to work which is the problem, but the type of devotion, 
the choice of work: useful work, or work for which there is no “especial need.” The 
defining difference is in the commitments one makes. Cather rather unexpectedly, 
but fully in the republican moralist tradition, presents the antibourgeois artist in this
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portrait as self-absorbed, impractical, wholly imsavory and fully responsible for his 
own failure, in “scorn of the labour that brought him bread.” As an aspiring artist 
herself this seems rather disingenuous, particularly since Cather quit her editing job at 
McClure’s in order to devote herself to her own art later. But what is clear is that 
Cather, like many antimodemists, is suspicious of art without a particularly American 
ethic of work, an ethic which betrays the unconscious acceptance of progressive 
belief which ultimately is responsible for the effects of modemity she and other 
antimodemists reject.
While Caroline’s father and brother (a chloral addict who never works), berate 
successful artists and her father kept his pupils waiting “while he discussed 
Schopenhauer with some bearded socialist over a dish of herrings and a spotted table 
cloth,” Caroline “wore tumed gowns and soiled gloves and improvised hats all her 
life” and only wanted the “luxury of being like other people” (33). It is the desire to 
conform, for acceptance, for “success,” for embourgeoisement and the work ethic that 
accompanies it, that brings Caroline to her husband, and ultimately to d’Esquerré and 
face to face with the conflicting values she has intemalized yet successfully repressed 
up until now.
The celebrity artist is the posited altemative to either of these opposing 
realities: the starving, irresponsible artist, or the “hard” calculating success story of 
Caroline’s life which refuses to admit idealism and artistic devotion into her material 
life, but rather holds it separate from “real” life as an imagined altemative available 
only to the imagination. Caroline’s decisions indicate her own resistance to the 
“answerability” of art: she maintains, in her decision to tear down the lodge and to
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deliberately forget what transpired in the lodge during the night, the separation of art 
and life Bakhtin describes as that liable to “blame” or “guilt.” Caroline’s 
answerability is elicited in the lodge during the difficult night, but she cannot afford 
to accept that responsibility, that unity of responsibility, not without rejecting the 
bourgeois sensibility she has determinedly adopted.
Gather’s sympathies are complex: they only partially lie with the bourgeois 
Caroline and her work ethic, just as they only partially lie with the artist as success — 
the artist as celebrity. But Gather’s dialogic narrative, her antimodem ambivalence, 
will become even more complicated in “The Garden Lodge.” It is in the lodge, in the 
middle of the night, that Caroline sees yet another, quite unexpected vision. Caroline 
had never been to the lodge at night, and is unprepared for what is about to confront 
her. Cather contrasts the conscious control Caroline exercises in the daylight with the 
accompanying anxiety produced by awareness of that which is outside conscious 
control: that which Caroline now faces in the dark and which is outside the 
rationalized, systematic control of her life for “maximum personal achievement.” 
Caroline’s desire proves to be a surprise, no matter how much she attempts to 
rationalize it:
Yet, she knew, she knew well enough, of what absurdities this spell 
was woven; she mocked, even while she winced. His power she knew, 
lay not so much in anything that he actually had — though he had so 
much — or in anything that he actually was; but in what he suggested, 
in what he seemed picturesque enough to have or be — and that was 
just anything that one chose to believe or to desire. (36)
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Here the elision between physical, personal passion and the imagination and idealism 
becomes overt, and so does the threat to her self-denying ethos:
His appeal was all the more persuasive and alluring that it was to the 
imagination alone, that it was as indefinite and impersonal as those 
cults of idealism which so have their way with women. What he had 
was that, in his mere personality, he quickened and in a measure 
gratified that something without which — to women —  life is no 
better than sawdust, and to the desire for which most of their mistakes 
and tragedies and astonishingly poor bargains are due. (36)
Implicit in this description of passion (besides overt sexism, which perhaps points to 
Gather’s desire to distance herself from heterosexual identification) is the pecuniary 
metaphor: passion (of whatever kind) exacts a price, and certainly marriage and 
relationships are bargains to be made or lost. Caroline’s life has been built around the 
value of material success; her friends, we are told very early in the story, “were fond 
of stamping Caroline as a materialist and called her hard. The impression of cold 
calculation, of having a definite policy, which Caroline gave, was far from a false 
one; but there was this to be said for her, that there were extenuating circumstances 
which her friends could not know.” And, thus, Caroline “held determinedly to the 
middle course” and distrusted “everything which inclined towards extravagance” — 
including passion, whether sexual, idealistic, or artistic (31).^ Celebrities like
 ^A notable difference between Gather’s and contemporary Kate Chopin’s writing, 
which explores similar themes, is that Chopin’s female characters are determinedly 
seeking out and exploring passion without the ambivalence consistently present in 
Gather’s characters. Chopin’s character Calixta, in “The Storm,” for example, gives
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d’Esquerré, like the goblin men, promise access to the imagination and to “visions” 
which are threatening, not because they mislead, but because they are accurate: they 
are subversive in their suggestion that bourgeois life is not enough in itself, that it is a 
bargain to be made or lost, and the implication is that one “standardized value” of 
bourgeois life — heterosexuality — is also a trap. Cather is clear that Caroline will 
continue to pay the price of her embourgeoisement.
Caroline, oddly, returns to her husband the next morning more pragmatic than 
ever, resolved in her denial of “that part of one which sets up an idol and that part of 
one which bows down and worships it” and to tear down the lodge about which she 
had been sentimental (35). Caroline spent the night wrestling with the impulses of 
the unconscious and deliberately decides to continue the assertion of her rationalized 
ethic of self-control — which she sees as necessary to an ordered, bourgeois life. In 
the absence of any clear religious commitment, Caroline, like many at the turn of the 
century, finds herself resorting to the banal cliche’s of modemity, informed as they 
still are by republican ideals of duty, strength of will, and a belief in individualism 
which will somehow make up for the loss of meaning in an increasingly modernized, 
self-indulgent and hedonistic world.
Angered and alarmed at the prospect of losing her self-control — that loss 
here elided with the authentic experience of art and the desire for participation in its 
sphere —and of abandoning herself to the passions which drive the artist (not.
in to her sexual passion for Alceé, and far from finding it alarming or threatening, in 
fact finds a kind of redemption in her sexual passion. While Chopin alerts her 
readers to the dangers from society of indulging in passion, “irrational” passion itself 
is not as threatening a force as much as are repression and rationalization.
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significantly, very alarmed at the prospect of adultery), a passion which is at once 
sexual and much more than sexual, Caroline consciously chooses the path of self- 
repression after her night in the lodge. As Caroline remembers one day in the lodge 
with the celebrity artist, when he put his hand under her heart, Cather writes:
She had been wonderfully the mistress of herself at the time; neither 
repellant nor acquiescent. She remembered that she had rather exulted, 
then, in her self-control — which he had seemed to take for granted, 
though there was perhaps the whisper of a question from the hand 
under the heart. . .  (39)
Much to her own surprise however, as she thinks of this, “Caroline lifted her hands 
quickly from the keyboard, and she bowed her head in them, sobbing” (39). 
D’Esquerré represents much more than physical passion denied. He is a renowned 
artist, a celebrity, and it is partly his “success,” his celebrity status, that Caroline 
recognizes and is drawn to.
But she is also threatened by something else he represents: the access to the 
imaginative realm of art, its passions, its challenge to her to “answer” for her own 
choices. He is threatening because he represents a challenge to her self-control. 
Further, he had taken that self-control for granted: he, as an artist, is still afforded 
passion, dreams, and imagination. She is not. It is the subversive element still 
present in the artist, not so much his ability to fire the imagination with romantic 
“womanish” visions or temptations to physical passion, which Caroline rejects. As 
Caroline thinks of him, she knows that “she had been haunted by an imploring little 
girlish ghost that followed her about, wringing its hands and entreating for an hour of
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life” (38) and she thinks of the various types of women who are pathetically 
enamored with such dreams as she herself is fighting.
The “hour of life” is here opposed to the self-repression of the rationalized 
individual, at the mercy of the American myths of self-determination and self­
repression required for success. The celebrity demands of her a self-control that she 
finds difficult and actually humiliating, since it awakens her to conflict and 
uncertainty about her own solid place in the world. It even seems to Caroline that she 
is, instead of a unique individual, simply one of the masses, perhaps not even 
individuated by her class status now, subject to emotions and impulses to which she 
had thought herself immune. She remembers scenes from his concerts in which:
Women of the world who accepted him knowingly, as they sometimes 
took champagne for its agreeable effect; sisters of charity and 
overworked shop-girls, who received him devoutly; withered women 
who had taken doctorate degrees and who worshipped furtively 
through prism spectacles; business women and women of affairs, the 
Amazons who dwelt afar from men in the stony fastnesses of 
apartment houses. They all entered into the same romance; dreamed, in 
terms as various as the hues of phantasy, the same dream; drew the 
same quick breath when he stepped up on the stage, and, at his exit, 
felt the same dull pain of shouldering the pack again . . . Young and 
old, however hideous, however fair, they yielded up their heat— 
whether quick or latent—sat hungering for the mystic bread wherewith 
he fed them at this eucharist of sentiment. (37)
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“Yielding up their heat” indicates a loss of control, a gift of what is personal and 
precious, an abandonment to desire, but also an abandonment to the imagination 
which can provide an “hour of life.” Desire and imagination also exacerbate the “dull 
pain of shouldering the pack again,” the effort required to fully repress the longings 
which survive a rationalized ordered existence and challenge it.
Furthermore, the enchantment with celebrity levels all class distinctions. 
Caroline herself realizes this when she admits her own “hungering for the mystic 
bread” of sentiment. Celebrity art is not an art which elevates or validates class 
distinctions, but rather obviates them; it grants equal access and is not reserved for the 
elite. D’Esquerré’s appeal is to the imagination, not to the pragmatic; to idealism, not 
to the rational, and this is the danger he represents to Caroline. The celebrity is 
whatever one makes of him. Whatever “talent” he may have is lost in the haze of 
imaginative projections, and therefore, the artist has at least partially lost value as a 
real altemative to the forces of rationalization and control. But imagination itself 
retains its subversive potential, and is clearly presented as threatening the status quo 
of the American ethic of work and success and Caroline’s successful achievement of 
bourgeois status. The celebrity threatens the bourgeois by stripping art of its potential 
as cultural capital reserved only society’s elite. The celebrity can spark imagination, 
which can lead simply to more “sentimentality,” to more banality, or it could, 
potentially, provide access to revolutionary passions which cut across all class 
boundaries, illuminating the emptiness and inauthentic experience of modem life.
Cather’s depiction of the artist as celebrity forces the issue of antimodem 
response: where, if anywhere, is authentic experience to be located? If not in the
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artist, who has been relocated out of a separate sphere into commodity culture then 
where? If not in private idealism, which is not to be trusted for its antiprogressive 
energy, then where? It is not until later in her career, I suggest, that Cather comes to 
clearer terms with these questions. She does however, in her earliest stories, ask the 
important questions and answers, as Bakhtin puts it, to the real dearth of alternatives 
present in the culture. As for Caroline;
The storm broke and the rain beat in, spattering her night-dress until 
she rose and lowered the windows. She dropped upon the couch and 
began fighting over again the battles of other days, while the ghosts of 
the slain rose as from a sowing of dragon’s teeth. The shadows of 
things, always so scorned and flouted, bore down upon her merciless 
and triumphant. It was not enough; this happy, useful, well-ordered 
life was not enough. It did not satisfy, it was not even real. No, the 
other things, the shadows—they were the realities. Her father, poor 
Heinrich, even her mother, who had been able to sustain her poor 
romance and keep her little illusions mid the tasks of a scullion, were 
nearer happiness than she. Her sure foundation was but made ground, 
after all, and the people in Klingsor’s garden were more fortunate, 
however barren the sands from which they conjured their paradise. 
(39)
Cather leaves her reader wondering just what kind of artist she validates. Neither 
altemative is particularly sympathetic: the bohemian, idealistic but poverty stricken 
father, who has rejected the demands of modemity, nor the celebrity who participates
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and even defines modem consumer culture. However, they both maintain subversive 
potential in their various ways: one in his rejection of the American work ethic and 
aggressive ordering of individual life for success, the other in the potential access he 
can provide to art and imagination despite his adherence to a work ethic and his 
subsequent success. Gather’s overt allusion here to “The Goblin Market” (“Who 
knows upon what soil they fed?”) through the “barren sands from which they 
conjured their paradise” suggests that success through adherence to progressive 
rhetoric and values is suspect, but also that happiness, through the rejection of 
progressive ideals, is impossible, or in any case, as Caroline sees clearly, “unreal.” 
“The other things, the shadows — they were the realities.”
The question remains, what are the shadows? Caroline spends the rest of the 
night in the lodge, her head buried in her hands, “fighting over the battles of other 
days” in “the blackness of storm.” Having no definite or clear path to follow, 
Caroline’s unconscious desire asserts itself in a liminal moment:
Toward morning, when the occasional rumbling of thunder was heard 
no more and the beat of the rain drops upon the orchard leaves was 
steadier, she fell asleep and did not waken until the first red streaks of 
dawn .. .There was a moment between world and world, when, neither 
asleep nor awake, she felt her dream grow thin, melting away from 
her, felt the warmth under her heart growing cold. Something seemed 
to slip from the clinging hold of her arms, and she groaned 
protestingly.. . .  Then her eyes opened wide and she sprang up and sat 
holding dizzily to the cushions of the couch, staring down at her bare,
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cold feet, at her labouring breast, rising and falling under open night­
dress. The dream was gone, but the feverish reality of it still pervaded 
her and she held it as the vibrating string holds a tone. In the last hour 
the shadows had had their way with Caroline. They had shown her the 
nothingness of time and space, of system and discipline, of closed 
doors and broad waters. (40)
In the lodge Caroline confronts the emptiness of her own life, only to face the day by 
denying it again. Cather clearly opposes the realm of rationalization, efficiency and 
self-denial, “system and discipline,” with the “dream” of art, imagination and 
passionate commitment. The “shadows” which “had had their way with Caroline” 
are from the past, from a pre-industrial, European idealism, inherited from her father. 
The shadows represent the reality that lies beneath the surface of her well-ordered, 
rationalized and repressed life, outside of modem time, ordered efficiency, ascetic 
repression and “discipline.”
The vague longings seem to Caroline to have come from her past, but she 
comes to realize that she has in fact intemalized them:
Caroline closed her eyes and dropped her elbows weakly upon her 
knees, her shoulders sinking together. The horror was that it had not 
come from without, but from within. The dream was no blind chance; 
it was the expression of something she had kept so close a prisoner 
that she had never seen it herself; it was the wail from the donjon 
deeps when the watch slept. (40)
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What is finally real to Caroline then is a kind of return of the repressed, the “wail 
from the donjon” as the conscious “watch slept.” Caroline is haunted by the idealism 
of an age past, her father’s premodem, immigrant vision of what an artist can be, 
oblivious to the claims of American modemity. Caroline sees beyond system and 
discipline to a dream that she “held as a vibrating string holds a tone”— the dream 
seems the resonance of an idea of a self unsubjected to outside repression and the 
obsessive striving for comfort and control. That space no longer exists, though the 
ghost of it lingers in Weber’s notion of “vocation,” which has outlived its origins and 
now informs the hedonistic culture of consumption he forecast in 1905. There is no 
separate sphere available to tum to as a refuge from the goblin men who promise 
fulfillment in modemity, as art has been tumed into what Lears calls (in his 
discussion of the loss of a coherent vocabulary of symbols) “commodities in the 
marketplace of taste”(33).
Caroline’s decision to have the lodge tom down after her night of anguish 
there is a rejection of artistic dreams, the need for a clear “path” with “finality”; it is a 
conscious decision to reject “sentimentality” and imaginative passion for the sake of 
clarity, rationality and respectability, all modem bourgeois values. Caroline’s brief 
moment of uncertainty, self-doubt and longing is symptomatic of the essential 
dilemma for people faced with ambivalence towards modemity: the sense that one 
must choose between a valid protest against hyperrationalization (which exists in 
tandem with a fear of irrationality or the unscientific), or accommodation to the 
pressures of modemity and its attendant ethic of individualism and myth of
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autonomy. Gather’s story “answers” this dilemma, though it does not attempt to 
solve it.
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Chapter Two The "Iron Cage” o f Acquisition: Veblen’s Conspicuous 
Consumption, "tasteless amplitude, ” and Ascetic Rationalism in 
"Flavia and Her Artists ”
In 1905, Max Weber deseribed one outcome of the Protestant ethic as it has 
evolved under pressure from modemity: “The Puritan,” he claimed, “wanted to work 
in a calling; we are forced to do so.” Weber connects the notion of “victorious 
capitalism” with its origins in asceticism in the words which follow that famous 
pronouncement:
For when asceticism was carried out of monastic cells into everyday 
life, and began to dominate worldly morality, it did its part in building 
the tremendous cosmos of the modem economic order. This order is 
now bound to the technical and economic conditions of machine 
production which to-day determine the lives of all the individuals who 
are bom into this mechanism, not only those directly concemed with 
economic acquisition, with irresistible force. Perhaps it will so 
determine them until the last ton of fossilized fuel is bumt. In Baxter’s 
view the care for extemal goods should only lie on the shoulders of the 
“saint like a light cloak, which can be thrown aside at any moment.” 
But fate decreed that the cloak should become an iron cage. (181) 
Gather’s “Flavia and Her Artists” confirms Weber’s notion of modemity as 
“victorious capitalism” but also alludes to his notion of the “iron cage of 
acquisition.” Flavia, a nouveau-riche social climber, has a “collection” of artists 
which she houses in rooms which her cousin terms “cages.” But while the
91
ostentatious house was built for granting artists “asylum” and to exhibit Flavia’s skill 
at “getting” them as guests, it is not merely the artists who live in cages, but Flavia as 
well. Flavia’s consumerist behavior suggests, besides Weber’s iron cage of 
acquisition, the relevance of Thorstein Vehlen’s notion of modemity as characterized 
by conspicuous consumption, as found in his famous satirical study. The Theorv of 
the Leisure Class, first published in 1899. In “Flavia and Her Artists” Cather overtly 
critiques conspicuous consumption in terms which mirror Veblen’s theory of the 
means and motivations for consumption.
In early stages of modem capitalist culture, what Veblen terms the “peaceable 
stage” of capitalism;
The leisure class stands at the head of the social structure in point of 
reputability, and its manner of life and its standards of worth therefore 
afford the norm of reputability for the community. The observance of 
these standards, in some degree of approximation, becomes incumbent 
upon all classes lower in the scale. In modem civilized communities 
the lines of demarcation between social classes have grown vague and 
transient, and whenever this happens the norm of reputability imposed 
by the upper class extends its coercive influence with but slight 
hindrance down through the social stmcture to the lowest strata. The 
result is that the members of each stratum accept as their ideal of 
decency the scheme of life in vogue in the next higher stratum, and 
bend their energies to live up to that ideal. On pain of forfeiting their
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good name and their self-respect in case of failure, they next conform 
to the accepted code, at least in appearance. (84)
Cather, in “Flavia and Her Artists,” considers the sphere of art as subject to invasion 
from the nouveau-riche class which seeks to “conform to the accepted code” and 
“ideal of decency” in the next level of society. The separate sphere of art and the idea 
of reputability are conjoined in the notion of a “cultured class” to which the new 
leisure class aspires. Cather demonstrates that the sphere of art is no longer safe from 
marketing and consumer forces, and counters this polluted sphere with the 
anachronistic force of ascetic rationalism: the hard-working, self-denying bourgeois, 
figured in this story as Arthur, Flavia’s husband.
Just as Veblen is concemed with the consumption of goods for “pecuniary 
reputability,” Weber, just six years later, claims that “since asceticism undertook to 
remodel the world . . .  material goods have gained an increasing and finally an 
inexorable power over the lives of men as at no previous period” (181). But because 
“victorious capitalism . .. rests on mechanical rather than spiritual foundations” by 
the new century, it needs the “support of asceticism no longer.” According to Weber, 
the “rosy blush of its laughing heir, the Enlightenment, seems also to be irretrievably 
fading, and the idea of duty in one’s calling prowls about in our lives like the ghost of 
dead religious beliefs.” Weber continues, in his discussion of the modem “vocation” 
of compulsive accumulation of capital:
Where the fulfillment of the calling cannot directly be related to the 
highest spiritual and cultural values, or when, on the other hand, it need 
not be felt simply as economic compulsion, the individual generally
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abandons the attempt to justify it at all. In the field of its highest 
development, in the United States, the pursuit of wealth, stripped of its 
religious and ethical meaning, tends to become associated with purely 
mundane passions, which often actually give it the character of sport. 
(182)
Gather depicts the means of consumption in terms identical to Weber’s theory of 
sport, which dovetails nicely with Veblen’s theory of “predatory behavior,” which I 
outline below. This is particularly written into Gather’s representation of Flavia’s 
aggressive self-assertion towards her guests, but also the way in which she literally 
“appropriates” their physical presence, their ideas, and even their passions. Flavia 
considers “interesting people” her “natural affinities,” but also, as Gather tells the 
reader in the same sentence, her “lawful prey.” Her behavior is depicted as 
predatory; her methods are those of a hunter. Gather’s language underscores this, in 
just one instance, as one of the key characters arrives and is “immediately 
appropriated by her hostess” (3).
According to Veblen, sport itself is the mark of a society which exhibits 
archaic impulses of the need for mastery. “Modem competition,” Veblen says, “is in 
large part a process of self-assertion on the basis of these traits of predatory human 
nature.” While these traits of desire for mastery and domination may serve the 
interests of the individual, they are “not directly serviceable to the community . . . .  
Ferocity and cunning are of no use to the community except in its hostile dealings 
with other communities; and they are useful to the individual only because there is so 
large a proportion of the same traits actively present in the human environment to
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which he is exposed” (263). Although this argument appears to be a bit circular, 
Veblen situates it in his overall analysis of conspicuous consumption, in which the 
“possession of property becomes the basis of popular esteem”: and therefore 
“requisite to that complacency which we call self-respect” (31). He observes that: 
as fast as a person makes new acquisitions, and becomes accustomed 
to the resulting new standard of wealth, the new standard forthwith 
ceases to afford appreciably greater satisfaction than the earlier 
standard did. The tendency in any case is constantly to make the 
present pecuniary standard the point of departure for a fresh increase 
of wealth . . .  the end sought by accumulation is to rank high in 
comparison with the rest of the community in point of pecuniary 
strength. (31)
This results in a “restless straining to place a wider . . .  pecuniary interval” between 
the consumer and the prevailing, average standard (31). The “struggle” or 
competition is not based on an alleviation of want, but is “substantially a race for 
reputability on the basis of an invidious comparison,” and, “no approach to a 
definitive attainment is possible” (32).
Add to this the spiritual lack and loss of what Weber called the “organic” 
cycle of life and sense of “wholeness”  ^also identified by Walter Benjamin, Lears, 
and many others, and acquisition takes on another incentive. “That propensity for 
purposeful activity,” Veblen claims, “and that repugnance to all futility of effort
’ From Lawrence Scaff, “Weber on the Cultural Situation of the Modem Age.” The 
Cambridge Companion to Weber. Ed. Stephen Turner. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 
2000. 103.
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which belong to man by virtue of his character as an agent do not desert him when he 
emerges from the naïve communal culture” and becomes individuated (33).
However, under advanced capitalism, “purposeful effort comes to mean, primarily, 
effort directed to or resulting in a more creditable showing of accumulated wealth” 
(34).
In “Flavia and Her Artists” Gather shows her contempt for the conspicuous 
consumption outlined by Veblen, but further qualifies it by focusing on a kind of 
consumption that disregards the reality of artistic expression and even preys upon the 
artist. Flavia is, for instance, not interested in what art can do for others, what it 
speaks to, what it might confront or protest, and yet she needs the aesthetic culture 
posited by Weber for what he terms “personal redemption” — to grant meaning to a 
rather meaningless existence, and to counter rationalism’s disenchantment of the 
world — and, as such, admits for art the possibility of critique of such an existence.
The need for personal redemption spoken of by Weber can be seen in the 
character of Flavia. But Flavia represents a particular American version of this need, 
and, as interpellated through the particular class dynamics at play in 1905, Thorstein 
Veblen’s ideas on conspicuous consumption are useful in helping to understand this 
figure. Gather’s figure of Flavia — certainly not an artist, not quite aesthete, but 
intensely interested in the artist as celebrity commodity, is a type of character who 
will show up again and again in Gather’s early fiction as she wrestles with the notion 
of aestheticism and individualism in nascent bourgeois culture. Flavia seeks 
“personal redemption” in her conformity to the “rule” of the next higher social class 
and through her instrumental consumption of art. In attempting to gain access to that
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strata of society which already holds the rights to “culture,” Flavia will attempt to 
buy her way in.
The lines between classes are quite vague in the United States in the higher 
strata in at least one way: the “leisure class” is actually composed of at least two 
classes. First, there is the older moneyed class, generally several generations old, 
who have inherited their wealth and established their “reputability” through their 
access to forms of what Pierre Bourdieu calls “cultural capital,” such as name, 
political influence, institutional endowments and the like, who have in general 
established the norm to which everyone else must aspire. In addition, they have lent 
their names to museums, to art collections, to opera houses, and the like, 
institutionally staking claims to cultural “legitimacy.” The other subset of the leisure 
class is the emerging bourgeoisie, who have newly acquired financial capital, who 
are new to business, who have more recently acquired ownership of the means of 
production, and who have less established generational reputations. They may 
however, have more money than the older blue-bloods of the quasi-aristocratic class. 
The rise of this class accompanied the decades after the second industrial revolution 
in America. These are the nouveau-riche, and Flavia belongs to this segment of the 
leisure class.
As a member of the new American bourgeoisie, she looks to the realm of 
“culture”— traditionally associated, at least for her, with the aristocratic classes of 
Europe — for her “ideal of decency.” In this, as in all things, Flavia is a plagiarist, 
and (like many good capitalists), a thief. Her social status is borrowed, co-opted, 
even stolen, and this perhaps is what the French writer in the story, M. Roux, most
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vehemently objects to. Gather herself is suspicious of Flavia’s status, and is vicious 
in her condemnation of her lack of discernment in matters o f art.
Flavia has plenty of leisure, she has plenty of money to consume, but she is 
still nouveau-riche, and, like all Americans of this nascent, quasi-aristocratic ruling 
class, she lacks tradition, lacks cultural validation —  perhaps the one thing a class 
cannot purchase, at least not in its beginnings. It can only be mimicked. As Veblen 
reminds us;
The basis on which good repute in any highly organized industrial 
community ultimately rests is pecuniary strength; and the means of 
showing pecuniary strength and so of gaining or retaining a good 
name, are leisure and a conspicuous consumption of goods. 
Accordingly, both of these methods are in vogue as far down the scale 
as remain possible. (84)
However, Veblen continues, as communities become larger and more anonymous, 
and “it becomes necessary to reach a wider human environment,” consumption 
“begins to hold over leisure as an ordinary means of decency,” since people have no 
other way of judging a person’s reputability than “the display of goods (and perhaps 
of breeding)” which he is able to make “while he is under direct observation” (86).
In general, Veblen writes, “The only practicable means of impressing one’s 
pecuniary ability on these unsympathetic observers of one’s everyday life is an 
unremitting demonstration of ability to pay” (87). But, when those around you are 
also able to pay, are able to waste time and money conspicuously, how then does one 
assert a dominance of “reputability”?
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For Flavia, as for those who seek embourgeoisement and the necessary 
accompanying cultural capital, the answer lies in finding something else to consume, 
in order to eompete in the arena of eonsumption at the next level. “Consuming” the 
culture of the elite, buying the prestige of others by hosting them, then showing them 
off, rather like name-dropping, might give one a leg up so to speak, creating a new 
status marker for which others might then compete. Rather than commissioning their 
compositions or paintings, publishing their books, or hanging their art on walls, one 
might choose, as Flavia does, to try to own the artist’s very ideas, their very persons, 
to buy a place at the celebrity table. Flavia consistently speaks of artists or 
“interesting people,” as someone to be “got” in the sense of aequired goods. The 
crucial thing is the competition for such people: instead of someone else “getting” 
them at their house, to get them for yourself, so that everyone will know you won, 
that you have acquired the cachet of your guest, or, in the more perceptive and 
sardonic view of Jimmy, Flavia’s cousin, that they have become your inmate, that 
they live in your “cage.”
Besides the basic and well-known theory of conspicuous consumption, 
Veblen’s Theorv of the Leisure Class also details the notion of “conspicuous 
leisure.” The forces at work in pecuniary emulation have different effects on the 
lower class; as the upper or leisure class develops, the most conspicuous display of 
wealth is one’s ability to waste — not just money, but time. While the lower classes 
find pecuniary reputability in saving, the richest find reputability in wasteful 
behavior, including “an instinctive repugnance for the vulgar forms of labour” (37). 
Veblen further claims that “’’the ancient tradition of the predatory culture is that
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productive effort is to be shunned as being unworthy of able-bodied men, and this 
tradition is reinforced rather than set aside in the passage from the predatory to the 
quasi-peaceable manner of life” (39).
Before detailing Flavia’s predatory behavior, it is worth hearing Veblen out 
in order to be clear about his position on this issue:
The traits of predatory man are by no means obsolete in the common 
run of modem populations. They are present and can be called out in 
bold relief at any time by any appeal to the sentiments in which they 
express themselves . . .  The common run of the population of any 
industrial community is emancipated from these, economically 
considered, untoward propensities only in the sense that, through 
partial and temporary disuse they have lapsed into the background of 
sub-conscious motives. With varying degrees of potency in different 
individuals, they remain available for the aggressive shaping of men’s 
actions and sentiments whenever a stimulus of more than everyday 
intensity comes in to call them forth. And they assert themselves 
forcibly in any case where an occupation alien to the predatory culture 
has usurped the individual’s everyday range of interest and sentiment. 
This is the case among the leisure class and among certain portions of 
the population which are ancillary to that class. Hence the facility 
with which any new accessions to the leisure class take to sports and 
hence the rapid growth of sports and of the sporting sentiment in any
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industrial community where wealth has accumulated sufficiently to 
exempt a considerable part of the population from work. (264)
As Gather critiques one modem reaction to the sense of unease within the 
“unreal city” of urban culture/ the status-seeking commodity culture which Veblen 
described, “Flavia and Her Artists” answers the search for authentic experience at the 
fin de siècle. Flavia’s desire to house, feed and conspicuously display her 
“collection” of celebrities corresponds with Veblen’s notion of competitive, 
predatory sport. “Costly entertainments . . .  are peculiarly adapted to serve this end. 
The competitor with whom the entertainer wishes to institute a comparison i s . . .  
made to serve as a means to the end. He consumes vicariously for his host” while at 
the same time he is “witness to” his host’s excessive consumption (75).
Flavia’s bourgeois hedonism and predatory behavior are the results of a 
“stimulus of more than everyday intensity”: her need to acquire cultural capital. 
Flavia has both wealth and leisure, and her desire for reputability is certainly still 
insatiable; but this desire is further conflated with Flavia’s need for what Weber 
termed personal redemption — one goal of the establishment of a separate sphere of 
art, the “aesthetic culture” Weber claims is postulated by the bourgeoisie as an 
alternative to the pressures of modernity. Veblen argues that “The leisure rendered 
by the wife . . .  is, of course, not a simple manifestation of idleness or indolence.”
* This is, as Lears observes, the same “Swarming city” of Baudelaire, and the 
“Unreal city” of Eliot. Lears notes that “the most sensitive observers imagined the 
modem city as the breeding ground of a vapid, anonymous existence —  a death-in- 
life. Yet the perception of urban culture’s unreality was not simply the property of 
isolated literati. In various forms, that perception was shared by the educated 
bourgeoisie on both sides of the Atlantic; it was rooted in sweeping social changes 
which affected ordinary people as well as poets of genius” (32).
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Flavia’s leisure, like the housewife Veblen describes, vicariously displays her 
husband’s leisure and wealthy privilege, but while certainly contributing to her 
husband’s reputability, Flavia’s consumption of culture also takes on a form which 
conspicuously displays her own need to compete.
Gather writes, intriguingly, that one of the criticisms of Flavia is that her 
“absurd” behavior is embarrassing to her husband. Her cousin remarks, “A man isn’t 
going to see his wife make a guy of herself forever, is he?” (20). While the traditional 
duties of a wife in contributing to the husband’s reputability entail leisure, Veblen 
says that they are almost always “disguised under some form of work or household 
duties or social amenities, which prove on analysis to serve little or no ulterior end 
beyond showing that she does not and need not occupy herself with anything that is 
gainful or that is of substantial use” (82). While this remains true for Flavia, she has 
demonstrated her need to assert herself competitively, and, rather than consuming 
vicariously for her husband, she herself crosses the gendered line into ego-centered 
competition.
While this cross-gendered behavior is one reason Gather satirizes Flavia, 
there is another hint at cross-gendering in the story which counters the aggressive, 
predatory, and superficial character of Flavia. Flavia’s cousin, a famous female 
actress, is named “Jimmy” and is described more than once as reminding another 
guest of “a nice, clean, pink-and-white boy who has just had his cold bath, and come 
down all aglow for a run before breakfast” (4), and to whose face “rouge never seems 
to stick” (7). Jimmy, however, refuses to be categorized with “the artists.” In a much 
more sympathetic portrait. Gather has Jimmy declare, “Just remember, I’m not one of
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them; the artists I mean” (9). Jimmy is in fact the most celehrated and most talented 
of any on the premises, but refuses to be placed into the category of a mere celebrity 
in order to be used to increase Flavia’s status.
The story can then hest be read as Gather’s critique of the commodity culture 
which attempts to subsume and consume art for its own ends: which may be defined 
as the nouveau-riche’s need to participate in the cultural elitism which eludes them, 
their need to substitute authentic experience for religious conviction, and their sense 
that conspicuous consumption of “culture” will provide a kind of redemption on both 
counts. In the early stories Gather attempts to answer, in the sense Bakhtin describes, 
cultural questions concerning the potential for art to offer a separate space from 
modem consumer culture, the potential for it to offer authentic experience, and, 
especially in this story, the relation of art to class, to conspicuous consumption, and 
to the American work ethic. “Flavia and Her Artists” is Gather’s most sardonic 
comment on the loss of the separate sphere of art postulated by Weber in his notion 
of an aesthetic culture. But Weber’s notion of the personal redemption which may 
be found in this sphere is not simply the search for authentic experience, for 
meaning, but, I argue, a particularly American sense of that meaning, rooted in 
economic and class status and based on an ethic of conspicuous consumption.
As Lawrence Scaff notes in his discussion of Weber, the connection “between 
social structure and character was actually a Weberian theme from the 1890s” (112). 
Scaff glosses Weber’s notion of “calling” at the beginning of the new century in this 
way:
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our lives, choices, opportunities, and cultural values are constrained 
by the “iron cage” of material goods and acquisitiveness. “Victorious 
capitalism” can dispense with its ascetic orientation or ethos and rely 
instead on opposite norms — hedonism, gratification, consumption, 
greed. (100)
Weber of course pointed out the contradictions inherent in the idea of duty or 
vocation, which “prowls about in our lives like the ghost of dead religious beliefs,” 
and the ethically “unjustified” pursuit of wealth. In this story, through the character 
of Flavia, Gather also critiques the class which has exploited others in its pursuit of 
wealth, but she especially focuses on the pursuit of status — Veblen’s reputability — 
through the conspicuous consumption, or “iron cage” of acquisition, of art. For 
Flavia, the self-indulgent quest for reputability is at others’ expense, and Gather is 
clear that it is conflated with the notion of vocation, much the way the rationalized 
accumulation of wealth has become inseparable from the notion of vocation as 
Weber describes it in The Protestant Ethic.
While the status-seeking nouveau-riche class attempts to consume aesthetic 
culture, to appropriate it, the story makes it clear that Gather does not think that 
personal gratification, hedonism, status, or greed justifies this pursuit. As Gather 
satirizes the self-made snob, Flavia, she shows how far her own position is from 
simply maintaining an elitist position with regard to access to a rarefied art. Gather’s 
position, similar to a critic like Matthew Arnold, is complex in holding art’s intrinsic 
value safe against cultural exploitation. In holding art as a separate sphere, safe from 
consumerism and aesthetic devaluation. Gather is maintaining an antimodem,
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contradictory, pro-republican yet nevertheless antiprogressive position. This is, in 
effect, both radical and conservative in its protest against and fear of modernity as 
“victorious capitalism” and the market forces which inform it.
In each of her early stories Gather is concerned with various types of poseurs, 
of which Flavia represents only one. However, the picture of Flavia is perhaps 
Gather’s most critical and insightful representation of the modem consumer. In 
addition to her excessive consumption of objects, Flavia “collects” “interesting 
people” in order to be thought “clever,” in a huge house which is a kind of pseudo­
salon; her drive to he perceived as a patroness of the arts derives from what Jimmy 
calls her “icy fastness” of self-esteem, which is “like St. Peter’s; you can’t realize its 
magnitude all at once” (20). The conflation of Flavia’s enormous ego with her will to 
acquire cultural capital through what Gather calls Flavia’s “collection” of the “ayes 
rares ” answers Gather’s concerns regarding the relationship between the nouveau- 
riche and the artistic elite, as well as her concern to maintain an artistic sphere outside 
the realm of businesslike rationalization, free from the progressive (and aggressive) 
rhetoric of consumer capitalism at the fin de siècle. In addition, the eonflation of ego 
with consumerism points to a more basic problem of modernity: the ideology of 
individualism which Gather wrestles with throughout this early collection, and even 
later in such stories as “Neighbour Rosicky,” or her novels sueh as Mv Mortal Enemv. 
The Professor’s House, and Death Gomes for the Archbishop.
While Flavia takes herself quite seriously, she is never taken seriously by 
anyone else, and in fact is laughed at behind her baek by her guests, including her 
own cousin, and even the servants. Jimmy tells another guest that “you see, it’s on
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an entirely false basis. Flavia hasn’t the slightest notion of what these people are 
really like, their good and their had alike escape her. They, on the other hand, can’t 
imagine what she is driving at” (20). But, Jimmy continues, describing the most 
celehrated guest on the premises:
Roux, that merciless dissector of egoism . . .  saw at a glance what 
some of them do not perceive at once, and what will he mercifully 
concealed from Arthur [Flavia’s husband] until the trump sounds; 
namely, that all Flavia’s artists have done or ever will do means 
exactly as much to her as a symphony means to an oyster; that there is 
no bridge by which the significance of any work of art could he 
conveyed to her. (20)
The climax of the story occurs when the above-mentioned novelist, M. Roux, writes 
an editorial for the local paper which is published after he has fled the house for 
France. It is an all too-thinly veiled, misogynistic description of his hostess, and is 
entitled “Roux on Tuft Hunters; The Advanced American Woman As He Sees Her; 
Aggressive, Superficial and Insincere” (22). This becomes Arthur’s “cue to act,” to 
protect his wife from herself by publicly proclaiming that Roux is a “mountebank 
and a snake-charmer,” to Flavia’s utter horror, and furthermore proclaims that Roux 
is a person one might receive but would never stoop to accepting an invitation from 
(24). Arthur, “a pillar of law” and “a rather ascetic man” (who is remembered by 
Imogen, the central consciousness of the story, as “the magician of her childhood and 
the hero of innumerable Arabian fairy tales”), is a figure of opposition to Flavia’s 
hedonistic self-absorption. Arthur, the figure of anachronistic ascetic rationalism, is
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shown to be not only a good bourgeois, but also a good husband, though be risks bis 
wife’s disavowal of him through bis act of saving her from humiliation. The 
celebrity artists are shown to be opportunistic and obsequious, but also at the mercy 
of the culture of consumption as embodied in Flavia. When Arthur speaks of Roux 
in this way, it is an implicit condemnation of them as well from the standpoint of a 
stolid, old-fashioned morality based on a common sense view of bard work and 
decency. It is directly opposed to the self-serving hedonism of both the consumer 
and the market- driven celebrity.
Veblen’s notion of conspicuous consumption and predatory behavior seems 
particularly applicable to Flavia. For example, besides appropriating artists and 
intellectuals for reputability, she also steals their “stories and opinions.” Even more 
to the point, “Flavia,” Jimmy tells her friend, “is infinitely more subtile than that; she 
can soak up the very thrash and drift of your day dreams, and take the very thrills off 
your back as it were.” This is because Flavia “gets no feeling out of things herself, 
and she demands that you impart yours to her by some process of psychic 
transmission” (21). The theft of other people’s passions and the collection of artists 
and celebrities themselves suggest a new level of American consumption,^ and the 
exposition of this behavior by a “real” artist, not a celebrity at Flavia’s mercy, 
suggests an alternative voice which can answer the culture of consumption by
* And contemporary culture seems to have taken this even one step further. Anne 
Friedberg, for instance, notes in Window Shopping: Cinema and the Postmodern. 
“The marketing of ' commodity-experiences ’ has almost surpassed the marketing of 
goods” (115). Friedberg also quotes Baudrillard, who claims that “individuals no 
longer compete for the possession of goods, they actualize themselves in 
consumption” (115).
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maintaining, as Jimmy does, an alliance with the figure of ascetic rationalism 
(Arthur) and bourgeois values of hard work, dedication to one’s art, and the rejection 
of celebrity status.
While Flavia is certainly of the nouveau-riche, industrial ownership class, 
thus of the bourgeoisie, her status or reputability is still relatively unfixed. She is a 
new member of the leisure class, in Veblen’s scheme, and in order to justify her 
status, not out of any economic necessity, Flavia finds she must aggressively assert 
herself. In her case, this manifests as the aggressive pursuit of cultural capital 
through the celebrity associations she cultivates; their experience bought and paid for 
in her quest for intense authenticity to make up for a lack of meaning in her own life. 
As her guest Imogen, who is the daughter of an old friend and not a celebrity, asks, 
“in the name of goodness, why does she bother? .. . She is pretty, wealthy, well- 
established; why should she bother?” The only answer Jimmy can give her is that, 
“To Flavia, it is more necessary to be called clever than to breathe” (20). While able 
to consume whatever material goods she desires, Flavia and her nascent, quasi- 
aristocratic class still need validation. As Veblen observes, “this conspicuous leisure 
of which decorum is a ramification grows gradually into a laborious drill in 
deportment and an education in taste” as to “what articles of consumption are 
decorous and what are the decorous methods of consuming them” (50). Veblen’s 
tone is most viciously satirical when he claims that “the possibility of producing 
pathological and other idiosyncrasies of person and manner by shrewd mimicry and a 
systematic drill have been turned to account in the deliberate production of a cultured 
class” (50). The “process vulgarly known as snobbery” is the outcome.
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However, Veblen further notes that “A standard of life would still be possible 
which should admit of invidious comparison in other respects than that of opulence; 
as, for instance, a comparison in various directions in the manifestation of moral, 
physical, intellectual, or aesthetic force. Comparison in all these directions is in 
vogue to-day.” But, he continues,
the comparison made in these respects is commonly so inextricably 
bound up with the pecuniary comparison as to be scarcely 
distinguishable from the latter. This is especially true as regards the 
current rating of expressions of intellectual and aesthetic force or 
proficiency; so that we frequently interpret as aesthetic or intellectual 
a difference which in substance is pecuniary only. (97)
The pathos surrounding Flavia is that she does not seem to realize that she has 
bought and paid for the company of these people; they do not see her as any type of 
equal, they do not think of her as she thinks of herself (i.e., having “intellectual or 
aesthetic force or proficiency”), and that her status is completely and utterly 
dependant upon her “pecuniary” ability. She has mistaken her own “ability to pay” 
for aesthetic or intellectual ability. Her search for her own personal validation and 
redemption through cultural consumption is an impossible one unless the society 
also “interprets as aesthetic or intellectual a difference which in substance is 
pecuniary only.” The potential for this realization seems to be one of Gather’s 
gravest concerns. In her antimodemist reaction, she betrays a sense that “pecuniary 
substance” may have indeed begun to be confused with aesthetic or intellectual 
quality. Furthermore, Flavia has often mistaken mere celebrity success, which is
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ultimately often pecuniary success based on market forces on the fringes of 
aesthetic culture, for intellectual ability or aesthetic excellence. This, despite her 
own pecuniary success, is not a mistake made by the “real” artist, Jimmy.
Throughout her career. Gather will persist in her critique of the American 
obsession with acquisition; to give just one example, Paul Comeau has noted how, in 
Gather’s 1925 novel The Professor’s House, Professor St. Peter returns from a 
shopping trip in Ghicago exhausted from the “orgy of acquisition” on which his 
family insists, and Gomeau reads the novel as partly a critique of such consumerism 
(154).*° Gather describes her intentions in writing the book in a 1938 letter, 
published as “On the Professor’s House” in Willa Gather on Writing:
In my book I tried to make Professor St. Peter’s house rather 
overcrowded and stuffy with new things; American proprieties, 
clothes, furs, petty ambitions, quivering jealousies — until one got 
rather stifled. Then 1 wanted to open the square window and let in 
the fresh air that blew off the Blue Mesa . . . .  (31)
Gather’s anti-consumerist aesthetic is also demonstrated in her 1922 essay “The 
Novel Démeublé,” in which she speaks of “unftimishing” the novel, to rid it of 
unnecessary clutter which will not stand the test of time. Her stated aesthetic 
preferences, as well as her fictional representations, answer the consumerist culture 
of the time, insisting on simple, elemental depictions that qualify the contemporary
Paul Gomeau, “The Professor’s House and Anatole France,” in Gritical Essavs on 
Willa Gather, ed. John J. Murphy (Boston: G.K. Hall, 1984): 223.
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notion of realism. Her denunciation of what is usually termed “realism” in the novel 
is, moreover, significantly figured as a rejection of consumerist materialism:
But is not realism, more than it is anything else, an attitude of mind 
on the part of the writer toward his material, a vague indication of 
the sympathy and candour with which he accepts, rather than 
chooses, his theme? Is the story of a banker who is unfaithful to his 
wife and who ruins himself by speculation in trying to gratify the 
caprices of his mistresses, at all reinforced by a masterly exposition 
of banking, our whole system of credits, the methods of the Stock 
Exchange? Of course, if the story is thin these things do reinforce it 
in a sense, — any amount of red meat thrown into the scale to make 
the beam dip. But are the banking system and the Stock Exchange 
worth being written about at all? Have such things any proper place 
in imaginative art? (38)
Gather replies to her own question by claiming that “Balzac tried out the 
value of literalness in the novel. . .To reproduce on paper the actual city of Paris; the 
houses, the upholstery, the food, the wines, the game of pleasure, the game of 
business, the game of finance: a stupendous ambition —  but,” she concludes, “after 
all, unworthy of an artist.” Gather claims, “In exactly so far as he succeeded in 
pouring out on his pages that mass of brick and mortar and furniture and proceedings 
in bankruptcy, in exactly so far he defeated his end” (38). In her essay “The Best 
Stories of Sarah Ome Jewett,” Gather describes the problem of most novels which, 
unlike Jewett’s, cannot “confront time and change . . . serenely” (58). “If a writer’s
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attitude toward his characters and his scene is as vulgar as a showman’s, as 
mercenary as an auctioneer’s, vulgar and meretricious will his product for ever 
remain” (57).
In “The Novel Démeublé” Gather differentiates Balzac’s realism from 
Tolstoi’s, claiming that “We have had too much of the interior decorator and the 
‘romance of business’ since [Balzac’s] day,” but that “Tolstoi was almost as great a 
lover of material things as Balzac”:
almost as much interested in the way dishes were cooked, and 
people were dressed, and houses were furnished. But there is this 
determining difference: the clothes, the dishes, the haunting 
interiors of those old Moscow houses, are always so much a part of 
the emotions of the people that they are perfectly synthesized; they 
seem to exist, not so much in the author’s mind, as in the emotional 
penumbra of the characters themselves. When it is fused like this, 
literalness ceases to be literalness — it is merely part of the 
experience. (39-40)
These statements underline Gather’s resistance to the modem ethos of meaningless 
acquisition, to what she terms the “enumeration” of material detail. In conflating the 
minimal material necessary for exposition with “the emotional penumbra of the 
characters,” Gather in effect redefines realism. What she calls “the material 
investiture of the story” should be “presented as if unconsciously”— and here 
Gather’s contempt for the acquisitive instinct becomes even more apparent — “by
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the reserved, fastidious hand of an artist, not by the gaudy fingers of a showman or 
the mechanical industry of a department-store window-dresser” (41).
It is not that Gather objects to sensation, as I demonstrate in chapter three of 
this project, but her statements seem to prefigure the kind of critique later theorists 
like Cornel West put forward of the American “addiction to stimulation.” In a 1991 
essay on postmodern culture. West agrees with Fredric Jameson in his thesis that 
“commodification of culture and commercialization of the arts are the major factors 
in postmodern culture,” and that the modernist T.S. Eliot:
rightly noted decades ago that American society is a deritualized 
one, with deracinated and denuded individuals “distracted from 
distraction by distraction” — that is, addicted to stimulation, in part, 
to evade the boredom and horror Baudelaire saw as the distinctive 
features of modem life. And in a society and culture that evolves 
more and more around the buying and selling of commodities for 
stimulatory pleasures — be it bodily, psychic, or intellectual — 
people find counsel, consolation . . . .  (41)
West’s (and Jameson’s) critique echoes that of Weber’s which posited what 
Lawrence Scaff has called a “disenchantment thesis.”
In an essay entitled “Weher On the Cultural Situation of the Modem Age,” 
Scaff notes that for Weber:
Modemity represents a loss of the sacred sense of wholeness and 
reconciliation between self and world provided by myth, magic, 
tradition, religion, or immanent nature. It ushers in the disraptive
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sense of disengagement, abstraction, alienation, homelessness, and 
“the problem of meaning” that begins to gnaw at the vital core of 
modem experience and social philosophy. (Scaff 105)
Part of the reaction to this is a turn to aesthetic culture, as an attempt to “take a stand 
against rationalism, carving out a protected zone of exclusion for [art], or cultivating 
a posture of redemption from mechanization or the merely technically rational 
through art”—  what Adorno, referring primarily to music, called “an irresponsible 
Ersatz for primary religious experience” (Scaff 114).
The problem of art for Weber, as for many antimodemist thinkers, was the 
emphasis on interiority as a reaction to the impersonal and formidable determining 
forces at work in the urban industrialized world: in response to the “technique” of 
everyday life, art becomes another form of the technical and rational in its attempt to 
“mirror the metropolis,” as Scaff puts it. But, and here we see the antimodem 
ambivalence inherent in many different types of reactions to culture at this moment, 
art is also, simultaneously, “an effort to criticize and overcome its limitations” (114). 
Art therefore, for Weber, can be effective only insofar as it uses the techniques of 
industrialized urbanity in an attempt to confront that very manifestation of 
rationality. Weber especially sees poetry (in his later 1924 work, Gesammelte 
Aufsatze zur Soziologie und Sozialpolitik). as:
partly a protest, as a specific means of escape from this [mechanized] 
reality — that is, escape through the highest aesthetic abstractions or 
the deepest dream-states or more intense forms of excitation — and 
partly as a means of adaptation, an apology for its own fantastic and
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intoxicating rhythmics. Lyric poetry.. .poetry characterized by such 
intense consciousness of the last impregnable fortress of purely 
artistic form, yet aware of the frenzy produced by the technique of our 
lives — could not be written at all without the poet allowing the 
experience of the modem metropolis to flow through himself, even 
though these impressions devour him, shatter and parcel out his soul, 
and even though he may condemn them to the abyss, (cf Scaff 115) 
Scaff glosses this by saying that, for Weber, “This portrait of the artist is a paradox: a 
mirror of the times, yet a rebellious figure; a defender of I’art pour I’art. but a 
proponent of art in the service of personal redemption and social criticism” (115).
Gather’s early stories, which deal with the urban, the modem, and the 
alienated individualism of the fin de siècle, have seemed superficial and limited to 
many critics, especially as contrasted with her later work in the broader American 
and even mythical landscape. But Gather attempts to contain the contradictions 
within the culture, to answer them; in the early stories she is “mirroring the 
metropolis,” not through poetic lyricism, but through a realism which attempts to 
essentialize the materialistic culture without sacrificing her own art to excessive 
“material investiture.” She tries to at once defend the role of art as protest in 
modemity, and yet in doing so betrays her need for personal redemption in and 
through art. Gather’s defense of art and culture in an attempt to keep them 
“disinterested,” to divorce art from what she terms “economics,” coupled with the 
desire for art to fill a space vacated by the spiritual retreat necessitated by modemity 
(and a space she recursively writes into several of the early stories), brands her as an
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antimodem paradox. Just as Caroline both flees from and actively seeks out the 
“shadows” that “were the reality” in “The Garden Lodge,” in “Flavia and Her 
Artists” Gather writes an emptiness into Flavia’s consumerism while still suggesting 
that art may have a contribution to make in filling that lack. While Flavia has no real 
conception of the power of art, and is therefore “false” in her approach, this is not a 
dismissal of art’s power to transform.
“Art, it seems to me, should simplify,” Gather writes in her essay “On the Art 
of Fiction.” She also seems to address the modem need for further and constant 
stimulation:
I should say the greatest obstacles that writers today have to get 
over are the dazzling joumalistic successes of twenty years ago . . .  
The whole aim of that school of writing was novelty — never a very 
important thing in art. They gave us altogether, poor standards — 
taught us to multiply our ideas instead of to condense them.
. . .  their work, when one looks back on it, now that the novelty 
upon which they counted so much is gone, is joumalistic and thin. 
(102)
The altemative aesthetic to novelty and enumeration, however, is the 
stripping down of life to its “essentials,” which leaves room for what Gather feels is 
“real”: the “shades of sweetness and anguish” that simply cannot emerge among a 
cluttered, superficial accounting of material reality. “The higher processes of art are 
all processes of simplification,” Gather claims in “The Novel Démeublé.” “The 
novelist must leam to write, and then he must unleam it” (40). Gather’s description
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of her intent in The Professor’s House, “to open the square window and let in the 
fresh air of the Blue Mesa,” shows her ambivalence towards modem American 
culture, stuffed with “proprieties,” stifling in its obsession with the “new.” Yet the 
book, like many of her stories, contains another rarefied landscape, a separate space 
which still holds both the promise and the relics of art for art’s sake: the pottery made 
by the Anasazi, not for utility, but painted for the sake of beauty. “Hundreds of years 
ago,” Gather writes in an article entitled “Escapism,” “before European civilization 
had touched this continent, the Indian women in the old rock-perched pueblos of the 
Southwest were painting geometrical patterns on the jars in which they carried water.
. .  Why did they take the trouble?” She continues:
These people lived under the perpetual threat of drought and famine; 
they often shaped their graceful cooking pots when they had nothing 
to cook in them. Anyone who looks over a collection of prehistoric 
Indian pottery dug up from old burial-mounds knows at once that the 
potters experimented with form and colour to gratify something that 
had no concern with food and shelter. (19)
Art — poetry, painting, architecture, sculpture and music — Gather claims, “did not 
come into being as a means of increasing the game supply or promoting tribal 
security. They sprang from an unaccountable predilection of the one unaccountable 
thing in man” (19). Just as Imogen asks Jimmy in “Flavia and Her Artists,” “why 
does she bother?” Gather, here, asks a similar question. But the answer is very 
different, as is the context. Art, considered in a sphere separate from consumer
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culture, in the fresh air off the mesa, divorced from economics, serves a clearer, even 
spiritual, purpose.
Later in the “The Novel Démeublé,” Gather describes the “high quality” of 
“the novel or the drama” in opposition to the more “joumalistic” forms of modem 
writing:
How wonderful it would be if we could throw all the fumiture out 
of the window; and along with it, all the meaningless reiterations 
conceming physical sensations, all the tiresome old pattems, and 
leave the room as bare as the stage of a Greek theatre, or as that 
house into which the glory of Pentecost descended; leave the scene 
bare for the play of emotions, great and little — for the nursery tale, 
no less than the tragedy, is killed by tasteless amplitude. (42-3) 
Perhaps the most significant distinction Gather draws in this essay is signaled by the 
term “tasteless” and points to her belief in the very different qualities of types of art. 
There is art which is “mass produced” for “amusement,” as things are produced for 
consumption and subsequent disposal, and there is “art” which can be “enjoyed,” 
playing upon the bare stage, evoking emotion. Her descriptive language is here 
infused with a spiritual connotation, suggesting transcendence, even an allusion to 
the descent of the Holy Spirit. The latter art, playing upon a bare stage, exemplifies 
the characteristics of her new approach to realism; when the material objects are 
“fused” with the emotions of the characters, “literalness ceases to be literalness — it 
is merely part of the experience” (40). Gather implicitly conflates art with 
“experience” here, and in the process differentiates the representation or
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consumption of material reality from “real life,” from “the emotional penumbra of 
the experience,” in a way which mirrors the split between matter and spirit, between 
this world and the next, of religious belief.
The spirit versus matter trope is found again in another discussion of Gather’s 
sense of realism in fiction: “One does not wish the egg one eats for breakfast, or the 
morning papers, to be made of the stuff of immortality.” But, again. Gather’s theory 
belies a contradictory position: art is transcendent, “immortal,” but also serves the 
very modem purposes Weber identified as “personal redemption and social 
criticism.” Gather continues her statement:
The novel manufactured to entertain great multitudes of people must 
be considered exactly like a cheap soap or a cheap perfume, or cheap 
furniture. Fine quality is a distinct disadvantage in articles made 
for great numbers of people who do not want quality but quantity, 
who do not want a thing that “wears,” but who want change, — a 
succession of new things that are quickly threadbare and can be 
lightly thrown away. Does anyone pretend that if the Wool worth 
store windows were piled high with Tanagra figurines at ten cents, 
they could for a moment compete with Kewpie brides in the 
popular esteem? Amusement is one thing; enjoyment of art is 
another. (36)
Gather insists that “one must make it clear whether one is talking about the novel as a 
form of amusement, or as a form of art; since they serve very different purposes and
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in very different ways” (35). And, again, in “On the Art of Fiction,” in 1920, she 
emphasizes the point:
Writing ought either to be the manufacture of stories for which 
there is a market demand —  a business as safe and commendable as 
making soap or breakfast foods — or it should be an art, which is 
always a search for something for which there is no market 
demand, something new and untried, where the values are intrinsic 
and have nothing to do with standardized values. The courage to go 
on without compromise does not come to a writer all at once — nor, 
for that matter, does the ability. (103)
The “courage to go on without compromise” implies resistance to “standardized 
values,” and is an implicit social criticism of a consumer culture which finds “safe” 
literature or art making up the “market demand.” The “enjoyment of art” and social 
criticism, despite Gather’s adherence to the notion of transcendence, are inseparable.
In “Flavia and Her Artists,” Gather furthers this distinction between art and 
business, using the trope of the artist him or herself as proof of the modem obsession 
with conspicuous consumption. The artists, and implicitly the art they produce, 
become products for Flavia’s consumption, part of “standardized values” and 
business as safe as making soap or breakfast foods, and as easily bought. This is 
evidence of the intrusion of modem consumer behavior and market values into the 
realm of art: the artist no longer functions independently of market forces and is 
dependant upon consumer “taste.” Gather’s nouveau-riche character, Flavia, 
becomes the arbiter of “tasteless amplitude,” collecting artists and celebrities around
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her like Kewpie dolls, without any basis for discernment than their popularity. Since 
she has, as Pierre Bourdieu might argue, no “legitimate way of appropriating 
culture,” Flavia needs to consume, and to consume conspicuously. Bourdieu claims 
that “to the socially recognized hierarchy of the arts, and within each of them, of 
genres, schools or periods, corresponds a social hierarchy of the consumers. This 
predisposes tastes to function as markers of ‘class’” (2).
Flavia’s point in collecting artists who are well-recognized is to further her 
own status, certainly not to “enjoy” art. As a fledgling bourgeois, Flavia needs all 
the cultural capital and legitimation she can get. Literally “buying into” the 
consumer ideology of fame, Flavia believes that her association with celebrity artists 
will further her claims to cultural legitimacy (class) and reputability (as an 
individual). As Flavia “enumerates” her collection to her guests as they arrive: 
Imogen realized the completeness of Flavia’s triumph. They were 
people of one name, mostly, like kings; people whose names 
stirred the imagination like a romance or a melody. With the 
notable exception of M. Roux, Imogen had seen most of them 
before, either in concert halls or lecture rooms; they looked 
noticeably older and dimmer than she remembered them. (12)
The celebrities — “Schemetzkin,” “Maidenwood,” “Wellington,” “Schotte,” 
“Martel,” Roux”— signify to Flavia a kind of cultural distinction; their celebrity 
status accords them, and thus by association herself, a distinction among other 
consumers.
121
Flavia’s collection is a manifestation of what Bourdieu has termed “the 
ideology of eharisma.” Flavia’s taste is informed by her soeial origins, and, as 
Bourdieu elaims, “the manner in whieh culture has been acquired lives on in the 
manner of using it,” including the ability (or inability) to “decipher” the eodes of 
“taste.” Bourdieu claims:
Consumption is . . .  a stage in a process of communication, that is, 
an act of deciphering, decoding, which presupposes praetical or 
explicit mastery of a cipher or code.. . .  A work of art has meaning 
and interest only for someone who possesses the cultural 
competence, that is, the eode, into which it is encoded.. .  .A 
beholder who laeks the specific code feels most in a chaos of 
sounds and rhythms, colors and lines, without rhyme or reason . ..
He cannot move from the “primary stratum of the meaning we can 
grasp on the basis of our ordinary experience” to the “stratum of 
secondary meanings” . . .  unless he possesses the concepts which 
go beyond the sensible properties and which identify the 
specifically stylistic properties of the work. (2)
While Flavia is notable in her attempt to commodify aesthetic and intellectual 
pleasure, her lack of discernment leads her to infer that the mere presence of a 
celebrity artist, a type of window-dressing, means that she is on the same level 
intellectually and aesthetically, and this provides her with “consolation” if not 
counsel. Consolation here means that she has found some reputability, at least in her 
own mind, for Gather will not allow art to provide “redemption” without a full
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understanding of it. For the guests this means, among other things, their confinement 
to what Jimmy ironically terms “the cages” (6). As Flavia’s wealth and leisure has 
increased, her desire for cultural reputability drives her so that now her guests are 
“less and less . . .those mysterious persons with mysterious obstacles in their paths 
and mysterious grievances against the world,” for “she had now the few, the select, 
the ‘best’” (6).
Gather writes that in homage to her own success at seducing artists to join her 
company, “Flavia’s [new] house was the mirror of her exultation; it was a temple to 
the gods of Victory, a sort of triumphal arch” (6), through which there is an endless 
procession of the newest “arrived” celebrity artists and intellectuals. As the line 
between celebrity, commodity culture and art becomes more diffuse and illegible, the 
nouveau-riche asserts “taste” in its “amplitude” of acquisition. In her assertion of 
“taste” in her consumption, Flavia distracts herself, but she also betrays her need for 
cultural acceptance and for the cultural capital she hopes to acquire through her 
association with those “of one name, mostly, like kings” (12).
In noting the effects of mass marketing on manufacturing, Walter Benjamin 
comments on the development of “taste” in the consumer. In “The Paris of the 
Second Empire in Baudelaire,” Benjamin claims that:
Taste develops when commodity production clearly surpasses any 
other kind of production. The manufacture of products as 
commodities for a market ensures that the conditions of their 
production — not only societal conditions, in the form of exploitation, 
but technological ones as well — will gradually vanish from the
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perceived world of the people. The consumer, who is more or less 
expert when he gives an order to an artisan . . .  is not usually 
knowledgeable when he acts as a buyer. Added to this is the fact that 
mass production, which aims at turning out inexpensive commodities, 
must strive to disguise bad quality. In most cases, mass production 
actually benefits when the buyer has little expertise. The more 
industry progresses, the more perfect are the imitations it offers on the 
market.. . .  As the expertness of a customer declines, the importance 
of his taste increases proportionately —  both for him and for the 
manufacturer. For the consumer, it serves as a more or less elaborate 
masking of his lack of expertness. For the manufacturer, it serves as a 
fresh stimulus to consumption . . .  (64-5)
Art as a commodity, and celebrity artists as producers or manufacturers, coexist in 
commodity culture as perpetrators of fraud.
Flavia, Gather writes, has a “note” which is “manifestly false” (11). Her face 
was “a perfect scream of animation,” “created and maintained by sheer, indomitable 
force of will” (11). As she throws herself into heated discussion with a novelist who 
“had fallen into the hands of a great American syndicate . . .  which had guaranteed to 
make him famous before he was thirty” and another artist arguing for the censorship 
the syndicate insisted upon, another semi-famous person, a chemist, “demanded the 
attention of the entire company for exposition of his devices for manufacturing ice­
cream from vegetable oils, and for administering drugs in bonbons” (13). And yet 
Flavia pretends that they are all “the artists.” As the line between commodity and
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artist has dissolved, the line between taste and acquisition for the sake of status has 
also disappeared, and Flavia is no “expert” despite her assertions of “taste” for “only 
the best.” Since Flavia cannot understand the “significance of any work of art” and 
since “all Flavia’s artists have done .. .means exactly as much to her as a symphony 
means to an oyster,” Flavia shows herself incapable of moving beyond Bourdieu’s 
“primary stratum” to the signifying stratum, and hence, is unable to “decipher the 
code” of the expert, or for that matter, of the imitator. Her consumption of culture is 
as crude as her apprehension of it; and just as she confuses reputability with 
pecuniary worth, she confuses the primary stratum of celebrity with the “art which is 
to be enjoyed”— which, for Gather, still offers personal redemption.
Flavia is self-deluded of course, but is also rather frightened. The sense of 
unease Lears has identified as attendant upon modem life is, as in “The Garden 
Lodge,” written into this story. For instance. Gather writes that “For all her sparkling 
assurance of manner, Flavia was certainly always ill at ease, and even more certainly 
anxious.” Further:
She seemed not convinced of the established order of material things, 
seemed always to conceal her feeling that walls might crumble, 
chasms open, or the fabric of her life fly to the winds in irretrievable 
entanglement. At least this was the impression Imogen got from that 
note in Flavia which was so manifestly false. (11)
Flavia lacks the moral commitment and firm spiritual grounding that Lears has noted 
in the bourgeoisie of the fin de siècle. Her moral commitments are, as Lears says, 
“hazy” and vague, and conspicuous consumption will help to displace this unease, at
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least temporarily. And, like so many faced with the enervation of modem life, Flavia 
will look to the realm of aesthetic culture, or what she perceives to be aesthetic 
culture, as an antidote to the sense of unreality.
But Flavia’s artists are rather understandably obsequious and resentful, 
depending upon their history with her. As if to underscore the predatory aspect of 
Flavia’s needs, Gather shows that Flavia treats those artists who have not paid back 
her attentions with fame as expendable. As her economic and pecuniary reputability 
has increased, she can now afford to have only “the few, the select, ‘the best’” and of 
all those she had first started with, “of all that band of indigent retainers who had 
once fed at her board like the suitors in the halls of Penelope, only Alcée Buisson 
still retained his right of entrée.” This is because:
he alone had remembered that ambition hath a knapsack at his back, 
wherein he puts alms to oblivion, and he alone had been considerate 
enough to do what Flavia had expected of him, and give his name a 
current value in the world. (6)
As Jimmy puts it, “he was her first real one”; and “Flavia, like Mahomet, could 
remember her first believer” (7). The reference to belief is significant since Gather 
represents in this story, as in “The Garden Lodge,” the sense of unease attendant upon 
modem life. Lacking moral commitment and firm spiritual grounding, thus looking for 
conspicuous consumption and aesthetic culture to alleviate the sense of her own 
weightlessness, Flavia will take her protégés as evidence that her life has purpose.
While “Flavia and Her Artists” only warrants one paragraph in Loretta 
Wasserman’s study of Gather’s short fiction, where she claims that the story
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“introduce[s] a number of psychological crosscurrents —  so many that the reader 
wearies of following them” (27), it is those very “crosscurrents” that I find most 
interesting in light of Gather’s antimodem stance. Susan Rosowski, in her book The 
Voyage Perilous: Willa Gather’s Romanticism, claims that while Gather’s 
“technique” in the early stories is “often quite good,” what is “missing” is 
“conviction” (29). Rosowski seems to hold that Gather’s primary intention in 
writing the story was to parody an acquaintance (Dorothy Ganfield Fisher’s mother), 
who, like Flavia, entered the “world of art,” as Rosowski puts it, “falsely.” While 
this parodie intent is of course tme, it nonetheless misses the answer Gather gives to 
consumerist modernity. Rather than lacking conviction. Gather holds strong 
convictions: the key point being that there is more than one “conviction.” Based as 
Gather’s convictions are on a commitment to American individualism that is itself 
inherently contradictory and therefore, like most antimodem strategies — as Lears 
argues throughout No Place of Grace — has unintended consequences, there are in 
fact, as Wasserman claims, many “crosscurrents” in the story. However, they aren’t 
particularly “psychological” as she asserts, but rather sociological and historical. 
Gather’s dual commitment is strong: to individualism and to the antimodem impulse 
to protest modemity’s effects on the realm of art, especially as it manifests through 
consumption.
Gather’s contradictions or conflicting commitments may be understood as a 
dialogic relationship which can be located in her texts. As Bakhtin claims in 
“Discourse in the Novel”:
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Language — like the living concrete environment in which the 
consciousness of the verbal artist lives — is never unitary. It is 
unitary only as an abstract grammatical system of normative forms, 
taken in isolation from the uninterrupted process of historical 
becoming that is characteristic of all living language. Actual social 
life and historical becoming create within an abstractly unitary 
national language a multitude of concrete worlds, a multitude of 
bounded verbal ideological and social belief systems; within these 
various systems (identical in the abstract) are elements of language 
filled with various semantic and axiological content and each with 
its own different sound . .  .Thus at any given moment of its 
historical existence, language is heteroglot from top to bottom: it 
represents the co-existence of socio-ideological contradictions 
between the present and the past, between differing epochs of the 
past, between different socio-ideological groups in the present, 
between tendencies, school, circles and so forth, all given a bodily 
form. These “languages” of heteroglossia intersect each other in a 
variety of ways, forming new socially typifying “languages”. .. 
(33-34)
Gather’s antimodem aesthetic maintains commitment to at least two strains within
American culture: the antimodem yet “progressive” strain of American individualism
and the work ethic, and the fear of and critique of hedonistic excess, most clearly
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manifest in consumerist culture, which is of course itself dependant on the ideology 
of radical individualism.
In her ambivalence towards the individual, and perhaps rooted in her own 
sense of the loss of authenticity of modem “unreal” life as she begins her writing 
career in the city. Gather posits the nouveau-riche consumer against a figure of what 
Weber termed ascetic rationalism, Arthur, “the pillar of law,” but also against the 
true artist, Jimmy, still uncontaminated by market forces and immune to Flavia’s 
attempts to appropriate her. In this story the “crosscurrents” can be more usefully 
understood as a multitude of “languages” competing for validation, for the right to 
“answer” the conditions within which a language must function.
Bakhtin claims that “concrete socio-ideological language consciousness, as it 
becomes creative — that is, as it becomes active as literature — discovers itself 
already surrounded by heteroglossia and not at all a single, unitary language, 
inviolable and indisputable.” Art as “answerability” then is inherently dialogic, even, 
one could say, multilingual. In “Discourse in the Novel,” Bakhtin also claims:
The actively literary linguistic consciousness at all times and 
everywhere .. .comes upon ‘languages,’ and not language. 
Consciousness finds itself inevitably facing the necessity of having 
to choose a language. (295)
Gather does not resist but rather participates in this heteroglossia of language, 
representing this multiplicity through the various characters and their responses in 
the story. However, as Bakhtin claims.
With each literary-verbal performance, consciousness must
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actively orient itself amidst heteroglossia, it must move in and 
oceupy a position for itself within it, it chooses, in other words, a 
“language.” Only by remaining in a elosed environment, one 
without writing or thought, completely off the maps of socio- 
ideological becoming, could a man fail to sense this activity of 
selecting a language and rest assured in the inviolability of his own 
language, the conviction that his language is predetermined. (295)
One of the striking things about Gather’s story is the multiplicity of points of 
view and “languages” spoken in the house, and — more importantly — Flavia’s 
distinct obliviousness to this. Coupled with her own glaring assurance of the 
“inviolability” of her own language, that is, her strength of will in attempting to bend 
all “her artists” to her intentions, she in effect requires that they submit to her 
“language” of acquisition. Gather’s answer to the heteroglossia of the socio- 
ideological moment is here figured in the variety of characters populating Flavia’s 
“closed environment,” where Flavia appropriates without much thought, much less 
artistic or intellectual endeavor of her own. Flavia’s house is significantly described 
by Jimmy as an “asylum for the arts,” “where” as Imogen observes, “people stalk 
about with a sort of mad-house dignity, each one fancying himself a king or a pope”
(27). In addition to housing the “languages” of ascetic rationalism, consumerism and 
aesthetic culture, there are frauds, pedants, pseudo-scientists, and pseudo-musicians. 
For example:
After dinner the guests took their coffee in the music-room, where 
Schemetzkin sat down at the piano to drum rag-time, and give his
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celebrated imitation of the boarding-school girl’s execution of 
Chopin. He flatly refused to play anything more serious, and would 
practice only in the morning, when he had the music-room to himself. 
Hamilton and M. Roux repaired to the smoking-room to discuss the 
necessity of extending the tax on manufactured articles in France . . .  
After Schmetzkin had grimaced and tortured the keyboard with 
malicious vulgarities for half an hour. Signor Donati, to put an end to 
his torture, consented to sing. . .  (15)
And, as Arthur notes, “the tenor,” is “a shaken reed,” “pathetic” (17). In addition, as 
Jimmy notes, “Chaos has already begun in the servants’ quarters. There are six 
different languages spoken there now,” and, when asked what Arthur must think of it 
all, she replies, “what would any man think of having his house turned into an hotel, 
habited by freaks who discharge his servants, borrow his money, and insult his 
neighbours? This place is shunned like a lazaretto!” (19) Flavia is clearly a 
transgressive character, but Cather’s depiction of her behavior as transgressive calls 
into question not only the progressive, bourgeois values of reputability, but the 
modem access to cultural capital and aesthetic culture through the market and 
conspicuous consumption.
“Language,” as Bakhtin argues, “is not a neutral medium that passes freely 
and easily into the private property of the speaker’s intentions; it is populated — 
overpopulated — with the intentions of others. Expropriating it, forcing it to submit 
to one’s own intentions and accents, is a difficult and complicated process”; and, 
further,
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not all words for just anyone submit equally easily to this 
appropriation, to this seizure and transformation into private 
property; many words stubbornly resist, others remain alien, sound 
foreign in the mouth of the one who appropriated them and who 
now speaks them; they cannot be assimilated into his context and 
fall out of it; it is as if they put themselves in quotation marks 
against the will of the speaker. (35)
Gather signifies this difficulty of appropriation of language, and most 
especially her disdain for the appropriation of the language of the artist, in Flavia’s 
attempts to mimic the artists whom she hosts in her house. Flavia literally cannot 
discern between artistic, literary intention and the popularized version of the artist, 
available to her through legendary accounts of their celebrity. For instance, one of 
the guests, Martel, has told Flavia of his own admiration for another guest, the 
celebrated Roux. Of him Martel:
had enthusiastically declared, “There are schools and schools, 
manners and manners; but Roux is Roux, and Paris sets its watches 
by his clock.” Flavia had already repeated this remark to Imogen.
It haunted her, and each time she quoted it she was impressed 
anew. (13)
As her cousin Jimmy Broadwood notes, Flavia could, “on occasion, utter things 
simply incomprehensible for their banality — at her feats of this sort Miss 
Broadwood was wont to sit breathless with admiration” (14). The most notable time 
this occurs in the story is when Flavia addresses the novelist. Roux, attempting to
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elicit from him a compliment for her “appreciation” of artists (those she terms “the 
best”). In order to impress Roux with her worldliness she will repeat the clock 
comment to his face as well. M. Roux responds with utter disbelief and astonishment 
at her attempts to appropriate his status, and at her lack of dignity in doing so; her 
attempts to draw him into conversation as she asserts herself, practically begging for 
recognition of her intelligence and perceptiveness only betray her lack of either. 
Roux clearly thinks of her as aggressive and self-serving, as he will show in the 
published article on American women which makes no attempt to disguise the 
particular prototype for his contempt. Despite his having accepted her invitation to 
stay at what Jimmy calls “an hotel, inhabited by freaks” Roux will betray his hostess 
in the most public way, in the resistant language of newsprint (20).
Cather’s characters in “Flavia and Her Artists” not only compete with each 
other for what Bourdieu terms “distinction” through their assertion of their own 
“language” — of fiction, of sculpture, of song, of science — but some, like Roux, 
also resist the appropriation of their languages by Flavia’s language of conspicuous 
consumption. The dialectic within the story is figured through the characters who 
resist and those who accommodate to this language of acquisition and appropriation. 
Cather’s crosscurrents are thus figures of competing discourses within an ambivalent 
antimodem moment, not mere psychological conflicts which the “reader wearies of 
following.”
One point of resistance to Flavia’s acquisitiveness is, ironically, the person 
closest to her, her husband Arthur. This figure of ascetic rationalism is figured as a 
“magician.” Arthur is a reluctant industrialist who manages however, with “quiet
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perseverance” and “without any demonstration of enthusiasm,” to add to his inherited 
fortune. Arthur Hamilton is a “self-sufficient, rather ascetic man of thirty” and, 
though “wholly negative in all other personal relations,” inexplicably loyal to his 
wife. Arthur, who funds the entire ridiculous enterprise and ultimately sacrifices 
himself to his wife’s reputation, is, according to Jimmy, “a pillar of sanity and law in 
this house of shams and swollen vanities” (27). Besides initially resisting the move 
to New York and the building of the house in the first place, Arthur maintains a 
critical distance now that he’s been worn down. While he sees exactly what is 
happening, at his own expense, he nevertheless exhibits a kind of self-denying moral 
discipline, a very Protestant stoicism in enduring and even indulging his wife’s 
whims. But Flavia finds it impossible to understand him; her theory is that he is 
“stupid, bigoted, blinded by middle-class prejudices,” lacking in “aesthetic sense,” 
and that the artists have “tolerated” him despite this (27). Flavia has no idea that she 
is describing herself instead. On the other hand, Arthur sees himself, as he sees 
Jimmy, as an “old cynic” and sees the young, scholarly Imogen, who stands to be 
disillusioned if she stays any longer, as “brim full of dates and formulae and other 
positivisms, and is so girt about with illusions that she still casts a shadow in the sun”
(28). An interesting description to be sure from the one who is described as “rather 
ascetic.” However, Gather offers us a clue about Arthur’s cynicism early in the 
story:
Arthur Hamilton was bom, and had spent his boyhood in the West 
Indies, and physically he had never lost the brand of the tropics. His 
father, after inventing the machine which bore his name, had returned
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to the States to patent and manufacture it. After leaving college,
Arthur had spent five years ranching in the West and traveling abroad. 
Upon his father’s death he had returned to Chicago and, to the 
astonishment of all his friends, had taken up the business — without 
any demonstration of enthusiasm . . .  (7)
Gather offers a hint of what has made Arthur the way he is later in the story in 
a scene in which Arthur responds to his small boys’ recounting of their dreams the 
night before. William has dreamed of fireworks hidden in a basement, and “Arthur 
reflected sadly” that “If little boys dream things, they are so apt not to come true.” 
When his son asks “But do things vanish just because they have been dreamed?” 
Arthur answers, “Generally that is the very best reason for their vanishing” (18). 
Perhaps Arthur’s childhood in another country, or his experience in the west, “the 
fresh air off the Blue Mesa,” has given him a vision of other dreams which for some 
reason he has been denied. While Flavia, despite her colossal ego, is depicted as 
someone lacking the ability to experience intensity or authenticity either in her 
personal life (her relations with her husband and especially her own children) or in 
her relationship to art, Arthur has seen more of the world and has become 
(consciously it would seem) “rather ascetic” and, now, even cynical as a result.
Weber’s description of the “ideal capitalist”— a type rarely realized but first 
described by Benjamin Franklin — is eerily close to the representation of Arthur 
Hamilton:
The ideal type of the capitalistic entrepreneur . . .  avoids ostentation 
and unnecessary expenditure, as well as conscious enjoyment of his
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power, and is embarrassed by the outward signs of the social 
recognition which he receives. His manner of life is, in other words, 
often . .  .distinguished by a certain ascetic tendency, as appears 
clearly enough in the sermon of Franklin... It is, namely, by no 
means exceptional, but rather the rule, for him to have a sort of 
modesty which is essentially more honest than the reserve which 
Franklin so shrewdly recommends. He gets nothing out of his wealth 
for himself, except the irrational sense of having done his job well. 
(71)
Arthur seems to have resigned himself to conforming to the ideal-type of bourgeois, 
to have accepted his literal and figurative “inheritance” from his father as his purpose 
in life, after having tried various other avenues.
Imogen, who remembers Arthur from her childhood as a friend of her family, 
cannot understand what Arthur sees or ever saw in Flavia, and the descriptions of 
Arthur’s reaction to Flavia imply that it must be a simple sexual attraction. Imogen 
remembers, twelve years ago, Arthur’s investment in reading her fairy tales, in 
“pulling her up to the river to hunt for fairy knolls” or reading her Alice in 
Wonderland (16). As she sees him for the first time upon arriving at his home, she 
barely recognizes him, his manner is so indifferent, he seems so bored among the 
“chaos” that reigns. Arthur, as Jimmy says, does not understand what Roux does: 
that Flavia really doesn’t understand the art or the artists. Perhaps this is one reason 
he defends Flavia by attacking Roux’s article in front of the other guests. Arthur, in
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the end, has given up fairy tales, dreams, and taken on the role of defender of 
bourgeois values.
But, regardless of the wealth available to her from her husband’s success in 
manufacturing, in spite of his devotion to her despite her lack of discernment, taste, 
or proper behavior, Flavia finds something missing. Gather writes that:
Flavia had, indeed, quite an equipment of epigram to the effect that 
our century creates the iron genii which evolve its fairy tales: but the 
fact that her husband’s name was annually painted upon some ten 
thousand threshing machines, in reality contributed very little to her 
happiness. (7)
In this description the reader is given the clue to Flavia’s insecurity, and also one key 
to Cather’s antimodemism. Like many at the turn of the century, when, as Lears 
claims, republican moralism began to give way to the pressures of industrial life and 
urbanity, Flavia embarked on what seems a rather desperate quest for “real life’’ — 
for a type of “authentic experience” that offers a sense of structure, solidity and 
meaning. Flavia has begun to doubt the solidity of her own experience, the potential 
of her wealth to provide happiness, and perhaps even her choice of husband. On the 
other hand, Gather alludes to the possibility that Arthur may have had “authentic” 
experience elsewhere. It seems to have been duty or the loss of a dream which 
brought him back to Chicago, to “take over the business,” and to Flavia. It seems to 
be duty which keeps him with her.
In addition to the search for authenticity in aesthetic culture, the 
disenchantment of everyday life inherent in progressive ideology and rationalized
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existence, and the fading of ascetic rationalism in favor of hedonism and greed which 
Weber outlines, Lears traces an antimodemist obsession with “eclecticism” which 
reaches “for the legitimacy conferred by traditional symbols.” Lears claims that the 
reappropriation of anachronistic symbols reached new proportions in fin de siècle 
America, and that by “uprooting once-sacred symbols fi-om their appropriate time, 
place, and purpose, the eclectic approach trivialized them — reduced them to 
commodities in the marketplace of taste.” But it also signified “the impoverishment 
of a culture which lacked sources for creating its own symbols,” intensifying the 
feeling that “the urban environment was somehow artificial and unreal” (33). Some 
hint of this is found in “Flavia and Her Artists.” For example, as Flavia leads Jimmy 
and Imogen to the smoking room, the description alludes to the appropriation of 
exotic symbols of status and power;
The June evening was chilly, and a fire had been lighted in the 
fireplace. Through the deepening dusk the firelight flickered upon the 
pipes and curious weapons on the wall, and threw an orange glow 
over the Turkish hangings. One side of the smoking-room was 
entirely of glass, separating it from the conservatory. . .  . There was 
about the darkened room some suggestion of certain chambers in the 
Arabian Nights, opening on a court of palms. (9-10)
Juxtaposed to what Lears calls the “crumbling Protestant culture of the late 
nineteenth century” and the “sterility of nineteenth-century positivism,” such 
symbols (often medieval or exotic in character, but still mixed with a fading 
Victorianism) intrude upon the architectural and decorative forms of the bourgeoisie
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(Lears xv). As Lears explains, even somewhat extreme forms of antimodemism 
were not simple escape, but, as they often coexisted with a belief in material 
progress, represented an odd “complex blend of accommodation and protest” which 
persists even today. Cather’s allusions to the exoticism of the Arab world, to fairy 
tales, and to the symbols of status and predatory power appropriated from other 
cultures, only highlights the nouveau-riche obsession with status. By displaying such 
symbols, the bourgeoisie can both lay claim to ancient (or at least older) cultural 
capital and protest the rationalization and “iron cage” of mechanical, bureaucratic life 
by reaching toward an “other.” This is especially important to those groups which 
lack cultural legitimacy.
Underlying the various antimodem reactions at the end of the nineteenth 
century were the outmoded, hackneyed banalities of progressive rhetoric 
accompanying the second Industrial Revolution, all of them undergirded by a belief 
in “progress” and implicitly or more obviously justifying all manner of excess and 
superficiality. The industrial revolution in America, according to Lears, was itself 
“entwined with the shift from the disorganized entrepreneurial capitalism of the 
earlier nineteenth century to the organized corporate capitalism of our own time.” 
This particular story represents this shift overtly. Arthur is now the head of a large 
corporation, which he has consolidated into a nationwide industry after his father’s 
original patent of the machine which originally made their fortune in what was 
presumably a small business or cottage industry in the West Indies. Utilizing Max 
Weber’s notion of the rationalization of everyday life, Lears notes that “the 
rationalization of economic life — the drive for maximum profits through the
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adoption of the most efficient forms of organization — was moving into high gear, 
especially in the United States” (9). The banalities, spoken at the banquets, written 
in self-help pamphlets, preached in the watered-down WASP pulpits of the late 
nineteenth-century, helped to fuel the search for meaning. And the search often 
triggered more “banal” approaches to the complex problems of modernity: a turn to 
medieval aesthetics, to utopian or mythical archetypes, to therapeutic culture, to fairy 
tales, to militarism. There was an urgent need to displace the angst of the period, 
often involving a search for a sense of order, which these approaches often seemed to 
meet. Some of these solutions Gather depicts in her fiction.
Lears claims that though “popular rhetoric spoke of ‘subduing nature,’ 
business leaders embraced the functional rationality and technological innovations of 
organized capitalism for more precise reasons: to stabilize production and 
consolidate control over a national market” (9). He also points out that this 
rationalization is not an impersonal process but was furthered by “dominant social 
groups who stood to benefit. . .  from corporate expansion.” He continues:
While old inequalities of wealth and power persisted, the growing 
ascendance of larger corporations brought to prominence a more 
nationally oriented bourgeoisie. The Marxist idiom, shopworn though 
it may be, is inescapable: rationalization promoted many interests but 
primarily those of an emergent national ruling class —  still 
embryonic, tom by tension, sometimes barely cohesive, but an 
incipient mling class nonetheless. (9)
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Arthur’s “quiet perseverance, marked ability, and amazing industry” has served him 
well, but “why or how a self-sufficient, rather ascetic man of thirty” should have 
been attracted to Flavia is a mystery no acquaintance has yet solved (7). Gather 
suggests that Flavia’s aspirations may have contributed to Arthur’s attraction, despite 
his reserve and tendencies towards asceticism. In fact, the complementary aspects of 
his relatively new wealth and her social status aspirations are inseparable. If Arthur’s 
“dream” has vanished, simply because he dreamed it, perhaps he has substimted 
something in its place.
Flavia saw herself stifled among the Midwestern “traditions,” which she 
associates with the milieu of Chicago and “the Michigan woods” which her husband 
much preferred to the Hudson valley. Flavia felt that those traditions stood in the 
way of her “ambition,” which had. Gather tells us, “long ago outgrown the 
dimensions of her house on Prairie Avenue” and of which she had “bitterly 
complained.” The traditions —afternoon clubs with other businessmen’s wives, the 
literary societies — have yielded up all their possible status. But “the establishing of 
a New York office had at length overthrown Arthur’s last valid objection to quitting 
the lake country for three months of the year; and Arthur could be wearied into 
anything.” Hence, we begin to see the compromise involved. While Arthur is 
unwilling to indulge Flavia’s whims full-time, she at least believes she has convinced 
him of “the value of such friendships on the children’s account, if for nothing else! 
What an advantage for them to grow up among such associations” (26). Flavia’s 
project of attracting the “aves rares” who could not be “lured so far away from the 
seaport,” after she “declared herself for the historic Hudson and knew no retreat” is
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now an accomplished fact, and her new house is a “minor of her exultation,” even if 
just for three months a year (6). Her contention is that she herself has made 
“concessions” to Arthur’s businesslike indifference towards art and artists, and that 
“this much Arthur owed her” (7). It would seem that he accepts this premise as well.
This story posits one additional aspect of the dilemma of modem culture for 
an artist: that artists in America also have a stake in a functioning elite, despite their 
personal distaste for the commodification of culture. But the story primarily seems 
to suggest that the new bourgeoisie has a stake in cultural capital to displace the 
angst of a “vocation” without spiritual underpinnings. Cather’s early stories 
consistently wrestle with issues of class, and, in doing so, seem ambiguous in their 
stance, even indeterminate. The ambiguity is real: Gather both promotes and resists 
the European, Amoldian notion of culture as the province of an aristocratic class, and 
as something to which an American artist should have access; and she both promotes 
and resists the American creed of individualism and the culture of consumerism it 
furthers. As an artist committed to the notion that art is the most authentic form of 
individual experience, yet aware of the process of rationalization involved in the 
promotion of celebrity culture, Gather could not help but be wary of modem celebrity 
culture’s effects. The problem of the place of art and the artist in American culture 
in the face of encroaching consumerism is not easily solved.
As an American artist seeking validation and a kind of access to cultural 
capital of her own. Gather will write into her own fiction the problems of class, 
nationality, and morality associated with the artist in an increasingly consumer- 
oriented and hedonistic culture, and, associated with these issues is the search for
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legitimacy in American letters, the attempt to claim a part in the cultural heritage of a 
tradition that is just barely established. One way Gather approaches these problems 
is to differentiate between the “true artist” and the “celebrity,” what might be termed 
“high” and “low” (“popular,” or “mass”) culture: but these categories are becoming 
increasingly difficult to separate and the tenuous separation is difficult to maintain.
In her attempt to answer the cultural contradictions she faces. Gather blends ascetic 
rationalism and consumer culture in one marriage; Arthur’s attempt to maintain a 
work ethic and Flavia’s attempts to appropriate art complement each other in a 
messy, difficult way. But their marriage beautifully represents the blend of 
accommodation and protest inherent in the culture. As Gather shows the two 
coexisting, even comingling, she addresses the impossible contradictions of 
capitalism. As she distinguishes the celebrity artist from Jimmy’s “real” art, she not 
only interrogates market culture, but reserves a space for the art one can “enjoy.” In 
her consignment of celebrity art to that category of a “business, safe and 
commendable as the making of breakfast foods or soap,” Gather inscribes her own 
commitment to a culture, or at least the notion of a culture, free from the dictates of 
the market and the arbiters of “taste.” As an artist seeking authentic cultural 
validation herself. Gather seeks distance between herself and the Flavia’s and the 
Roux’s of the world: the tasteless amplitude of the “snob,” and the assumed cultural 
superiority of the European artist.
As Benjamin says in “Paris, the Gapital of the Nineteenth Gentury”:
The art that begins to doubt its task and ceases to be “inseparable from 
. .utility” (Baudelaire) must make novelty into its highest value. The
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arbiter novarum remtn for such an art becomes the snob. He is to art 
what the dandy is to fashion. (41)
Gather’s “utility” is actually an art for art’s sake, but a qualified one. The next chapters 
will examine Gather’s theory of art further, and then, her depiction of the dandy.
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Chapter Three The Rhetorics o f Pleasure: Problems and Protest in Gather’s
Aesthetic
“Not the fruit of experience, but experience itself, is the end.” Walter Pater, 
“Conclusion” to Studies in the History of the Renaissance, 1873.
Parti. Introduction'. “His dearest pleasures” and “sense of power”: protest and 
Gather’s excess of seeing in “Paul’s Case”
In perhaps the most famous of Gather’s early short stories, “Paul’s Case,” the 
vicarious experience of aesthetic culture provides a respite from the ugliness and 
asceticism of Cordelia Street, a place populated by people who believe devoutly in the 
work ethic, by people who are “as exactly alike as their homes, and of a piece of the 
monotony in which they lived” (175). Gather overtly contrasts the Protestant ethic of 
those who “had a worthy ambition to come up in the world” with artistic ambition, 
“something akin to what churchmen term ‘vocation’” (179). Cordelia Street, “where 
business men of moderate means begot and reared large families of children, all of 
whom went to Sabbath-school and learned the shorter catechism,” exacts from Paul, a 
seventeen-year old boy, a shuddering repulsion for the “flavourless, colourless mass 
of every-day existence” (175). In contrast, Paul feels he “lives” only at the theatre, 
where he works as an usher, but Gather shows that his experience of the theatre is 
really only “Paul’s fairy tale” with “all the allurement of a secret love.” Paul escapes 
to the theatre as a protest to his monotonous life at home and at school. While he 
doesn’t understand art, and is actually more interested in the celebrities associated 
with it and what they represent, nevertheless, at the theatre he “breathed like a
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prisoner set free, and felt within him the possibility of doing or saying splendid, 
brilliant things” (179).
Gather writes that as the “cracked orchestra” of the local theatre “jerked at the 
serenade from Rigoletto. all stupid and ugly things slid from him, and his senses were 
deliciously, yet delicately fired” (179). For Paul, the theatre represents “the actual 
portal of Romance.” Paul, like Flavia, is not really moved by the music itself or the 
paintings he “lost himself in”; he had “no desire to become an actor, any more than he 
had to become a musician.” Paul experiences art vicariously, through the sensations 
which surround artistic production, and is never stirred to become an artist in his own 
right. “He felt no necessity to do any of these things; what he wanted was to see, to be 
in the atmosphere, float on the wave of it, to be carried out, blue league after blue 
league, away from everything” (180). Gather is clear that, in Paul’s case, the sphere 
of art serves another purpose than art for art’s sake: it signifies an escape from the 
conditions of modernity. Paul’s pleasure in simply “being in the atmosphere” is, like 
Flavia’s experience, “false,” but is nonetheless a gesture of protest towards the ascetic 
rationalism of modernity.
Paul’s teachers and father agree that “Paul’s was a bad case,” and Gather does 
as well, but for a different set of reasons (181). As Paul sits in his hotel room after 
embezzling money from his father’s company and running away to New York, he 
sees the “rumble and roar, the hurry and toss of thousands of human beings as hot for 
pleasure as himself,” and felt “the nerve stuff of all sensations” “whirling about him 
like the snow flakes.” Paul, as he watches the “pageant” of wealth on Fifth Avenue, 
“burnt like a faggot in a tempest” (184). Gather’s allusion to Pater’s famous sentence.
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“To bum always with a hard, gem-like flame” as “success in life” is clear: but her 
application of this philosophy to Paul is tempered by her antimodem commitments, 
including a republican suspicion of excess. This suspicion is coded in Paul’s 
confusion of art with consumption. “He knew now, more than ever, that money was 
everything, the wall that stood between all he loathed and all he wanted,” and “his 
dearest pleasures were the grey winter twilights in his sitting-room; his quiet 
enjoyment of his flowers, his clothes, his wide divan, his cigarettes and his sense of 
power” (186). He had “never lied for pleasure,” only to “assert his difference from 
other Cordelia Street boys,” and felt “a good deal more m anly..  .now that he could ..
. dress the part” (186).
In his “Conclusion,” Pater writes that “the whole scope of observation is 
dwarfed to the narrow chamber of the individual mind. Experience, already reduced 
to a swarm of impressions, is ringed round for each one of us by that thick wall of 
personality through which no real voice has ever pierced on it way to us . . .  . Every 
one of those impressions is the impression of the individual in his isolation, each mind 
keeping as a solitary prisoner its own dream of a world.” Paul’s dream is very much 
the dream of a modem individual; solitary, alienated, and driven by the fleeting 
impressions which Pater outlines, and their effects on identity. Pater writes, “it is with 
this movement, with the passage and dissolution of impressions, images, sensations, 
that analysis leaves off— that continual vanishing away, that strange, perpetual 
weaving and unweaving of ourselves” (157). Paul’s attempts at re-inventing himself 
through sensational impressions, especially those which he can purchase, will succeed 
only for the briefest of moments. In New York, for example:
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He had no sooner entered the dining-room and caught the measure of 
the music, than his remembrance was lightened by his old elastic 
power of claiming the moment, mounting with it, and finding it all 
sufficient. The glare and glitter about him, the mere scenic accessories 
had again, and for the last time, their old potency. He would show 
himself that he was game, he would finish the thing splendidly. (187) 
Pater writes that “while all melts under our feet, we may well grasp at any exquisite 
passions . . .  to set the spirit fi'ee for a moment . . . .  With this sense of the splendor of 
our experience and of its awful brevity, gathering all we are into one desperate effort 
to see and touch, we shall hardly have time to make theories about the things we see 
and touch.” This is at least partly because we are all, as Hugo said, “condamnes”— 
sentenced to death but “with a sort of indefinite reprieve . . .  we have an interval, and 
then our place knows us no more.” Pater continues: “Our one chance lies in 
expanding that interval, in getting as many pulsations as possible into the given time” 
(159). Paul’s attempt at living for the moment is understandable, given his “real” life 
and misery on Cordelia Street, and Gather shows her very real empathy for this.
But Gather’s empathy with Paul’s escape from conformity is rooted in her 
particularly American faith in individualism: the very thing which, ironically, fuels 
the progressive rhetoric and the world of big business which in turn creates both 
grimy Cordelia Street and the glittering world of Fifth Avenue. With progress comes 
the ultimate conflation of consumption with cultural distinction and a debasement of 
art. With progress comes the need to escape from the monotony of Cordelia Street, 
and the need to seek refuge in the pageant of Fifth Avenue consumerist distraction.
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While the pageant elicits pleasure from Paul, Gather also depicts Paul’s 
problematic “realization” —  that consumer culture, wealth and the aestheticized 
illusion of wealth is “the plot of all dramas, the text of all romances, the nerve-stuff of 
all sensations.” Gather writes that, as a result of Paul’s confusion as to what 
constitutes experience, all Paul “demanded was the right to look on and conjecture, to 
watch the pageant. The mere stage properties were all he contended for” (185). 
Gather’s language suggests that Paul’s pleasure, while real enough, is built on illusion, 
like his “fairy tale,” or the theatre, which for Paul is “the actual portal of Romance”
— a genre of fantasy (179). Pleasure simply “floods Paul’s dream with bewildering 
radiance” (185), preventing him from seeing that it is mere seduction, that the fire of 
the moment is not quite enough if not rooted in reality. The plot of the story of course 
bears this out: Paul is in New York on stolen money, under false pretenses. He judges 
himself and everyone around him through the artificial standards of taste he has 
appropriated from stories of the rich and famous heard on the stoops of Gordelia 
Street. He has made others the arbiter of his own taste, and given strangers the power 
to endow him with distinction. “He felt now that his surroundings explained him. 
Nobody questioned the purple; he had only to wear it passively. He had only to 
glance down at his dress coat to reassure himself that here it would be impossible for 
anyone to humiliate him” (185). Yet outside his hotel room is a “raging storm” which 
he watches from his window, and he must sleep with the lights on out of “his old 
timidity” (185). Paul’s attempts at assuaging his own insecurities with superficial 
commodities are ultimately useless, despite having lived in what he takes to be the 
intensity of a Paterian moment. The next day finds him in despair as his money runs
149
out and he reads that his father is coming to find him. Paul dies after throwing 
himself in fi-ont of a train, but in a flash of insight in which he realized “the folly of 
his haste” he sees the “blue of Adriatic water, the yellow of Algerian sands” and “the 
vastness of what he had left undone” (189). Being caught up in the moment proves to 
be Paul’s literal undoing.
Gather’s language echoes Pater’s throughout the story and her allusions to 
Pater’s aestheticism are intriguing. Furthermore, in her own aesthetic promulgations 
one finds her affinity to Pater’s theory of art for art’s sake, which she describes as 
“escapism” in an essay of the same name. In addition, in a 1925 preface to The Best 
Short Stories of Sarah Ome Jewett. Gather writes that the one thing that should 
survive in all “good writing” and “clever story-making” is “inherent, individual 
beauty” (49). She develops her notion of aesthetic beauty when she quotes Pater, who 
claimed:
That every truly great drama must, in the end, linger in the reader’s 
mind as a sort of ballad. Probably the same thing might be said of 
every great story. It must leave in the mind of the sensitive reader an 
intangible residuum of pleasure; a cadence, a quality of voice that is 
exclusively the writer’s own, individual, unique. (49)
Gather’s adherence to this individual, unique voice in art reflects her commitment to 
individualism in general, and this presents a dilemma which “Paul’s Gase” cannot 
resolve. In the second part of this chapter I examine the ways in which Gather’s 
aesthetic of sensation poses problems for this commitment. Gather is ultimately
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cautious about Pater’s Aestheticism, in much the same way Pater came to be in the 
infamous footnote he appended to later editions of his text.
Gather, like most artists in America, was clearly aware of the Aesthetic 
movement that had gained in influence in America by the 1880s, derivative of Pater’s 
ideas but disseminated, with some mutations, through the likes of Oscar Wilde. 
Wilde’s 1882 tour of the United States had been exceptionally successful, and he was 
hailed as “the Apostle of Aestheticism,” despite heckling from journalists. Mary 
Warner Blanchard notes, in Oscar Wilde’s America: Counterculture in the Gilded 
Age, that his influence was admitted as the “artistic movement” took hold. Wilde was 
called the “figure-head” of a “great movement,” the “representative and exponent of a 
school of culture in art,” which was expounded as a “new social movement” 
(Blanchard xii).
Blanchard also claims that John Ruskin and William Morris “were well known 
to Wilde’s American audiences,” and that even Whistler and Pater “were recognizable 
figures. Thus Wilde represented a known and valued English legacy to his American 
followers in 1882” (xii). But while Gather’s interpretation of Pater’s notion of “art 
for art’s sake” as propounded in his “Conclusion” to The Renaissance is one of the 
most striking features of Gather’s own critical writings, her interpretation of it in her 
fiction nonetheless represents the limitations of this philosophy under modem 
American conditions. She exhibits, through the character of Paul, a positive role for a 
qualified aestheticism (which she bases on impressionistic sensation) as a protest to 
progressive rhetoric and dreary industrialized culture, but she also simultaneously 
suggests the dangers and limits of a kind of “sensationalized” Aestheticism in her
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portrait of Paul as a dandy, an “Aesthete”; this is a picture which draws more 
specifically on a type of Yellow Book or even earlier Baudelarian decadence, and is a 
particularly nervous answer to the anxieties present in the culture, twenty years after 
Wilde’s sensational tour. I explore the roots of Gather’s dandy figure further in 
chapter four.
Blanchard argues that while the “aesthetic craze” was a “brief but important 
interlude” in late nineteenth-century culture, by the end of the century worries about 
American manhood “discredited” the sense that Aestheticism might offer a “higher, 
finer spiritual life” (xiv). It came to be seen as “grotesque” as the backlash against 
“inverts” grew; especially after the disgrace of Wilde in 1895 after he was arrested on 
charges of “gross indecency” (xiv). Journalists who had portrayed Wilde as the 
leader of the “Gilded Youths” of Fifth Avenue, and who had averted their eyes from 
the realities of pedophilia and newsboy prostitution, had, by the end of the century, 
expressed anxieties about the “feminization” of American culture and American 
manhood. These anxieties, Blanchard argues, eventually brought down the movement 
(xiii). The questions began to be asked, as not only female aesthetes like Candace 
Wheeler, Celia Thaxter, or the potter Mary Louise McLaughlin (whose enormous 
1880 vase, “Ali Baba,” represented the exotic Arabian Nights), but men like Louis 
Comfort Tiffany began to follow the “new religion of beauty”; “were the American 
heroes of the battlefield to be replaced by dandies and interior designers?” (xiv).
While the artists (particularly the women) “recognized in aestheticism an escape from 
Calvinist orthodoxy, an evasion of tyrannical fathers and ineffective husbands, and an 
opportunity to advance in the social and business worlds of the Gilded Age,” it was
152
“precisely this liberating power” that would bring down upon the American 
movement “a repressive reaction” (xiii). And, with the launching of “the imperialist 
adventure of the Spanish-American War of 1898, the soldier/hero returned in triumph 
as a cultural icon.” As a result, Blanchard argues, “the female visionaries of 
American aestheticism faded into historical oblivion” (xv). The price of aestheticism 
— the feminization of public space and of men — was too heavy to pay. The 
reassertion of a “manly” culture (helped along by the McKinley/Roosevelt ticket of 
1901 and the subsequent Roosevelt Presidency after McKinley’s assassination) played 
its part in a new national identity constructed as the wounds from the Civil War began 
to heal, leaving behind the place of aestheticism as a counter to the violence and 
trauma of mid-century culture.
This is the context in which Gather’s commitment to the inherent 
individualism in her own aesthetic becomes problematic. As Gather’s belief in 
individualism plays out through Paul as Aesthete — his stylized, consumerist reaction 
to bourgeois culture at the turn of the century — Paul’s pleasure is shown as empty 
and dangerous. It becomes less the symbol of manly American success and more a 
feminized emblem of consumerism, and may be read as the ultimate modem 
appropriation of the individual. Gather’s vision of Paul is ambivalent and both her 
sympathy with his plight on Gordelia Street and her depiction of the limitations of 
Paul’s consumerist solution can be read as Gather’s dialogic answer to modernity.
Through Gather’s careful differentiation of fin de siècle Aestheticism from her 
own qualified aesthetic of sensation (examined more fully in the second part of this 
chapter). Gather writes the basic dilemma of antimodemism into “Paul’s Gase”: the
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commitment to individualism, which brings both progress as the American dream, 
and the ultimate manifestation of radical individualism, the effects of industrialized, 
modem progress — alienation, the rationalized and “colourless mass of every-day 
existence,” depression, consumerist superficiality, and even despair and suicide. Paul, 
a weak, nervous boy, given to illusions and dreams, cannot hold up in such an 
America. In his attempt to turn to aesthetic culture, he mistakenly finds only “nerve- 
stuff’ and “sensation,” not the spiritual nourishment Gather believes art can and 
should deliver.
Both Gather’s aesthetic and Paul’s version of Aestheticism are coded 
antimodem reactions. Paul’s attempt to consume the pleasure art can induce codes 
the individualistic Protestant ethic as it plays out at the fin de siècle. Paul’s attempt at 
purchasing pleasure and vicariously experiencing art begins as protest, and ends as 
pointless. The other altemative. Gather’s own sensational, individual commitment to 
beauty outside commercial culture, is also a protest to that very form of modemity. In 
order to maintain her own sensational, and what I argue is an Impressionistic 
aesthetic. Gather must qualify her commitment to individualism. She does this 
through depicting the aesthetic sphere as inaccessible to mere consumer culture and in 
doing so, qualifies her individualistic, antimodem stance. The second section of this 
chapter is dedicated to understanding Gather’s sensational aesthetic and its 
philosophical roots.
While Blanchard argues that American Aestheticism was an evasion of the 
“conformity of the late Victorian period which saw capitalism advance” at mid­
century (xiii), by the fin de siècle, Paterian or Wildean Aestheticism and its
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individualistic philosophy have become indistinguishable from consumer culture. 
Individual and sensational experience as codified in the figure of the Aesthete, 
though explored by Gather as an altemative to the repressive bourgeois culture and 
morality in America, is ultimately shown to be anything but viable, and is in fact 
complicit in the type of consumerist modemity which Gather rejects. The limitations 
of Paul’s Aestheticism which Gather writes into the story are of a piece with the 
repressive reaction which greeted the proponents of the Aesthetic movement 
(particularly the female adherents of it) late in the nineteenth and early in the 
twentieth-century, after Wilde’s disgrace. Gather’s antimodem commitments, 
especially her republican fears of excess, also help to explain her retreat from a pure 
Aestheticism.
Gritics of “Paul’s Gase” tend to read the story as a psychological “case 
study,” and, while Aestheticism and neurasthenia in this period do share some 
common traits, this story does not seem to be, for example as Loretta Wasserman 
claims, about “diseased will,” which, in William James’s theory, often results from 
too much fantasy stimulated by fiction (among other things). Gather did read James 
extensively; however, Paul, contrary to James’ theory, is clearly very much able and 
inclined to plan as well as to act. Further, there is a caveat by Gather herself in the 
story that even though Paul’s teachers “had a theory that his imagination had been 
perverted by garish fiction,” which may have contributed to his scandalous behavior, 
“the tmth was, he scarcely every read at all” (179). Wasserman also claims that 
“readers must reluctantly side with Paul’s teachers (voices for the best understanding 
his culture could provide), admitting, as each does, ‘that it was scarcely possible to
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put into words the real cause of the trouble’” (24). This is a superficial reading at 
best: Gather is most certainly not on the side of the teachers or the church; and 
though it can be argued Gather does point up the need for an altemative ethical code, 
it is most certainly not that of Gordelia Street morality or the teachers who represent 
it. In fact, the teachers are depicted as animals bent on tormenting the young man, 
not as “voices for the best understanding his culture could provide,” and even the 
minister who lives next door is only moved to act on Paul’s behalf once he has 
committed an actual crime. The messages from Paul’s culture are indeed conflicted 
and contradictory, but it is up to the reader to begin to interpret them, not to dismiss 
them.
Though it is difficult to put into words the cause of Paul’s real trouble, as 
Wasserman claims, it is in fact possible. Paul’s dilemma is clearly that of the 
individual in danger of losing his identity in a conformist culture, and this threatens 
the very heart of progressive rhetoric and belief. But this is also a culture which is 
accelerating rapidly into modemity, coming face to face with the chaotic elements of 
it, and which has posited the impossibly contradictory solutions of individual 
conformity and Victorian repression with the competitive American Dream of the 
individualistic, self-made man. It is a culture attempting to reconcile a repressive 
Protestant ascetic rationalism and morality with the notion of affluence as the marker 
of success. It is a culture which has confused “taste,” “culture,” and the aesthetic 
sphere with the pecuniary ability to consume. The root of Paul’s “trouble” is his 
culture’s commitment to individualism, and the fact that individuals as a result 
increasingly bear the bmnt of moral responsibility that society should share; Paul’s
156
culture also rejects that responsibility as it moves into perpetuation of “progressive” 
virtues of “success” under strategies of eapitalist exploitation.
Gather’s dilemma is that art can and should offer pleasure, but that pleasure 
plays into the hands of hedonistie excess. While appearing to offer Paul the 
altemative of art, Gather is clear that he cannot discriminate between aesthetic and 
commodity experience. She believes in individualism over conformity, but the space 
for individualism and protest must be in art, not in the rejection of work or the 
assimilation into hedonistic excess. Ultimately, there is no clear path of action under 
such a system. The character of Paul embodies this dilemma. His mother dead, 
having left a hand-embroidered “red worsted” on the wall (which significantly reads 
“Feed My Lambs”), Paul is left with only two choices. Both are devoid of any 
spiritual substance. Paul can either conform to the bourgeois ethos and morality of 
the period, which requires him to give up his individualism (to conform to the 
expectations of his class), or he can follow an individualistic, hedonistic, and 
sensational aesthetic which imitates the higher classes. This, however, provides him 
with no moral direction other than consumerist values: which, as Weber argues, had 
already overtaken the original spiritual imperatives underlying the Protestant work 
ethic. Neither altemative is acceptable for Gather, as the ending of the story so 
clearly shows. In this sense, the indeterminacy of this text can be traced to Gather’s 
antimodem stance, to the sheer irreconcilable differences between the altematives.
Gonsequently Gather maintains her antimodem stance, in keeping with many 
other antimodernists at the tum of the century. Gather’s contradictory commitments 
are, as usual, coded through her representations of art. In this case. Gather again
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rejects the elision of consumer culture with aesthetic culture, and indicts modemity 
for its lack of moral direction. But, this has unintended consequences, which is, I 
believe, why Gather comes to be read so often as simply conservative and why her 
early work is so often misinterpreted or dismissed. Lears argues, “as at other points 
in twentieth-century American cultural history, the most radical critics of capitalist 
culture were at bottom the most conservative” (167). Gather’s critique is in fact 
“radical,” as it explores the consequences of the rhetoric of the American dream on a 
young, motherless boy who is smothered in fantasies of wealth, often provided to 
him by his very own neighbor’s stories about their “chiefs and overlords,” in this 
case the steel magnates of Pittsburgh. And since her own aesthetic corresponds to her 
notion of “The Novel Démeublé,” as I show above, the story does not enumerate the 
“realities” of capitalism in the way Balzac or Dreiser do. Rather, Gather’s approach 
is to “see” Paul’s response to modemity, and to art, as the story.
As part of her critique of encroaching modemity Gather eodes Paul’s 
response to art and Aestheticism carefully and quite subtly. In the context of looking 
at how she differentiates Paul’s Aestheticism from her own aesthetic beliefs it is 
possible to read Gather’s own artistic practice as an answer to the very real political 
conditions of modemity, and to read Gather as an antimodem writer relying on the 
very assumptions which reinforce the individualism at the basis of the modem 
condition — all as an attempt at finding a way to subvert that condition. This 
accounts for much ambivalence, even indeterminacy, present in this particular story 
since, as Lears claims, “the cult of inner experience had an ironic effect: its devotees 
reinforced the evasive banality they had intended to escape,” at least partly by easing
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“the transition to a consumer culture based on the imperative of self-fulfillment and 
instinctual gratification. Here, as elsewhere, dissent from modemity paved the way 
for modemity” (167). As Gather attempts to locate a workable aesthetic for her 
character, Paul becomes an emblem of “inner experience” and his commitment to it 
indeed works to modemity's advantage, producing Paul, not as an agent of critical 
protest, but as yet another new consumer.
While Gather ultimately rejects Aestheticism as an altemative to bourgeois 
banality, she maintains her own distinctly unconservative aesthetic of sensation. 
Gather’s affinity for Pater’s individualistic “art for art’s sake” sensational aesthetic, 
as well as the theories of “flux” and duration she assimilates into her own aesthetic 
from sources such as Bergson, Ford, and others, differentiates her position from 
those of the “evasive” moralists of her period. It also differentiates her a bit from the 
Modernists who follow her; the direction which will come to define canonical 
Modemism is much more that of Pound’s aesthetic than Ford’s or Pater’s, as I show 
below. That her sensational aesthetic is a self-described “escapism” does not make 
the story any less an antimodem protest against bourgeois morality and notions of 
progress. In fact, Gather’s sensational aesthetic itself belies her own rejection of 
bourgeois culture, even though it problematically rests on the identical notion of 
individualism which also undergirds bourgeois morality and progressive rhetoric.
As a result of this rather tangled interplay of contradictory alliances. Gather 
has often been reduced to a conservative, reactionary writer, when, in fact, her work 
has its roots in a far more radical and complex antimodem position. “Paul’s Gase” 
is, in its critique of the culture of industrialized modemity, an artistic, if complex,
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answer to modemity and to individualist rhetoric. “Paul’s Case” can be read as a 
Bakhtinian “excess of seeing”; as Michael Holquist notes, “everything must be 
approached from the point of view of — point of view. And point of view is always 
situated” (xxviii). To be more specific:
We not only interrogate each other, we interlocate each other, and it is 
the interlocative or dialogic self that is the subject of Bakhtin’s 
architectonics. The interlocative self is one that can change places 
with another— that must, in fact, change places to see where it is. A 
logical implication of the fact that I can see things you cannot, and 
you can see things that I cannot, is that our excess of seeing is defined 
by a lack of seeing: my excess is your lack, and vice versa. If we 
wish to overcome this lack, we try to see what is there together. We 
must share each other’s excess in order to overcome our mutual lack, 
(xxvii)
Gather’s particular excess of seeing in “Paul’s Case” is the refracted image of a 
culture which is itself refracted at many levels: the personal, the political, the 
Aesthetic, the sensational, the impressionistic and the concrete, all are represented in 
her story, and much more. Gather’s brilliance is that she sees Paul from the inside 
out, but also from the outside in, just as she is able to make the reader see her own 
“excess of seeing.”
Gather does not advocate Paul conservatively returning to Gordelia Street and 
“respectability,” and she is most certainly not sympathetic with the teachers and the 
ministers who commit themselves, much too late, to “reclaiming the boy.” Neither is
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Paul merely “a case” —  any more than Charlotte Perkins Gilman’s narrator is 
“simply crazy” or disturbed in “The Yellow Wallpaper.” Paul’s nervousness is 
consistent with the neurasthenia of the Aesthete and of the age and with the teachers 
claiming there is something “wrong about the fellow” (172). But, as properly 
orthodox instructors of official rhetoric, paid to disseminate it, what else would they 
say? Paul’s inability to fit into the society which has produced him, to submit to the 
demands of modem life, is depicted not as crazy but as inevitable, and as a tragedy 
of uniqueness, much as Gilman’s narrator is the product of the paternalistic ideology 
responsible for the rest cure. In this sense, the conflict in Gather’s story is finally 
about the inherent dangers and limitations of seductive, radical individualism as 
much as it is about the concomitant dangers of conformity — and the articulation of 
these dangers is a culturally conservative yet nonetheless radically antimodem 
position. Gather’s resistance to modemity and progress through Aestheticism is a 
catch-22, leaving no viable altemative for Paul. Paul’s Aestheticism and, 
problematically. Gather’s antimodem sensational aesthetic, are each ultimately 
subverted by their complicity with individualistic sensibility and morality. In the 
following section I attempt to trace the major elements of what I call Gather’s 
sensational aesthetic.
Part II. Pater, Impressionism, and the problem of pleasure: Gather’s sensational 
aesthetic
The young Gather’s commitment to the individual and to “inner experience” 
persists even in her later critical writings. Gather read and traveled widely, was well
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acquainted with the intellectual climate of New York and Boston, and with the 
debates within literary circles concerning modemism, Impressionism, Bergsonian 
vitalism, and post-impressionism. In addition to Gather’s notion of aesthetic quality 
as “exclusively” “individual,” Loretta Wasserman has noted that Gather’s idea of 
how writers come to find their ideas “stress[es] the inexplicable: A writer must 
depend on Bergsonian intuition. Only young writers have specific opinions that they 
want to defend; serious writers must let something that ‘teases the mind for years’ 
finally find its form . . .  The beginning of a story lies in a ‘personal explosional 
experience’ that is allowed to wait until ‘the form fixes itself.’” Wasserman notes 
that this has reminded some of Joyce’s notion of epiphany or W oolfs “moments of 
being,” which in themselves seem much like Wordsworth’s “‘spots of time’— 
sudden and evanescent insights into a central meaning” which grow out of 
commonplace experience (12-3). The “personal” experience, the individual and 
unique experience, like the art that emerges Irom it, is based on sensation, and is the 
key component of Gather’s aesthetic. That this is rooted in a Paterian notion of 
experience, based on “impressions” which come from the senses — shifting, 
transient, and difficult to capture — is evident in Gather’s belief that impressions 
must coalesce, that “the form” must “fix itself’ eventually.
T. E. Hulme, in his essay, “Bergson’s Theory of Art,” *^  describes the 
philosophical positions which are important to an understanding of Bergson’s 
aesthetic, which informed Gather’s own aesthetic theory. Most relevant to this
This essay is derived from notes Hulme delivered in lectures on the philosophy of 
Bergson in London during 1913, collected and published in Speculations in 1914.
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discussion is Bergson’s “conception of reality as a flux of interpenetrated elements 
unseizable by the intellect” (146). Hulme, in his exposition of Bergson, claims that 
“art merely reveals, it never creates” (151). This is a passive view of the artist, quite 
similar to Gather’s claim that “the form” which derives from personal experience 
must “fix itself,” sometimes after years. Hulme argues that what we generally 
perceive, as opposed to a kind of apperception which is requisite to an aesthetic 
perception, is a “selection made by my senses to serve as a light for my conduct . . .
no more than a practical simplification of reality.” Ordinary perception then is
through “moulds,” through classifications of things, or “fixed types.” For Hulme, as 
for Bergson, these moulds tend to reinforce the illusion of a stable reality which does 
not exist. This “reality” then, determines our conduct. In this essay, Hulme glosses 
Bergson:
the creative activity of the artist is only necessary because of the 
limitations placed on internal and external perception by the 
necessities of action. If we could break through the veil which action 
interposes, if we could come into direct contact with sense and 
consciousness, art would be useless and unnecessary. Our eyes, aided 
by memory, would carve out in space and fix in time the most 
inimitable of pictures. In the center of one’s own mind, we should 
hear constantly a certain music. But as this is impossible, the function 
of the artist is to pierce through here and there, accidentally as it were, 
the veil placed between us and reality by the limitations of our 
perception engendered by action. (147)
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Hulme asks, then, if most perception is guided by “necessity of action,” of what does 
the “true” aesthetic emotion consist? He answers that, according to Bergson:
The element in it which will be found in the rest of art is not the 
accidental fact that imagery conveys over an actually felt visual 
sensation, but the actual character of that communication, that 
fact that it hands you over the sensation as directly as possible, 
attempts to get it over bodily with all the qualities it possessed 
for you when you experienced it. (164)
Bergson’s ideas, here inflected by Hulme’s modemism, describe an unmediated, 
untheorized experience which is ahistorical, atemporal, unclassified, and, 
significantly, bodily — not, “the accidental fact that imagery conveys over an 
actually felt” sensation. It is perception unmediated by the “necessity” of action, 
perception without considered consequences. It is entirely reminiscent and 
derivative of Pater’s theory of immediate impressions. Bergson’s theory of art, as he 
describes it in Creative Evolution, derives from experience which he describes as 
“duration” (durée), a kind of flux of “sensations, feelings, volitions, ideas — such are 
the changes into which my existence is divided and which color it in tum. I change, 
then, without ceasing. . . ” (2). This idea of unattenuated experience has remained 
under attack since Bergson theorized it, beginning at least with Lukacs, and most 
recently from deconstmctionists who deny the possibility of unmediated experience 
and the transcendence implied by it.
Bergson’s notions of experience and duration can be understood as 
broadening Pater’s claims of experience as “intervals.” Pater says, “our one chance
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lies in expanding that interval, in getting as many pulsations as possible into the 
given time”; that “passion” yields this “fruit of a quickened, multiplied 
consciousness,” and, that “art comes to you proposing frankly to give nothing but the 
highest quality to your moments as they pass, and simply for those moments’ sake” 
(184). A multiplied consciousness, like a multiplied and accretional time, undoes the 
notion of a “fixed” personality, and it is, according to Bergson, only the “imagined 
ego” which tries to unite the flow, the duration, to perceive distinct moments as 
“solid” (1-7). Neither time nor identity is fixed, and art and the aesthetic sensation is 
therefore unmediated, pure experience — pure flux.
This notion of Impressionism will be critiqued by many early in the twentieth 
century, perhaps most notably by Hulme himself in another essay in the posthumous 
collection Speculations, when, in his “Modem Art and its Philosophy” (1914), he 
calls Renaissance humanism full of “flat and insipid optimism” (which begins to 
decay with Rousseau)^^ and links the move away from this optimism about humanity
Hulme states: “In a certain sense, all philosophy since the Renaissance is satisfied 
with a certain conception of the relation of man to the world. Now what is this 
conception? You get the first hint of it in the beginnings of the Renaissance itself 
[...] You get the hint of an idea there of something, which finally culminates in a 
doctrine which is the opposite of the doctrine of original sin: the belief that man as a 
part of nature was after all something satisfactory. The change which Copernicus is 
supposed to have brought about is the exact contrary of the fact. Before Copernicus, 
man was not the center of the world; after Copernicus he was. You get a change from 
a certain profundity and intensity to that flat and insipid optimism which, passing 
through its first stage of decay in Rousseau, has finally culminated in the state of 
slush in which we have the misfortune to live. [ .. .]  It may seem paradoxical in view 
of the extraordinary emphasis laid on life by philosophy at this present day, to assert 
that this Renaissance attitude is coming to an end. But I think that this efflorescence 
is its last effort.” And, later in the essay, “When I speak of a new complex 
geometrical art then, I am not thinking of the whole movement. I am speaking of one 
element which seems to be gradually hardening out, and separating itself from the
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and progress with the change in perception that accompanies the modem era, which 
moves away from the notion of flux. The “new” art (post-impressionism) is instead 
clear cut, “austere,” most definitely not (as, he claims. Futurism is) the “deification 
of flux, the last efflorescence of impressionism” (94).
In linking a belief in “progress” with flux and the impressionistic moment 
Hulme articulates something similar to that which T. J. Jackson Lears calls “the 
pattern of evasive banality” which permeates late nineteenth-century American 
attempts to assimilate the new post-industrial modernity's assaults on traditional 
culture. Lears, like Hulme, postulates impressionistic, aesthetic “cults of 
experience” as growing out of a sense of impotence in the face of modem culture. 
Lears explains:
Haltingly, half consciously, Europeans and Americans alike began to 
recognize that the triumph of modem culture had not produced greater 
autonomy (which was the official claim) but rather had promoted a 
spreading sense of moral impotence and spiritual sterility — a feeling 
that life had become not only overcivilized but also curiously unreal.
(4)
One “antimodem” response to this is the attempt to heighten experience, to locate 
“authentic” altematives to modemity. “In both Europe and America,” Lears notes.
others. I don’t want anyone to suppose, for example, that I am speaking of futurism, 
which is, in its logical form, the exact opposite of the art I am describing, being the 
deification of the flux, the last efflorescence of impressionism.” “Modem Art and Its 
Philosophy,” 1914. (80-1,94)
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the antimodem impulse was rooted in what can aptly be called a crisis 
of cultural authority, which had both public and private dimensions... 
For decades republican moralists had worried that a liberal polity 
would be unable to contain the centrifugal tendencies in an atomized 
market society; the unprecedented class and ethnic conflict of the late 
nineteenth century intensified that worry as never before.. . .  From 
the republican view, the ruling class required not only more guns but 
moral regeneration. (5)
Aestheticism is one of many possible antimodem reactions to the crisis of modemity 
in the United States. There are others, of course: religious extremism, fanaticism 
about health, obsessions with other places and historical times, just to give some 
examples. Each of these manifests in the art and literature of the late Victorian 
period, and strains of them persist well into the modem period, sometimes 
renegotiated and augmented or mutated. Gather will of course draw on several of 
these antimodem responses throughout her career.
If, during the rise of finance capitalism and the so-called Second Industrial 
revolution, public authority seemed to be in trouble, Lears argues “private authority 
seemed on the wane as well”:
The internalized morality of self-control and autonomous 
achievement, the basis of modem culture, seemed at the end of its 
tether; the chief source of that morality, the bourgeois family, seemed 
a hothouse of suffocating repressions and insoluble personal conflict
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. . .  ultimately even personal identity seemed affected by the 
unreality of modem existence. (6)
Accordingly, one “cult of experience” was that which Pater’s aesthetic philosophy 
engendered: the Aesthetic movement, and its philosophy of “the moment,” in which 
intensified, individual “impressions” are incommunicable and of which aesthetic 
sensation consists. Gather depicts, in “Paul’s Case,” both the social problem of the 
bourgeois family —  including its breakdown in communicating moral authority and 
the ethic of achievement, and the more individual problem of “personal identity”— 
seen in Paul’s alienation, and in his posturing as a kind of flâneur, which I examine 
more fully in the next chapter.
Gather then posits a qualified form of aestheticism as one possible 
antimodem solution. It is in the picture of Paul, drawn as a would-be Aesthete and 
dandy, that Gather differentiates the American problem of antimodemism from its 
antecedents in Europe. While her aesthetic draws on European sources, Paul’s 
Aesthetic, antimodem, and rebellious posture is interpellated by his particularly 
American lower middle-class status, the incipient consumer culture of the period, 
and his aspirations to a higher class which lead to conspicuous consumption as an 
ironic attempt to reject bourgeois morality.
It is misguided attempts at “aesthetic” living for the “intensity of the 
moment,” for “passion” and expanded consciousness that lead Pater to write his 
curious footnote to the third edition of Studies in the History of the Renaissance. 
The famous “Gonelusion” (originally written in 1868 and published in the first 
edition of The Renaissance in 1873), which advocates “buming with a hard gemlike
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flame” as “success in life,” was omitted in the second edition, only to be 
reintroduced in the later 1888 edition, with a footnote which acts as a caveat to his 
notion of sensational, hedonistic experience, the very kind of antimodem response, 
looking for “authenticity of experience,” which gave rise to the Aesthetic movement. 
The full text of the footnote is cryptic, merely alluding to interpretative problems 
with his original “Conclusion.” Pater writes:
This brief “Conclusion” was omitted in the second edition of this 
book, as I conceived it might possibly mislead some of those young 
men into whose hands it might fall. On the whole, I have thought it 
best to reprint it here, with some slight changes which bring it closer 
to my original meaning . . .  (233)
However cryptic the warning may seem with the “young men” left unnamed, the 
fallout from moralists warning against Pater’s notion of aestheticism and the 
interpretation of it in the Aesthetic movement had already been great. Wilde’s had 
gained many followers across Europe and America. In addition, Jonathan Freedman 
writes that “during the 1880s and 1890s, the Pater vogue was so intense that students 
wrote home for copies of The Renaissance because all the available editions had 
been stolen from the [Harvard] college library” (115).
Pater’s footnote seems a bit prophetic when it alludes to the consequences for 
“some of those young men into whose hands [the book] might fall,” who might take 
his advice on the aesthetic life too literally. This warning or admonition is not 
limited to “young men” either. For instance, by 1893 William Dean Howells, in The 
Coast of Bohemia, is clearly bothered by the forbidden and transgressive sexuality of
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many Aesthetic women (women like Anna Lloyd Jones — the mother of Frank 
Lloyd Wright, Candace Wheeler, or Celia Thaxter, for example), some of whom 
question traditional marriage, wear aesthetic dress, or (like Cather herself) live with 
other women;*"* however, the alleged feminization of men who have become 
involved in the arts, including the decorative arts (often men in Aesthetic dress), is 
also an impetus for a powerful reaction against the Aesthetic model (Blanchard xiv). 
Women artists in the Aesthetic movement also compete in traditionally male 
decorative professions, using traditionally masculine materials — not cloth and 
china, but wood, for example. The Aesthetic movement, at least in the beginning, is 
perceived as an alternative to the pressures of incipient modernity and the bourgeois 
notions of success which accompany it, but quickly becomes the object of attack.
In 1895 Wilde is prosecuted for homosexuality, effectively ending the 
Aesthetic craze in America and his own career. Yet certain elements of the Aesthetic 
movement remain, though the movement itself evolves and is even coopted by much 
more conservative elements. However, the repercussions of it impact American 
culture in various ways for many years.B lanchard  notes:
Howells’ puritanical reaction to lesbianism seems particularly odd, given his 
friendship with Annie Fields and Sarah Ome Jewett, who lived in a “Boston 
marriage” for many years after the death of Annie’s husband, James Fields, editor of 
The Atlantic Monthlv. Howells was a regular at Fields’ Boston salon, where she 
lived with Jewett during the winter season.
Interestingly enough, just this week as I write a story surfaced that in 1920, many 
students were expelled from Harvard for alleged homosexual activity. The concerns 
Wilde’s influence had generated had far reaching, and apparently long lasting, 
implications. Blanchard has argued convincingly that the early twentieth century 
masculine backlash, epitomized by Teddy Roosevelt’s “Rough Riders,” has its roots 
in a response to the American Aesthetic movement.
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If Wilde could be castigated as homosexual, yet endorsed as manly, 
and if a workman could become a beautiful objet d’art while women 
received acclaim as woodcarvers, painters, and scroll carvers, then 
Victorian society was fundamentally adrift. The debate over aesthetic 
style that Wilde sparked in 1882 was only one element of the way 
manhood was defined both by the individual and by the state. Wilde 
had foregrounded aesthetic style, but this was corollary to a more 
important controversy in Gilded Age America —  the definition of the 
manly citizen and his relationship to these new forms of art. (35) 
Both Lears and Blanchard have documented the rise of a reactionary “soldier 
citizen” culture in response to the perceived “softness” and “overcivilization” of the 
late nineteenth century. In fact, Wilde was also “directly responsible for the 
proliferation” of schools of industrial and decorative arts, and for the commissioning 
of artists in public institutional decoration. Many newspapers and publications 
congratulated Wilde on this achievement, hailing the new emphasis on art and art 
education. Wilde, furthermore, had encouraged his American audiences to 
“Congratulate yourself if you have done something strange and extravagant and 
broken the monotony of a decorous age” (Blanchard 36). This seems to have been 
taken to heart, particularly by female Aesthetes, who began to work to create 
“substantial objects” for “prominent and public spaces” (35).
But while Aestheticism had been originally embraced as an alternative to the 
encroaching banality and monotony of modernity’s industrialization, by the end of 
the century the backlash is well established, even in very public ways — for instance
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in 1893, at the Columbian Exposition in Chicago. The conductor of the music 
festival at the inaugural ceremonies (which had fifty-five hundred voices and a full 
orchestra), John Philip Sousa, saw art as a “force for disciplined order.” As 
Blanchard notes, this signaled new (or at least reemergent) attitudes towards both art 
and manhood: Sousa also said that his music was “virile,” and that “Bohemianism 
has ruined more great minds than any one other thing in the world.” He went on to 
proclaim that “long haired men and short haired women you never see in my 
audience” (Blanchard 39). It is worth noting that Sousa has become best known for 
his marches: the elision of moral manhood and military prowess should not be 
overlooked and is a kind of reclamation of a masculinity which had been sidelined 
rather deliberately after the Civil War.
The individualism on which Pater’s theory is based and which Aestheticism 
attempts to assert has become problematic in other ways by the end of the century. 
The aestheticist notion, articulated in Pater’s “Conclusion,” that “those impressions 
of the individual mind to which, for each one of us, experience dwindles down, are 
in perpetual flight, [that] each of them is limited by time, and that as time is infinitely 
divisible, each of them is infinitely divisible also” clearly constitutes a problem for 
ethical and moral conduct. By 1895 this ethical problem is particularly obvious to 
the parents of those university students — looking everywhere for Pater’s book— 
parents, who, unlike their children at Harvard or other universities, Freedman notes, 
had read Pater with “earnest moral concerns” rather than a concern for heightened 
and intensified sensational experience (115). The very agenda of Aestheticism has 
changed, first on the Continent as a result of Wilde, the fin de siècle Paris experience
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of Gide, Valéry, Verlaine, and others in Mallarmé's mardistes i'alon, as well as 
Beardsley and the Yellow Book decadents.*^ In America the clash between avant- 
garde Aesthetes and middle-class culture is beginning to define the direction 
American modernism itself will take/^
Clive Scott, in his essay, “Symbolism, Decadence and Impressionism” notes
that;
Any view that has relativity at its center must propound an ethic 
and an aesthetic of the moment. This is not the narrational 
“moment of Truth”, which is the culmination of a continuity; it is 
not the moment of dramatic convenience, in which can be
Jonathan Fryer recounts, in André and Oscar: The Literary Friendship of André 
Gide and Oscar Wilde, that Wilde influenced Gide immensely, beginning with their 
very first meeting, first by postulating that people should try to imitate art in their 
life, just the opposite of what Gide had been learning at Mallarmé's feet: the 
Symbolist notion was that one should “scorn life in order to devote oneself to the 
Symbolist work of art” (32). Gide writes to Paul Valéry in 1891 that “Wilde is 
piously setting about killing what remained of my soul . .  .he wants me to deplore my 
soul. The effort to destroy it is to be the measure of it. Everything is made up only of 
its emptiness.. .’’(Fryer 33). Despite Gide’s ambivalence about Oscar’s assault on his 
religious convictions, by the end of his life, in 1947, according to Fryer, he made 
what amounted to a pilgrimage to Wilde’s rooms at Magdalen College in Oxford
(237).
The accounts of Wilde’s exploits in Europe, his affair with Lord Douglas, rumors 
of Gide’s (and, no doubt Wilde’s) exploits in North Africa with young Arab boys, 
would have been publicized by the time of Gather’s earliest stories. The sensational 
aspects of Wilde’s imprisonment and subsequent debauchery after his release, his 
rather tragic decline and death, in 1900, would have been well-known as well in 
America. Perhaps more to the point are the writings which describe the philosophy 
of the Aesthetic lifestyle, just as one example, Gide’s Les Nourritures terestres 
(1897), which George Painter has described as Gide’s “hymn to the joy of life”: “or, 
rather, to the life in which everything is joy; to the pleasures of the senses—or, 
rather, to the state of being in which everything gives pleasure to the senses” (in 
Fryer 138). Cather, being a connoisseur of French culture and letters, with a 
particular affection for Flaubert, likely would have been aware of such works, as 
well as the rumors circulating through literary circles.
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concentrated the momentous decisions of a lifetime. It is, rather, 
the moment of coincidence, of confluence, in fact any moment 
where the relationship between experience and time-sequence is 
haphazard; it is the moment of discontinuous flux, of mere and 
therefore piue existence; as memory destroys the present (unless it 
replaces it entirely), so meaning destroys sensation and the sense 
of an object’s function destroys its reality. (222)
The Aesthete not only applies this aesthetic of the moment to artistic experience, but 
to all experience, and therein lies the problem. In order to function morally, much 
less politically, one must create categories, must classify behavior, and must regard 
reality as something more than an individual experience of flux and sensation: must, 
in other words, create meaning which runs the risk of “destroy[ing] sensation.”
But the autonomous individual of Aestheticism is, paradoxically, as Lears 
points out, absolutely necessary to the agenda of bourgeois notions of morality which 
help to promote “progress” and the cultural hegemony of the bourgeois class. But 
the identical notion of the autonomous self as described by Pater, “the individual in 
his isolation, each mind keeping as a solitary prisoner its own dream of a world” is 
the very foundation of an Aestheticism which sets itself up as oppositional to such 
bourgeois morality. It is this inherent tension surrounding the notion of individual 
experience which is inscribed in Gather’s “Paul’s Case.” Cather writes her first 
volume of short stories in 1905, just at the moment when antimodem impulses and 
literary modernism collide.
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Pater’s famous exhortation “to bum always with a hard and gemlike flame, to 
maintain this ecstasy” which “is success in life” points to the dilemma of “Paul’s 
Case” and the problem of this sensational Aestheticism. “Paul’s Case” is, at least 
partially, about Pater’s footnote. It is Paul’s refusal to conform to the bourgeois 
notion of success, and the attendant conventional morality on which this success 
relies, which leads him to escape into a dangerously hedonistic Aestheticism. Paul’s 
dilemma, like Pater’s footnote, is a cautionary tale for Cather’s audience about 
Aestheticism; yet the story, while critiquing bourgeois morality through Paul’s 
escapism, simultaneously reinscribes the very ideology of individualism on which 
that morality is based.
In 1905, Aestheticism as a formal movement had been renegotiated, but 
whether comprised of strains from the “decadent” aestheticism derived from 
Baudelaire or Symons, the “pure” “art for art’s sake” aestheticism of Pater, or the 
more celebrity and sensationalized Aestheticism of Oscar Wilde, clearly the 
modernist notion of art and aesthetics relied on one principle which has come down 
from Pater and which persisted as literary modernism struggled to define itself. 
“Experience,” Pater claims, has “already [been] reduced to a group of impressions 
. . .  ringed round for each one of us by that thick wall of personality through which 
no real voice has ever pierced on its way to us, or from u s . . . .” (235). While Pater’s 
doctrine derives from Lockean empiricism, through a Humian skepticism, it 
proceeds further into a kind of solipsism when he claims: “Every one of those 
impressions is the impression of the individual in his isolation, each mind keeping as 
a solitary prisoner its own dream of a world” (235).
175
One of the hallmarks of modernist alienation and individualism is this sense 
of isolation, that one is alone with one’s own impressions and the resulting problem 
of transmitting that experience. And, since each impression, according to Pater, is in 
“perpetual flight” and is “limited by time, and that as time is infinitely divisible,” all 
that is actual is “a single moment, gone while we try to apprehend it.” Truth, 
therefore, if indeed it can be apprehended at all, is in the moment, and exists without 
reference to “what we can only conjecture to be without”— the external world. The 
“actual,” the external world, based as it is on subjective impressions, then ceases to 
objectively affect one’s own reality, and, by implication, one’s moral or ethical 
decisions. Wilde becomes the poster boy for the bad behavior which may result from 
such Aestheticism. Paul, in Cather’s “Paul’s Case,” is also misled, but Cather does 
not go so far as to renounce the antimodem potential of aesthetic experience. As a 
writer who resists aspects of modem experience and modemity, Cather cannot afford 
to disregard the moral implications of Aestheticism, but neither can she afford to 
reject the possibility of individual, aesthetic experience of redeeming the alienated 
individual in modem, conformist, banal society. Cather’s persistent belief in the 
value of individual experience despite its ethical implications is a particularly 
American commitment and encodes particularly American contradictory impulses. 
Elevating the individual betrays a belief in the American dream which Cather both 
validates and critiques in much of her work: this elevation encodes the bourgeois 
notions of success (and the mores that such success is built upon) despite her 
attempts to corral individual experience within the confines of Aesthetic experience.
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The attempt to “capture” one moment’s impression and to communicate it 
will become a hallmark of such modernist experimental forms as stream of 
consciousness; and the inability to communicate private experience will become a 
major theme of modernist fiction — the theme of alienation. Pater’s theory has set 
the stage for the division between art and action, between experienced time and 
historical engagement. Cather’s earliest fiction may be read as an unconscious 
attempt to mediate the inherent contradictions in her own aesthetic theory, based as it 
is on her interpretation of such figures as Pater and Bergson.
Pater, unlike his predecessor David Hume, who shared such philosophical 
skepticism towards the external world, does not (even skeptically, as Hume does) 
speculate upon moral judgment, virtue, conscience, or an external reality we might 
call “truth,” much less the existence of God, in his most well-known theory of 
Aestheticism. In his “Conclusion,” Pater is concerned entirely with our 
consciousness of impressions, which are themselves bom of sensation, and which are 
momentary and fleeting, and, as in Bergson’s model, independent of time; he is 
concerned with “the individual in his isolation,” not the individual within a social, 
communal moral context. Conduct is only addressed as “a life of constant and eager 
observation,” since it is “not the fruit of experience but experience itself’ that is “the 
end” (236). According to Pater, unlike the philosophers to whom he is indebted for 
the basis of his theory, “our failure” is in forming habits, since habits of the mind — 
reflection, making connections, categorizing, drawing conclusions — interfere with 
the “stirring of the senses.” This “fruit” of experience, making necessary
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connections, deriving moral judgments, considering consequences, is extraneous, 
and in fact, is harmful to fully experiencing art in “the intensity of the moment.”
The moral implications are obvious. With no objective truth, no God, no 
categorical imperative, one’s reality and one’s response to that reality is wholly 
subjective, momentary, and necessarily self-referential. Wilde’s very public disgrace 
only verifies the dangers of Aestheticism to the growing American bourgeoisie. 
Further, Pater writes, “with this sense of the splendour of our experience and of its 
awful brevity, gathering all we are into one desperate effort to see and touch, we 
shall hardly have time to make theories about the things we see and touch” (183). 
Instead, the Aesthete must be “for ever curiously testing new opinions and courting 
new impressions, never acquiescing in a facile orthodoxy of Comte, or of Hegel, or 
of our own” since “the theory or idea or system which requires of us the sacrifice of 
any part of this experience... has no real claim upon us” (184). One can almost hear 
echoes of Harper’s New Monthlv Magazine in 1877-78 when the author of “A New 
Departure in American Art” claimed that “art is one thing and morality another 
thing” (Blanchard 35). Pater, in one fell swoop, does away with positivism, with 
rationalism, and indeed any quest for certainty beyond the personal, individual, 
impressionistic moment, and does not address issues of conscience or moral action, 
nor historical and political consequences.
The implications of this become crystallized in the figure of Wilde, who 
could proclaim that “Truth is entirely and absolutely a matter of style” by the end of 
the century. Cather’s fiction is rife with examples of the “matter of style” and the 
problems it engenders. Her early obsession with celebrity culture, her critique of that
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culture, is complicated by her need to project the aesthetic success of her hero/ines.
In an attempt to separate the aesthete from the demands of celebrity culture, from 
mere “style,” Cather’s protagonists adopt a heroic pose in her later fiction (Thea, in 
Song of the Lark, for example), hut in her early short stories, the question of where 
modem celebrity culture will lead is still an open one. While problematic, the 
celebrity of someone like Kitty Ayrshire in “Scandal,” or Cressida Garnet in “The 
Diamond Mine,” just like Raymond d’Esquerre in “The Garden Lodge,” is both an 
homage to individual triumph and lament for the burdens that accompany such 
success. The question of what to do with such success remain unanswered, though 
the stories themselves hint at moral obligations that have become a necessary burden.
Both Pater and Bergson assume that language itself is an attempt to stabilize 
reality, and that the stability of reality is in fact an illusion. Cather’s character, Paul, 
represents the problem of amorality in Aestheticism, and the links between it and the 
hedonistic, modem materialism, what develops into mass consumer culture — the 
“evasive banality” of the culture of expanding capital and “progressive” ideology. 
“Paul’s Case” is, however, despite Cather’s own belief in the aestheticizing of 
experience, a strangely “moral” piece of fiction. It is Cather’s antimodem position, a 
resistance to modemity, that retains a qualified belief in aesthetic experience of a 
particular kind, one that would help to recapture authentic experience, which, I 
believe, accounts for this.
In a 1921 Lincoln Sundav Star interview, Eleanor Hinman relates that Cather 
claimed: “It happened that my mind was constmcted for the particular purpose of 
absorbing impressions and retaining them. I always intended to write, and there were
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certain persons I studied. I seldom had much idea of the plot or the other characters, 
but I used my eyes and my ears.” In her diseussion with Hinman, Cather also 
declares that “Everywhere is a storehouse of literary material. If a true artist was 
bom in a pigpen and raised in a sty, he would still find plenty of inspiration for his 
work. The only need is the eye to see” (Wasserman 93-5). It is this ability of the 
“eye to see” which separates, in true Paterian fashion, the “true” artist from the 
perfectly ordinary person. “Art,” as Cather further declaims, “is a matter of 
enjoyment through the five senses. Unless you can see the beauty all around you 
everywhere, and enjoy it, you can never eomprehend art. [ . . . ]  Esthetie appreciation 
begins with the enjoyment of the morning bath. It should include all the activities of 
life” (96-8).
Cather’s own notion of aesthetics, like Pater’s, is self-eonsciously sensual, 
and by extension, apolitical, and, later in her career, in a 1936 critical essay, 
“Escapism: A letter to The Commonweal,” *^  she claims this overtly when she says 
that “religion and art spring from the same root and are close kin. Economics and art 
are strangers.” While her alignment of art and religion during a period which saw 
fascism gathering strength is disturbing, we should note that this essay is also, 
overtly, an apologia for individualism. Individualism has beeome by now a target of 
many modernist, anti-bourgeois, avant-garde artists, including Pound and other 
Imagists — as well as fascists. Cather claims that
in Willa Cather on Writing: Critical Studies on Writing as an Art. Lincoln: 
Nebraska UP, 1988. 18-29
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the revolt against individualism naturally calls artists severely 
to account, because the artist is of all men the most individual: 
those who were not have been long forgotten. The condition 
every art requires is, not so much freedom from restriction, as 
freedom from adulteration and from the intrusion of foreign 
matter; considerations and purposes which have nothing to do 
with spontaneous invention. (26-7)
The “foreign matter” and purposes which she is railing against are allied with 
“clumsy experiments in government, futile revolutions and reforms.” What survives 
instead of these failed and transient attempts at change through an adulterated 
corruption of art is art from the “individual genius,” which is “fired with some more 
vital feeling than contempt” (26).
In this essay, Cather defends the traditional against the “new,” despite her 
claim for “spontaneous invention” (27). For instance, in a rant against “literary 
radicals” who must be imagined as Pound, she writes:
The literary radicals tell us there must be a new kind of poetry.
There will be, whenever there is a new poet — a genuine one.
The thesis that no one can ever write a noble sonnet on a noble 
theme without repeating Wordsworth, or a mysteriously lovely 
lyric without repeating Shelley, is an evasion . [ . . . ]  No fine 
poet can ever write like another. His poetry is simply his 
individuality. And the themes of true poetry, of great poetry, 
will be the same until all the values of human life have changed
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and all the strongest emotional responses have become different 
— which can hardly occur until the physical body itself has 
fundamentally changed. (28)
The elision here between the physical sensation of the individual body and “true,” 
“great” art is not to be missed. Emotions and even values derive from the physical 
sensation that experience evokes, and art springs from this in turn. A new art form 
will not exist until the physical body itself has different sensational responses to 
impressions. That which the “fine” poet writes “is simply his individuality”— which 
is inseparable from his or her bodily, sensational response. This is aesthetic 
response, what one “values” as well as what one “writes”: always individual, always 
directly through the five senses.
Cather inherits the legacy of the Aesthetic movement, but through her own 
reading she expands and qualifies the Paterian aestheticism which has informed 
Impressionism. For Cather, Bergson’s view of time affects this vision of art and 
aesthetics. Time accrues, Bergson says, as duration, which is never the same at any 
moment, can never be re-experienced in precisely the same way, and as a result “we 
are creating ourselves continually” through our sensations; “in reality, the past is 
preserved by itself, automatically” (Bergson 3). Georg Lukacs articulates one 
problem with this idea in The Ideologv of Modernism: this aesthetic theory of time 
will separate time from historical change and particularity of place. Lukacs claims 
that Bergson’s theory of “Experienced time, subjective time, now became identical 
with real time; the rift between this time and that of the objective world was 
complete” (37). It is only in this sense, then, that in Cather’s fiction the past always
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impacts the present: as an experience of the moment, a sensational experience of 
private time, not of history. The individual, subjective experience is no longer 
simply private, but transcendent: transcending history, politics, and ethical necessity.
“Paul’s Case,” however, quite simply subverts this notion of individual 
transcendence. One way in which Cather’s transcendent individual is qualified is 
through her notion of a sensational aesthetics. That Paul’s experience is rooted in 
sensation, rather than idealism, that it is concrete rather than abstract, is the 
corrective to the “dream of a world” to which Paul’s aestheticism would seem to 
lead. His “real,” bodily experience is the determining factor in the story, at least as 
much as his aesthetic response to sensation is.
The plot is therefore driven by the sensational aspect of material existence, 
more so than by Paul’s aesthetic reaction to sensational impression. In this way the 
story points up the limitations of radical individualism, and, as an antimodem writer, 
Cather is simply consistently inconsistent on this point. Her story, like the resistance 
to modemity which informs it, is overdetermined, both conservative and radical in its 
critique of the very history and culture art is supposed to transcend. It is Cather’s 
sensational aesthetic, the aesthetic of the moming bath, the cooking odors in the 
kitchen, which determine Paul’s future. It is his response to his surround that keeps 
Cather’s individualism from becoming tmly Paterian and which forces her to 
comment on both economics and art.
It is clear that in Cather’s 1936 essay, while distancing herself and art from 
history, from political agendas, and from the agenda of literary modemism, she 
specifically has in mind the “hard, dry,” even “geometrical” aesthetic of modemists
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such as Pound, (the later) T. E. Hulme and others who, by this period, proclaim 
artists should “make it new.” This overtly pro-modemist aesthetic is not the aesthetic 
of the body as much as it is an attempt to recapture the rationalism and abstraction of 
the neo-classical or even the Byzantine age, to which Pater and the Romantics before 
him dealt such a blow. Cather would have been well aware, in the early years of the 
twentieth century, as a young writer, of the strains of early modemism. For instance, 
as an editor at McClure’s she met William Archer, the theater critic, who arranged a 
seat for her in his box to view the Abbey players and also introduced her to Yeats.
Yeats in turn introduced Cather to H.G. Wells, Lady Gregory, and Ford 
Maddox Ford) (Wasserman 8). As Michael Levenson notes, by 1914 “competing 
perspectives” in the early modernist movement converge, and Hulme’s last essays 
articulate the “new artistic demands” (102). Levenson delineates these demands, 
citing an insistence on “the independence and objectivity of form, value and 
meaning.” But, Levenson claims, this strand of modemism (which will become 
Imagism) merges with a Fordian Impressionism which defended, as Pound put it, 
“direct speech and vivid impression.” Ford, Levenson claims, “characterized his 
Impressionist method as a frank recognition ‘that all art must be the expression of an 
ego, and if this Impressionism is to do anything, it must, as the phrase is, go the 
whole hog.’ The Impressionist novelist ‘gives you, as a mle, the fruits of his own 
observations and the fruits of his own observations alone,’” and —  here we hear 
echoes of Cather in Ford — “his art therefore is a ‘frank expression of personality’” 
(107).
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In some ways the tradition that Cather looks back on and draws from is not 
the rationalist tradition but that of the Romantics, even, one might say, Wordsworth’s 
“egotistical sublime.” Susan Rosowski has made this argument in her book*®, but I 
argue that any “Romantic” impulse Cather may have is informed by Impressionistic, 
aestheticist developments. In her reliance on flux and duration, Cather rejects, at 
least at this stage of her writing career, the efforts of the post-impressionists which 
attempt to “harden” the impression into an objective fact. “So far,” Cather will 
claim later, “the effort to make a new kind of poetry, ‘pure poetry,’ which eschews 
(or renounces) the old themes as shop-worn, and confines itself to regarding the grey 
of a wet oyster shell against the sand of a wet beach through a drizzle of rain, has not 
produced anything very memorable . . .” (28). This type of “hard” image, clearly a 
parodie reference to such a poem as Pound’s 1916 “In a Station of the Metro,” or 
perhaps the poetry of Amy Lowell or Richard Aldington, supposedly made of the 
Vortex of the poem’s own forces, may be transcendent on some level, but is clearly 
not rooted in individual experience. The “new” aesthetic, is, in fact, intended to 
depersonalize and objectify experience and poetry, and the essentializing of
Rosowski’s definition of Romanticism seems problematic to me. She writes in her 
preface to The Vovage Perilous: Willa Cather’s Romanticism. “The essential 
characteristic of romanticism concerns a mode of perception by which the 
imagination is used in its synthesizing or creative powers to transform and give 
meaning to an alien or meaningless material world. In this sense, the Romantics 
inaugurated modem literature: modems and Romantics hold a common view of 
public official tradition as discredited and of the world as essentially meaningless .. 
.”. Romantics such as Goethe, Keats or Wordsworth would most certainly not have 
found the world “essentially meaningless,” though they too may have found “public 
official tradition” so.
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experience such poetry requires is not the polymorphous, personal, sensational 
response that Cather espouses, which maintains its affinity to early Impressionism.
Despite Cather’s own later modernist experimentations with form,^ *^  her 
theory of aesthetics seems to be firmly committed to and rooted in a kind of realism 
that, while being “unfurnished,” as she terms it in her essay “The Novel Démeublé,” 
maintains a determinedly sensuous relationship with her material. In “Escapism” she 
attacks the new aestheticism of “iconoclasts and tomb-breakers: who wish to destroy 
the ‘false past’” (26); but she also derides the kind of investigational journalism, 
“collecting material for fiction” in the name of social reform movements, “hunting 
among the ash cans on Sullivan Street”^'— these are the propagandists, “the Radical 
editor[s],” who should be “following the methods of the pamphleteers” rather than 
attempting to face problems as “facts presented in a coating of stock cinema 
situations” (23). All art, she reiterates, is “Escape.” An artist who has to hunt down 
material in the streets in order to claim it as his experience is no true artist. A young 
reader, she says, may indeed enjoy Balzac (as she herself did), but will sooner or 
later outgrow him. It is the artist’s own, private experience that matters. It is perhaps
This experimentation with form has been established by many critics, though what 
it means is still a subject of much debate. I examine some of the implications for 
Cather’s narrative aesthetic in another chapter.
Clearly this is a reference to the so-called “Ash Can School” of social realist 
painters such as John Sloan, Robert Henri, George Luks and others, known for their 
gritty scenes of New York City featuring the poor and disenfranchised. In 1908 
they staged an exhibition to protest the restrictive academic exhibition procedures 
which became a symbol of rebellion in the world of American modem art. It was 
self-organized, self-selected, and non-juried. Despite Cather’s invective, Sloan 
resigned as editor of The New Masses to protest the overly politicized captions that 
were being attached to prints in the magazine, just as many other artists resisted the 
reduction of their work to the service of particular political agendas.
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Cather’s acquaintance with Ford’s ideas which help to explain her insistence on a 
kind of realism that a “pure” Impressionism might deny. Impressionism was, as 
Levenson claims, “Ford’s acknowledged literary doctrine” (106), however it is a 
qualified impressionism, an impressionism which is moving towards a compromise 
with the Imagists and later modemists. While Ford’s impressionism remains 
committed to the notion that “all art must be the expression of an ego” it is also a 
type of realism (107).
Levenson notes that Ford’s most important statements were developed during 
the years 1912 through 1914, precisely the years when Hulme was lecturing, and 
represents a slightly different strain of modemism. In maintaining his 
Impressionism, Ford makes the point that it is a kind of realism — as opposed to 
Yeats’ poetry, for example, which is deliberately focused (like many antimodemists 
of the period) on another time and place. Ford will claim that the “supreme literary 
goal” is “the rendering of the material facts of life, without comment and in exact 
language.” Levenson terms this a kind of “civic realism”:
The artist assumes, as it were, the responsibilities of citizenship in the 
modem world, and according to which the artist’s goal is to reflect 
contemporaneity, or — in Ford’s credo of that period — “to register 
his own terms in terms of his own time.” Because Yeats registered 
other times in other terms, he provoked Ford’s jeer. (109)
It seems that Cather could have followed the antimodemism of Yeats or the strain 
which ultimately becomes Imagism. However, in Cather’s critical essays she insists, 
as Ford does, on the direct treatment of the “thing” (which ultimately, and ironically,
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through Pound’s appropriation of Ford, becomes an Imagist tenet). Ford’s praise for 
Pound’s “rendering of the material facts of life, without comment and in exact 
language” is echoed in Cather’s critical essays. For instance, Cather says in the 
Hinman interview:
Many people seem to think that art is a luxury to be imported and 
tacked on to life. Art springs out of the very stuff that life is made of. 
Most of our young authors start to write a story and make a few 
observations from nature to add local color. The results are invariably 
false and hollow. Art must spring out of the fullness and the richness 
of life. (Wasserman 97)
Growing out of a sensual, experiential and private human relation to the 
material, rather than some objective or pragmatic service to an agenda, Cather’s 
aesthetic is more “traditional,” though sometimes deliberately “legendary” (as she 
herself termed it), as in her novel. Death Comes for the Archbishop: sometimes neo- 
Romantic, as in Mv Antonia or Song of the Lark.- but not “hard” or “dry.” In a 
preface to Defoe’s The Fortunate Mistress Cather claims, “The book is as safe as 
sterilized gauze. One is bumped up smartly against the truth, old enough but always 
new, that in novels, as in poetry, the facts are nothing, the feeling is everything” (84). 
Her own theory of sensational aesthetics is essentially unpragmatic, and, in theory at 
least, Paterian. Cather begins the essay on escapism with an example: the Pueblo 
Indians of the southwest “paint geometrical patterns on the jars in which they carried 
water up from the streams. Why did they take the trouble?” she asks. Barely 
surviving drought and famine, why bother to paint when it would not increase the
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food supply or help maintain tribal security? The impulse “sprang from an 
unaccountable predilection of the one unaccountable thing in man,” which she leaves 
unnamed, but is clearly the aesthetic impulse to experience beauty, to nourish the 
senses.
But, curiously, Cather’s fictional writings which deal most particularly and 
overtly with the questions of art and aesthetics seem to contradict, or at least qualify, 
the positions found in her essays regarding the politics of writing. Art for art’s sake 
— an art committed to sensation, to individual perception, and, thus, to 
individualism — has an implicit position with regard to the mechanisms of the 
world. This position is inherently ahistorical, apolitical, transcendent, contemplative, 
and unapologetically escapist. And yet, in her fiction, and particularly in “Paul’s 
Case,” such Aestheticism is not the answer to the questions she herself poses 
regarding modemity: Paul is directly impacted by his social and economic 
circumstances, and falls prey to the ideology intended to transcend those 
circumstances. Cather’s statement in “Paul’s Case” is indeed about the historical 
realities — social, economic, political, industrial — of early twentieth century 
modemity.
It is imperative to read Cather’s work over/against her overt theoretical 
statements, and to understand the conditions which produced both her theoretical 
aesthetic position and her rather different artistic practice. To be fair, the 
aestheticism of Pater, which requires the dismissal of the “fruit” of experience — the 
rationalizing and theorizing of experience — does not lend itself well to the type of 
fully articulated critical theory one would wish for in this case. It is through an
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examination of her own artistic practices more than through Cather’s critical essays 
that it is possible to locate Cather’s own overdetermined responses to modemity, 
including her ambivalence towards the pure individualism that forms the basis of 
Aestheticism at the turn of the century. In “Paul’s Case” in particular we find 
deliberate echoes of Pater’s language in Cather’s diction and in her descriptions of 
Paul’s responses to art, but we also find, in the limitations of Paul’s Aestheticism, a 
concern for the content of Pater’s footnote in the theme of the story. The caveat 
which Pater attaches to his conclusion’s second appearance seems to be foremost on 
Cather’s mind as she herself explores the implications of a more decadent 
Aestheticism in 1905, post-Wilde. It is in this space which is opened up by this very 
ambivalence, perhaps fueled by a sense of moral loss that is coded in the story, that it 
is possible to locate an antimodem “political” statement. This position is a critique 
which resists the development of modem individualism and resulting bourgeois 
morality, which are products of modem capitalist hegemonic practices, while 
simultaneously advocating an aesthetic of individual sensation.
While Cather’s fiction posits a sensational aesthetic as an antidote to a 
modemist crisis, the ideology of individualism which both her sensational aesthetic 
and Paul’s Aestheticism depend upon contribute to the very modemity she rejects. 
This conflict points up the overdetermined message in her claim that “economics and 
art are strangers” (27). While art should not “comment” upon “economics” (a trope 
for the current historical socio-political situation), and in this sense may be a stranger 
to economics, it becomes clear in the story that the possibilities for “art”— or, in this 
case, sensational aesthetics and Aestheticism — are wholly dependent on historical
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and economic circumstances. That is, the very notion of art for art’s sake, the 
Aesthetic movement, is derivative of the ideology of individualism and its bourgeois 
manifestations: the politics, the institutions, the daily life from which the Aesthete 
desires escape.
Cather’s own sensational aesthetic, perhaps closer in intent to Pater than to 
Wilde’s Aestheticism (and Paul’s), is also driven by the need to invigorate 
experience, to heighten it, and of course it is utterly dependent on the conditions 
which make sensation possible in the first place. Pater’s “one chance” for “great 
passions” give “us this quickened sense of life, ecstasy and sorrow of love . . . ”
(238). But the very theory of either brand of “sensational” aestheticism derives from 
notions of the individual which have been produced by the hegemony at work during 
a particular period of history. Sensational aesthetics can be defined almost entirely 
by the need to escape from these conditions, “against” such conditions, in the sense 
that Wlad Godzich uses the notion “against”; “both in opposition to and in the sense 
of resting against” (xvii). At the same time, however, as Lears argues, individualism 
is a necessary component of the very bourgeois morality which will both condemn 
aesthetic sensation as an avant-garde alternative and give rise to it in the first place.
Bearing in mind Althusser’s notion of ideology as an “imaginary resolution 
of real contradictions,” it is crucial to look at the consequences of the ideology of 
individual, sensational aestheticism, and the implications following from its reliance 
on private perception. It is possible then to locate, in Paul’s individual and private 
perception, the transformation of such perceptions into social and institutional 
effects. Far from experiencing art for art’s sake, Cather’s interpretation of Paul’s
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experience exposes the ideology of the institutions which create Paul’s responses. 
The institutions from which Paul is alienated — the public education system and its 
agents (the English teacher, the art teacher), his father’s company and the bank from 
which he steals money, the police, and the church —  each indicates specific 
hallmarks of bourgeois culture. Through Paul’s private perceptions and reactions to 
them, these institutions represent the problem of Cather’s stance on aesthetics and 
the limited possibility of art standing outside specific historical conditions — all of 
which Cather places under the rubric of “economics.” The ideology of Aestheticism, 
with its emphasis on individual perception and impressions which create an 
ahistorical, atemporal reality, is an “imaginary” solution to the real contradictions 
within bourgeois modem culture. Like many forms of neurosis, Cather’s sensational 
aesthetic and Paul’s pseudo-Aestheticism are simultaneously symptoms of the 
problem and attempted solutions to the problem of modemist alienation. Put another 
way, Paul’s attempts to be an “Aesthete” — and Aestheticism as an avant-garde 
approach to life in general — represents his “imaginary” resolution of the real 
contradictions of modemity in which he is immersed and by which he is determined. 
However, his ideological practice (and the results of it) represents and even helps to 
perpetuate the very problem aestheticism hopes to “solve”: the ideology of 
individualism, as articulated through Cather’s sensational aestheticism, is both a 
cause of and a perceived solution to the crisis of modemity. This story, 
overdetermined in this way, exhibits the tensions within modemity and within 
literary modemism; and also exhibits the tensions between individualism and the
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morality based upon it (in the name of “progress”) under late nineteenth-century and 
early twentieth-century capitalism.
Clearly Cather’s work is not that of a pamphleteer or a social reformer, but 
neither is it the work of an artist ignorant of the conditions of modemity. Finally 
then, along with Althusser, “I shall. . .  suggest that ideology 'acts’ or ‘functions’ in 
such a way that it ‘recmits’ subjects among the individuals (it recmits them all), or 
‘transforms’ the individuals into subjects (it transforms them all) by that very precise 
operation which I have called interpellation or hailing, and which can be imagined 
along the lines of the most commonplace everyday police (or other) hailing: ‘Hey, 
you there! While Cather’s own aesthetic ideology is at work in the story, the 
concomitant, inextricable ideology of individualism interpellates the character of 
Paul, “hailing” or forcing both Paul and the reader to confront the limitations of 
Cather’s notions of a pure aestheticism. This tension between an apolitical/ahistorical 
aesthetic of sensation, which is posited as an alternative to bourgeois notions of 
progress and conformity, and the ideology of individualism which informs such an 
aesthetic (which has already been interpellated in the Aesthetic movement), in 
“Paul’s Case” can finally only be resolved, not through a manifesto on the 
advantages of Aestheticism, nor through a Paterian sensational aesthetic, but through 
the death of Paul.
^Louis Althusser^ Lenin and Philosophv. trans. B. Brewster (New Left Books, 1971).
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Chapter Four Aesthetic Strategies o f Accommodation: Gather's American Dandy 
and Consuming Experience 
Part I. Icons of Ambivalence: Calvinism, class and conformity in “Paul’s Case”
Paul, a seventeen-year old boy, dressed in an ill-fitting frock coat with a red 
carnation in his lapel, a would-be Aesthete, is yet another of Cather’s poseurs. While 
Paul finds his power in “claiming the moment, mounting with it, and finding it all 
sufficient,” the implications of this carpe diem and radieally individualistic 
philosophy are clearly dangerous to late nineteenth-century bourgeois morality. 
Cather depicts this morality exquisitely through the “burghers of Cordelia Street,” 
Paul’s teachers, and the icons that hang over his bed at home. The Calvinist icon, the 
very portrait of Calvin himself, representing the work ethic and the internalization of 
repression propounded in Protestant ideology, hangs over Paul’s bed in a bedroom 
with “horrible yellow wallpaper.” And yet, next to it, is a needlepoint with the 
scriptural injunction to “Feed my lambs”— a clear elision in Paul’s household of 
modem notions of success and religious imperative, but fundamentally irreconcilable 
goals. One cannot look out for others while accumulating capital in the way Weber 
observed. It is telling that the needlepoint was worked by Paul’s mother, long dead. 
As a result, she represents a set of values both absent from his life and replaced by 
other, more immediate concerns instilled in him through his authoritarian father, his 
teachers and “the Cumberland minister next door.” Each sets out, in their own way, 
to “reclaim the boy” for their oppressive brand of the Protestant ethic after he acts 
out (in an admittedly extreme way) the imperatives of capitalist individualism. Paul
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comes by his money dishonestly, and then spends it on the best clothes, food, 
accommodations and flowers he can buy in New York.
Paul seeks asylum through consumerism, but not from the bourgeois class; in 
fact he seeks access to that class. He seeks asylum from the banal morality of lower 
middle class Cordelia Street, a class which has appropriated the morality of the 
higher bourgeois classes as a substitute for actual cultural capital. The assimilation of 
bourgeois morality takes the place of material access to wealth and what it can buy. 
Promises of an American Dream, on Cordelia Street, are therefore reiterated, but 
utterly qualified. As an American flâneur, who can only look out on the pageant of 
Fifth Avenue abundance, Paul is at the margins of the bourgeois class, and is 
nowhere at home.
The attempt to internalize morality within Paul’s community, and more 
particularly within his home, is represented in an especially interesting passage. 
Cather describes Paul’s return late one night from ushering, and in her description of 
Paul’s bedroom is something which exemplifies Lears’ notion of the evasive banality 
and the often confusing messages that represent the reaction to modernity. Cather 
writes:
He turned and walked reluctantly toward the car tracks. The end had 
to come sometime, his father in his night-clothes at the top of the 
stairs, explanations that did not explain, hastily improvised fictions 
that were forever tripping him up, his up-stairs room and its horrible 
yellow wallpaper, the creaking bureau with the greasy plush collar- 
box, and over his painted wooden bed the pictures of George
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Washington and John Calvin, and the framed motto, “Feed my 
Lambs,” which had been worked in red worsted by his mother, whom 
Paul could not remember. (175)
While Paul’s notion of Aestheticism stands in direct opposition to the “grey 
monotony” and “tepid waters of Cordelia Street” and is a kind of test case for 
Cather’s own aesthetic of sensation as found in her various critical writings, the story 
also exhibits her resistance to modernity in her depictions of class relations. The 
icons of antimodem ambivalence hang over Paul’s bed: Washington, Calvin, and the 
actual words from the gospel, attributed to Jesus, represent the conflation of 
conflicting values in the culture, and the attempts to impose these on the boy.
Cather’s antimoderaism hinges on the very notion at the root of modem 
experience which drives the force of modem progress. This is of course her 
commitment to individual experience — itself derivative of a deep rooted belief in 
personal autonomy — an American individualism which intmdes upon Cather’s 
insistence on personal morality, transcendent meaning, and the necessity for 
community. This insistence is traceable to Victorian or premodem influences, 
including Cather’s own avowed literary models, Sarah Ome Jewett and, by 
extension, Harriet Beecher Stowe. But her faith in individualism also leads her to 
progressive belief in the work ethic and the accompanying ascetic rationalism 
necessary for success.
However, in “Paul’s Case,” these issues become subordinate to the lack 
informing the entire story: the absence of the mother and subsequent lack of a 
countervailing influence to progressive rhetoric. Nowhere in the story is there
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anyone to “feed” Paul, the Iamb who is lost, trying to find his way in the world 
which is inhospitable to his nervous and sensitive nature. And nowhere in the story is 
there anyone reinscribing this kind of compassion or sense of an alternative ethic of 
generosity as a cultural value, since, as Weber observed, modernity as the pursuit of 
wealth has “stripped” all ethical and religious meaning from everyday life, and 
capitalism “no longer needs the support of any religious forces, and feels the 
attempts of religion to influence economic life, in so far as they can still be felt at all, 
to be as much an unjustified interference as its regulation by the State” (72) Weber 
also notes that “the people filled with the spirit of capitalism to day tend to be 
indifferent, if not hostile, to the Church. The thought of the pious boredom of 
paradise has little attraction for their active natures; religion appears to them as a 
means of drawing people away from labour in this world” (70). Cather draws the 
picture of the minister next door as impotent, only called to assert an influence over 
Paul once has crossed the line into criminal behavior.
Lears describes the “constellation of modem values”— the “liberal faith in 
rationality, a Victorian commitment to decomm, a positivist belief in orderly 
progress through discovery of scientific laws” — as being “central to the nineteenth- 
century bourgeois world view” (285). Cather’s reaction to Victorian repressive 
morality and the stifling of individuality of the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century is to nonetheless assert the potentiality of individual and secular 
achievement, a position in danger of being appropriated by the very modem ideology 
she wishes to confront. In “Paul’s Case” the problem of individualism is highlighted 
by the absence of any deeper stmcture of meaning. Cather clearly depicts the
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available forms of religion as bankrupt and meaningless. They, and the structure of 
positivism, rationality, and Victorian decorum, are useless against the forces of 
modem consumer culture which seduce Paul.
In many of Cather’s stories, the structure of meaning and assertion of 
“personality” (through individual achievement) are inextricably linked, ultimately 
undercutting any resistance to modernity. The implications of individualism are, by 
1905, appropriated by ministers and other standard bearers of “official conduct” in 
order to help link material and moral progress. This, Lears argues, helps to 
legitimate material progress by shifting the locus of moral authority onto the 
“autonomous individual, whose only moral master was himself’ (12). According to 
Lears, a “central tenet of the modem world view” was “faith in individual autonomy. 
The official creed held not only that progress was inevitable but that the key to it was 
the disciplined, autonomous self, created in the bosom of the bourgeois family” (17). 
But, despite this faith in progress, and a smug satisfaction that surfaces in the 
“official” rhetoric, Lears claims that for the educated bourgeoisie at the end of the 
nineteenth century:
authentic experience of any sort seemed ever more elusive; life 
seemed increasingly confined to the airless parlor of material comfort 
and moral complacency. Many yeamed to smash the glass and 
breathe freely — to experience “real life” in all its intensity. Groping 
for altematives to modem unreality, they sometimes clung to the 
shreds and patches of republican tradition, but they also tumed to 
other cultural resources as well: the literary romantic’s rejection of
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urban artifice in the name of a rustic or childlike “simple life”; the 
philosophical vitalises rejection of all static systems in the name of 
the flux of “pure experience”; the avant-garde artist’s rejection of 
bourgeois respectability in the name of primal irrationality. The very 
effort to categorize this fin de siècle cultural ferment oversimplifies 
its richness and variety. (5)
Paul, while not an “educated bourgeois,” nonetheless turns to the only attractive 
option available: a search for “authentic” experience though the consumption of 
pleasure. And part of that pleasure is pure consumption. The desire for wealth, 
untempered by the bourgeois morality of Cordelia Street which Paul overtly rejects, 
is, while extreme, nonetheless an enactment of the progressive rhetoric he hears 
every day at home and in school. While Paul’s Aestheticism begins as protest, as I 
argue above, it ends in a meaningless quest for sensation. Cather’s aesthetic of 
sensation also represents antimodem protest, but in “Paul’s Case,” she interrogates 
its limits and seems to argue for its tempering, not through a banal Cordelia Street 
morality, but through something which is left undefined. “Paul’s Case” is the best 
representation of the challenges to both accommodate and protest modernity in 
Cather’s early stories. The contradictions in the culture require this: she has written 
herself into a box in much the way Paul himself has backed himself into his comer. 
There is no tuming back from modemity, and no escape. There is only the haunting 
phrase over Paul’s bed, suggesting a lost potential for meaning — “Feed My 
Lambs”; this appears both anachronistic and incomprehensible in its context.
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In “Paul’s Case,” the lower middle class’s appropriation of bourgeois 
morality is represented satirically in Cather’s depiction of Paul’s neighborhood, and 
less lightly in the patriarchal figure of Paul’s father and the “Cumberland minister” 
who lives next door. The conformity to Calvinist moral pressures, which the 
authority figures in the story represent, buttresses emergent capitalist ideology and 
the concomitant rise of an elite class. This orthodoxy and the attendant notions of 
“progress” filled public discourse in the late nineteenth century and the early years of 
the twentieth: not only from the pulpits, but from the banquet orators, in the civic 
clubs, from the bankers, in success manuals for boys, in schools, and, in Cather, on 
the stoops of Cordelia Street on Sunday afternoons, where the “burghers” of 
Cordelia street, with their stomachs protruding sit and extol the virtues of their 
“chiefs and overlords”— the “iron kings,” as well as the “cash boys” who “made it” 
above their station (177). Embracing the ideology of the class above themselves, 
retelling stories of success, represents for the people on Cordelia Street not only their 
acceptance of bourgeois morality, but the aspirations of this lower middle class to 
maintain its distance from the working class and to identify with the upper class.
Enthusiasm for material progress is, Lears claims, often
difficult to chart because it was omnipresent and often implicit in the 
emergent modem culture. It united businessmen, politicians, 
ministers, journalists — all the stout thought-leaders of the urban 
bourgeoisie. Even many labor leaders, socialists, and dissident 
farmers accepted the progressive faith: they attacked the 
maldistribution of wealth, not the fundamental beneficence of
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economic growth; they accepted the conventional link between 
technological development and national greatness. (8)
Furthermore, Lears argues, this rationalization of “progress” — a process which 
equates material with moral, even “Christian,” progress — “epitomizes the pattern of 
evasive banality which pervaded modem culture” (12). This is a rationalization 
which served many interests, but, Lears says, primarily those “of an emergent 
national mling class — still embryonic, tom by tension, sometimes barely cohesive, 
but an incipient mling class nonetheless” (9).
As Weber has clearly shown, even the moral messages of traditional 
Christianity have been redirected: much of the “official doctrine” was geared 
towards relocating the social conflicts incited by modemity after the so-called 
Second Industrial Revolution onto the individual, to make those issues matters of 
individual moral conscience, and, according to Lears, “providing troubled Americans 
with an innocuous means of discharging half-conscious anxieties about the effects of 
expanding market capitalism” (6). The best description of this, Lears says, is not 
social control, but (a carefully defined) cultural hegemony:
Modem values and attitudes served the interests of the bourgeoisie in 
more oblique ways as well. The cultural dominance of the bourgeoisie 
was partly an unintended consequence of sincere (though often self- 
deceiving) efforts to impose moral meaning on a rapidly changing 
social world — efforts led not by bankers and industrialists but by 
ministers and other moralists. (12)
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This discourse leads not only to more responsibility placed on the individual but also 
to an attack on older, more external forms of moral authority. The pressure 
contained within the new discourse was geared towards a promotion of a “new, 
internalized mode” of repression, in order to locate the center of morality within the 
autonomous individual. Aggression, sexuality, and health all become issues linked to 
self-control, and are made the exclusive province of the individual conscience.
To give one outré example of this type of direction in self-control, Lears 
quotes from John Harvey Kellogg’s Man. The Masterpiece, or Plain Truths Plainlv 
Told. About Bovhood. Youth and Manhood (1886). In this “success manual” for 
boys, Kellogg (the same Kellogg of Rice Krispies’ fame) argued that sensual self- 
indulgence was a danger whether the issue was food, sleep or sex, but especially 
with regard to sex. Lears explains that for many of the moralists of this period, 
masturbation, “the secret vice,” is seen as the most dangerous of the possible 
exercises of the will, and must be conquered through the will. But what makes 
Kellogg’s regime so striking, even for this Victorian period, is its insistence on the 
domination by the will of the unconscious; during sleep one must avoid erotic 
dreams in order to maintain self control. To illustrate the extremity of this it is worth 
quoting Lears at some length:
The key agent in this program (as indeed in all of modem character 
formation) was the will. During the waking hours, Kellogg advised, 
young men should keep the will in fine trim by practicing self-denial: 
properly disciplined, the will might even be applied to unconscious 
temptation, snapping the youth awake and out of his dream in time to
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prevent nocturnal emission. Like many of his contemporaries,
Kellogg provided medical as well as moral advice. His physiological 
agenda included;
1. Kneading and pounding on the abdomen each day to 
promote evacuation before sleep and thus avoid “irritating” 
congestions.
2. Drinking hot water, six to eight glasses a day (same end in 
view).
3. Urinating several times each night (same end in view).
4. Avoiding alcohol, tobacco, and tea because they stimulated 
lecherous thoughts.
5. Taking cold enemas and hot sitz baths each day.
6. Wearing a wet girdle to bed each night. (13-4)
Lears notes that while Frederick Taylor’s time and motion studies of the labor 
process promoted the scientific management of the workplace, Kellogg “yeamed for 
the full rationalization of the human psyche. The aspirations of both men represented 
a high point in the development of the modem superego” (14). Similar regimens are 
found throughout the self-help literamre of the period.
The alignment of material (whether bodily or economic) “success” with 
moral progress is more than simple “complacent hypocrisy,” Lears argues. It 
represents an intemalized “ethic of self control” which, by the 1880s, has become the 
“unquestioned norm for the middle and upper classes well as for much of the rest of
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society” (13). Lears explains, in terms which echo Foucault’s analysis, that the 
center of the new morality is the autonomous individual;
For centuries, the internal dynamic of bourgeois individualism had 
been undermining all the older, external forms of moral authority — 
the authority of king over subject, priest over communicant, master 
over slave. Freed from older constraints, each masterless man needed 
a moral gyroscope to keep him on course or else market society might 
dissolve into a chaos of self-seeking individuals. The destruction of 
old oppressive forms created new problems of social control; in order 
to preserve any semblance of public order, oppression had to yield to 
repression. (12-3)
This type of morality and concomitant attempts at rationalization are clearly 
coded in Cather’s stories, particularly in “Paul’s Case,” and her contradictory 
impulses are worth examining. Cather’s own sensational aesthetic is essentially 
oppositional to late Victorian repressive morality, despite her reservations about 
Aestheticism per se.
The images which hang above Paul’s bed recall the sometimes ridiculous 
efforts of someone like Kellogg to repress desire, even unconscious desire. In 
situating Calvin above the bed, Cather is reinscribing the Victorian morality which 
undergirds the values disseminated, according to Lears, by the educated bourgeoisie. 
This “respectability” constitutes a kind of hegemonic cultural capital for the 
dominant social classes, and for those like Paul’s father and the lower middle class 
who aspire to participation in such power (who listen to the stories of the iron kings,
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the Camegies, and aspire to their wealth and privilege despite the odds against that 
happening), to adopt the ethos and morality of the bourgeoisie is seen as winning 
half the battle. To participate in this morality lends respectability to a class which 
has been denied access to wealth and privilege. But through having intemalized the 
bourgeois ethic, subversion, critique, and the class consciousness which would 
advance such critique is effectively “evaded.” Thus, “the end” has to come some 
time for Paul.
Not only does Cather foreshadow his eventual suicide when Paul (correctly) 
believes he is in danger of being delivered hack to Cordelia Street by his father, but it 
signals the end of his individual, sensational pleasure and thus, quite literally, his 
individuality. Cather’s ambivalence is further underscored by her direct and 
unmediated quotation from the New Testament which appears alongside the picture 
of Calvin; “Feed My Lambs.” In this case the image of Calvin above Paul’s bed, 
while connoting the Protestant work ethic, also codes the repressive morality which 
requires self-control and desire in order to practice the work ethic and to succeed, 
and indicates the shift of the locus of moral authority fi'om the public to the private, 
from external forms of authority to more intemalized forms of repression. The “red 
worsted” motto, with its exhortation to “Feed my Lambs” on the other hand, is a 
traditional, compassionately based religious imperative, spoken by Jesus to his 
disciples, and indicates a public, social and very contradictory message to the others 
on the wall: not one of “success” or “progress” through competition but, rather, what 
has become a residual (to use Raymond Williams’ formulation) message of putting 
others first, of community responsibility. The fact that this has been “worked” by his
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mother, who died when Paul was an infant and whom “he could not remember,” 
inscribes a moral loss in this story. The old, residual messages of Christianity may 
be given lip service, but they are no longer emphasized. Also, the absent mother 
indicates a breakdown of the bourgeois family ethos, with the great expectations 
placed upon it: that the family, under the pressures of urban market economies, will 
safeguard culture and morality.
Through the absent mother, Cather in effect highlights the other messages 
that Lears claims the family also conveyed, that of socializing males to succeed in 
the competitive realm, teaching the traits of aggressive and acquisitive behavior in 
order to compete and “make it”(16). By placing Calvin alongside the religious 
exhortation the two messages are effectively conflated: the religious imperative has 
now become the Protestant work ethic. In addition, alongside both these images is 
the image of George Washington, making the Calvinist/religious ethic a patriotic 
one, linking economic progress and the requisite moral and bodily repression with 
national interest and identity. The religious imperative has now become elided with 
the message to “work hard, succeed,” and, hung over the bed, points to the need for 
self-control, self-denial, and discipline in matters of work, education, and even 
sexuality. The icons over the bed signify the equation of morality with material 
success, typifying the “evasive banality” present in the culture as it confronts 
advancing modernity in the late nineteenth century.
Lawrence Scaff outlines what he terms the five “theses” of Max Weber’s The 
Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. One of the major points in what Scaff 
calls Weber’s “capitalism thesis” is that:
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Modemity is characterized above all by the increasing 
dominance of a specific kind of rationalism which must be understood 
in terms of means-ends categories, purposive or goal-oriented actions, 
and “instmmental” standards. The notion of purposive or 
instmmental rationality (Zweckrationalitat) intruding into the 
everyday lifeworld and all spheres of culture, including those aspects 
of art and morality where claims to a protected “autonomy” had 
prevailed previously, is often considered Weber’s most distinctive and 
original contribution to an understanding of modemity [ .. .] .  [T]his 
rationalization thesis maintains that the essential driving mechanism 
of purposive or instmmental rationality is “intellectualization” or the 
increasing dominance of abstract cognitive processes. Rationalization 
can thus include pervasive features of modem life such as 
standardization, commodification, measurement in terms of 
efficiency, cost-benefit analysis, legalistic administrative procedures, 
and bureaucratic coordination and mle. The last of these features — 
the tendency toward “bureaucratization” in public affairs, which 
Weber tends to characterize as “inescapable” and an “objectification 
of mind”— therefore becomes an exceptionally obvious example of a 
more general and deep-rooted cultural development. (104-5)
To deny desire is part of what it means to be a man in the reactionary republican 
culture which feels that a reinvigoration of manliness and morals is imperative to 
success, and this functions in both bolstering emergent finance and corporate
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capitalism and in redressing the sins of the hedonistic, decadent Aestheticism post- 
Wilde. However, as Weber noted, as the pressures of capitalist acquisition increase, 
the imperative shifts from “saving” to “spending” and by the end of the century, 
“hedonism and greed” have taken the place of ascetic rationalism. Paul is coming of 
age in the advent of the new consumer culture. His sense of being drawn to art 
signifies however his rebellion towards rationalization, the efficiency of school, the 
internalization of “instrumental” standards: art still poses a sphere outside 
instrumentality, although celebrity and market culture is quickly encroaching into 
that space. While Paul may not understand or fully experience art as sublime, he at 
least recognizes the potential of it as another space in what Weber termed the “life- 
world.”
In order for the will to be redirected, for “morality” to be intemalized, the 
body must submit to denial, and sensation must be repressed as it too becomes an 
instmment of rationalism. The allusion to Gilman’s “Yellow Wallpaper” in “Paul’s 
Case” and Paul’s own hunger for sensational experience is enough to suggest 
Cather’s distaste for the coercion of a seventeen-year old boy through repressive 
Calvinist mores. While Cather may disapprove of some of Paul’s hedonistic choices, 
as shown through the ending of the story, she nevertheless sides with him on this 
issue. Paul’s resistance mirrors Cather’s own aesthetic, and his antimodemism is 
complicated in much the way her own is. Lears argues that:
This [self-repressive] prudery has provoked the enlightened twentieth 
century’s contempt, but if we move beyond sneers we can begin to 
see the historical significance of this unprecedented extension of self-
208
control. It was the strongest attempt yet made to extend the process 
of rationalization from the outer to the inner life; it meant that 
systematic methods of self-control would press beyond the workplace 
into the most intimate areas of daily experience —  perhaps even into 
unconscious wishes, dreams, and fantasies. In other words, the 
Victorian extension of self-control meant the triumph of a modem 
superego, more thoroughly intemalized, more systematically 
demanding than any of its historic predecessors. (13)
The antimodem problem is that, on the one hand, a rejection of “pmdery”— such as 
Paul’s when he defies the authorities and indulges in consumerism and perhaps even 
a one-night stand with a student from Yale in New York—is in fact a protest against 
the rationalistic ethic; but on the other hand it represents a danger to intemalized 
rationalization since it might lead to the loss of individualism which consumer 
culture requires in order to function.
The modem superego, like Aestheticism, is ultimately made possible, both in 
theory and in practice, through modemity’s focus on the autonomous individual, but 
it has come to serve a new end, that of the rising bourgeoisie and emergent 
capitalism, bolstered by intemalized Protestant morality. Cather’s resistant aesthetic 
is rooted in individualism and individual sensation, and therefore quite vulnerable to 
the very hegemonic structures in place she wishes to denounce. But her insistence 
on sensation and the sensual in artistic experience, the “experience of the moming 
bath” as aesthetic experience, points to her opposition to the regimentation and 
rationalization of inner life and a rejection of the body’s instmmentality. Cather’s
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aesthetic demands and attempts to carve out a separate space free from these 
pressures in order that individual, unique art may flourish.
Though late nineteenth-century bourgeois morality and an oppositional or 
alternative Aestheticism seem to pursue radically different aims, in fact, both share 
the same root: radical individualism. And both ultimately serve the same end by 
contributing to the emergent capitalist modemity that Cather critiques through Paul, 
his neighborhood, and his family, early in the new century. It is important to look at 
one other effect of this intensified and intemalized bourgeois morality. The family, 
under the pressures of urban market economies, “acquired new psychological and 
ideological burdens.” According to Lears, “work” becomes separated from “home,” 
women become the “guardians of culture and morality,” birthrates dropped and 
children were more easily sentimentalized as innocent, yet more autonomous 
individuals. However, despite lingering notions of a separate sphere, complete 
segregation did not in fact take place: Lears argues that the home was still meant “to 
socialize people (particularly males) to succeed in [the] competitive realm.” If the 
home officially “encouraged mutual harmony, it also taught the aggressive traits of 
the self-made man” (16). This conflict too is represented in Cather’s piece, and her 
depiction of Paul’s father “at the head of the stairs” deserves attention in order to 
understand her critique of bourgeois morality.
Early in the story, Cather describes the model to which Paul’s society, 
including his father and the teachers at his school, his neighbors and the minister 
next door, think he should aspire:
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Today, Paul’s father, on the top step, was talking to a young man who 
shifted a restless baby from knee to knee. He happened to be the 
young man who was daily held up to Paul as a model, and after whom 
it was his father’s dearest hope that he would pattern. This young man 
was of a ruddy complexion, with a compressed, red mouth, and faded, 
near-sighted eyes, over which he wore thick spectacles, with gold 
bows that curved about his ears. He was clerk to one of the magnates 
of a great steel corporation, and was looked upon in Cordelia Street as 
, a young man with a future. (178)
The expectations for Paul here are clearly delineated: the hope of the class of people
V
on Cordelia Street is fairly constrained. The young man — a clerk — is looked up to 
as a “young man with a future” though Cather leaves this ambiguous: is it because he 
has access to the powerful steel magnate, or is it because he himself might rise above 
his clerk status? Alastair Hamilton, in discussing The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit 
of Capitalism, explains Weber’s notion of the “ideal-type of the capitalist” as 
possessing a “disciplined spirit of enterprise, from which all joy was absent” (155). 
Hamilton notes that Weber was intensely interested in the relationship between 
asceticism and labor. Cather’s further description of the clerk alludes to such 
asceticism as well:
There was a story that, some five years ago — he was now barely 
twenty-six — he had been a trifle “dissipated,” but in order to curb his 
appetites and save the loss of time and strength that a sowing of wild 
oats might have entailed, he had taken his chief’s advice, oft reiterated
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to his employés, and at twenty-one had married the first woman 
whom he could persuade to share his fortunes. She happened to be an 
angular schoolmistress, much older than he, who also wore thick 
glasses, and who had now home him four children, all near-sighted, 
like herself. (178)
Cather’s depiction of this near-sighted neighbor is allegorically satirical: the near­
sightedness indicating an inability to see beyond the confines of class, and the 
expectations of this class, represented by the neighborhood, and, specifically, 
Cordelia Street, which
was a highly respectable street, where all the houses were exactly 
alike, and where business men of moderate means begot and reared 
large families of children, all of whom went to Sabbath-school and 
learned the shorter catechism, and were interested in arithmetic; all of 
whom were as exactly alike as their homes, and of a piece with the 
monotony in which they lived. (175)
Cather, in this passage, draws a vivid, if dreary, picture of life under industrial 
capitalism and the deadening, monotonous conformity accompanying it. The 
expectations for the occupants of this neighborhood are low. In order to be regarded 
as someone with a “future” one must be self-repressed, must exercise self-denial; the 
near-sighted neighbor has taken his “chiefs” advice, in a manner of which Kellogg 
would most certainly approve. The “curbing of appetite” that marriage effects is the 
target of Cather’s critique (there is no space for being even a “trifle dissipated” in 
this world of regimentation), as well as the resulting monotony; the homes and
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people who are “exactly alike” hint at the problem for individualism in this text. 
While it is clear that conformity is undesirable and that individuality is valued, 
ultimately, as Paul moves into a more decadent Aestheticism, Cather will be forced 
to qualify her belief in individualism.
Being a clerk like his neighbor is certainly not a future Paul wants any part 
of, despite the overt pressure from his father and the futile efforts of his teachers at 
school (177-78). The evasive banality of the lessons taught to Paul are 
fundamentally congruent with the progressive rhetoric of the American Dream, but 
the actual expectations of conformity attached to Paul and his classmates inscribe the 
impossibility of the self-made man success stories. Cather codes this irreconcilable 
conflict in her descriptions of Cordelia Street society and in Paul’s experience at 
school. Paul’s teachers are frustrated and at a loss, and he is suspended, not for any 
particular reason but for generally being insolent, for his “disorder and 
impertinence,” a kind of “hysterically defiant manner,” and a “contempt which they 
all knew he felt for them, and which he seemingly made not the least effort to 
conceal” (170). Paul, of course, represents a challenge to their own unexamined and 
contradictory beliefs.
As Lears notes, the “destruction of old oppressive forms” of social 
constraints late in the nineteenth century had created “new problems of social 
control” (12). The rise of standardized public education was, and of course still is, 
one method of imparting measures of social control, along with defining the 
expectations for certain classes destined for particular types of work. Paul is not 
amenable to such education, “in one class he habitually sat with his hand shading his
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eyes; in another he made a running eommentary on the lecture, with humorous 
intent” (171). After his conference with the principal and all his teachers, the 
teachers feel ashamed to have “felt so vindictive toward a mere boy”; Paul on the 
other hand, whistles as he leaves the building hoping his teachers witness his 
lightheartedness (172). Cather’s tone in these passages is not especially judgmental 
towards Paul, but it is much harsher towards the teachers, whom she figures as 
wolves in a pack and compares to a “ring of tormentors” who go after Paul as a 
“miserable street cat” (172).
The teachers are one form of external authority which Paul adamantly rejects. 
But his father’s authority is also at issue. The Victorian, patriarchal, traditional 
authority of the father “at the head of the stairs,” an image in Paul’s mind when he 
comes home late from ushering, is not a reality he faces willingly, especially since he 
fantasizes about his father accidentally killing him (and not regretting it). He prefers 
instead to spend the night in the cold, dark basement and to lie to his father the next 
moming rather than be confronted. Paul lies quite often, to his father and to others; 
in fact, he has come to find lying “indispensable for avoiding friction” (170). He tells 
extravagant and ludicrous stories to his classmates about trips to the Continent that 
are delayed for various reasons, and stories about his close relationships with famous 
personages.
But once he has been cut off from ushering as punishment from his father, he 
turns to stealing as well. After successfully embezzling money from Denny and 
Carson, his father’s company, and fleeing to New York, Cather tells us that in that 
city there is “no figure” like his father “at the top of the stairs” (183). This is
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especially comforting, since “Paul had done things that were not pretty to watch, he 
knew,” but now he has “a curious sense of relief, as though he had at last thrown 
down the gauntlet to the thing in the comer” —  his fear (183). Cather never tells us 
precisely what Paul fears, besides his father’s authority and anger. The allusion to 
“sin” or “evil” is left unmarked, ambiguous, merely suggested.^^
In Lears’ discussion of antimodem reactions he notes that “yeamings for 
unconscious vitality” represent a “mounting challenge to the modem superego,” in 
the attempt to intemalize morality in the autonomous individual (166). He notes 
that:
This rebellious impulse animated avant-garde art and literature; it also 
had a wider social significance. Therapeutic quests for well-being 
proliferated, focusing often on premodem models forming an inchoate 
cult of inner experience. Though they aimed to recover primal 
irrationality, devotees of inner experience frequently trivialized 
unconscious mental and emotional life by denying its darker 
dimensions of aggression, rage and conflict.. .the cult of inner 
experience had an ironic effect: its devotees reinforced the evasive 
banality they had intended to escape (166-7).
Judith Butler discusses this aspect of “Paul’s Case” in her chapter, “Dangerous 
Crossings,” in Bodies that Matter. She argues that Paul’s “scandalous” behavior 
may be linked to his homosexuality: “here is a gesture that both covers and defers 
some allegedly criminal sexuality, that takes place against and through the law that 
produces that criminality.” And, “like the gendered surface of Cather’s own 
narrative, Paul’s presentation is maddening precisely for the expectations that it 
defies” (165).
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Paul’s rebellious stance as a self-fashioned Aesthete and flâneur is not simply a 
teenaged rebellion, but an inability to reconcile the conflicting demands of 
modemity. The “darker dimensions” of this rebellion are rather brutally depicted in 
this piece, in Paul’s crimes and particularly in his suicide. The “failure” of Paul to 
conform to bourgeois morality, which will place him squarely under the “waters of 
Cordelia street clos[ing] above his head” (174), leaves him very few options. His 
attempted dissent, through Aestheticism, is one imagined solution to the “yearning 
for unconscious vitality” Lears describes. The traditional Christian virtues are no 
longer an option, though they appear accessible (the minister living next door, 
Sabbath-school every week), but they have been elided with the Calvinist work ethic 
so that they are virtually indistinguishable from the pressures to be a “success.” The 
appearance of Christian virtue counts, but the real virtues extolled are those of 
becoming the self-made man; in terms of status, this is what really counts. The 
repression through the will, as in Kellogg, has yet another function. Through ascetic 
denial and the repression of sensation, the stage is set for the enactment of capitalist 
efficiency. By turning the forces of conscience away from traditional religious 
concerns to the vocation of work and success, a different type of individual emerges 
who is much more fitted to the new system.
One reaction to this intemalized pressure of rationalization is of course, 
neurasthenia. Charlotte Perkins Gilman had published “The Yellow Wallpaper” in 
1891 in The New England Magazine, and it made enough of a stir that many, 
including a Boston physician, protested its publication. Gilman’s story is about the 
repression of creativity in a woman diagnosed by men as having a “nervous
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condition” or “hysteria” brought on by childbirth and exacerbated by writing. Her 
protagonist’s dilemma is that in order to “cure” her, her very body must be 
controlled; she is infantalized and isolated by her husband, a patriarchal figure of 
authority (he is both her husband and her doctor). As Elizabeth Ammons has noted, 
“Denied freedom of movement, intellectual stimulus (books, friends, writing, or 
drawing). . .  she was transformed into nothing but body, a mass of pure passive, 
ostensibly desexualized flesh without self-control” (36). The regimen of S. Weir 
Mitchell, called the “rest eure,” depended upon the doctor being in control and the 
patient knowing that her feelings, questions, and concerns will and must be 
disregarded. The end result is a desexualized, unchangingly six-month pregnant-like, 
“refeminized” woman. Ammons claims that the “successfully refeminized woman is 
at first forced and then later learns cheerfiilly to place her whole being in the hands 
of another, who, not accidentally, is a physician: the new priest, the new male 
authority, of the new scientific era” (36). Cather’s female characters, as well as 
Paul,^ "^  refuse this male authority, and her female bodies are particularly resistant to 
such refeminization, maintaining a near flawless, if “masculine,” self-control. 
Cather’s aesthetic not only reaffirms the sensation of the body but reclaims its 
experiences for a higher purpose: that of art. But, in “Paul’s Case,” Paul does not 
have the artistic vocation or drive himself, and thus, has no means of redemption
Paul seems to be a feminized male in the sense Blanchard argues Aesthetic men 
were by the end of the century. And Judith Butler also argues this point, claiming 
that “the vectors of Paul’s sexuality” are impossible to determine. Butler argues that 
the “ban of suspension” imposed on Paul as he is expelled from school “puts into 
doubt to which gender and sexuality ‘Paul’ refers, confounding a reading that claims 
to ‘settle’ the question” (163).
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available to him. He will have to find another means of protest, and he does it by 
emulating the Aesthete. However, as the next section demonstrates, this model has a 
particularly American inflection.
Part II. Paul as flâneur: the aesthetic body and “morbid desire”
In her book Gender on the Divide: The Dandv in Modernist Literature.
Jessica Feldman claims that Cather uses the figure of the dandy to interrogate gender 
categories, but also to “solve artistic problems, chief among them the conception of a 
precisely modem beauty” (22). I would go further and suggest that Cather also uses 
the figure of the dandy to embody her antimodem sentiment, itself an irresolvable 
problem. The history of the dandy is instmctive for understanding Cather’s 
antimodemism since her particular use of it is necessarily inflected by the period 
during which she writes. Feldman has established that Cather read French literature 
extensively, particularly during her years at the University of Nebraska and her early 
years as a writer. She also notes that Cather makes mention of or alludes to a “wide 
range of French writers, including Gautier . .  .Baudelaire; Barbey”; as well as 
Dumas, Flaubert, Verlaine, Zola, Daudet, and Maupassant in her literary reviews.
Of course she also read English literary dandies such as Pater, Swinbume and Wilde 
(144). Feldman’s notion of Cather’s search for a “moral aestheticism” is a useful 
and provocative one, but her analysis of Cather remains ahistorical. Lears’ notion of 
antimodemism in America at the tum of the century can help illuminate Cather’s 
response.
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Feldman notes that Gather’s use of the dandy figure is aimed at interrogating 
the limitations of gender and transcending them. Her observation that “the chief rule 
of the brotherhood of dandies, strictly observed, is to evade conformity” and that the 
writers she studies, including Gather, represent the dandy figure as a figure of 
protest, is particularly useful. She continues in her discussion of the dandy by 
claiming that, generally:
he is the figure of paradox created by many societies in order to 
express whatever it is that the culture feels it must, but cannot, 
synthesize. This dandy is neither spirit nor flesh, nature nor artifice, 
ethical nor aesthetic, active nor passive, male nor female. He is the 
figure who casts into doubt, even while he underscores, the very 
binary oppositions by which his culture lives. (4)
This said, there is nevertheless a history to the evolution of the dandy. Gather’s 
depiction of the dandy, or what Walter Benjamin later calls the flâneur is, while a 
most particularly American one, based on ideals which can be traced back at least to 
Baudelaire and his own brand of antimodemism in mid-century France.
Ellen Moers argues, in The Dandv: Brummell to Beerbohm. that:
With Le Peintre de la view moderne the dandy tradition reached its 
apogee. Baudelaire brought out all the capacity of the dandy figure 
for rebellion: for scornful, silent, unsuccessful rebellion against the 
mediocre materialism of a democratic era. Dickens had suggested a 
dandyism of failure; Barbey had expounded a dandyism of 
dissatisfaction; Baudelaire finally posited a dandyism of despair.
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Precisely because the dandy was, for Baudelaire, a figure apart from 
life, irresponsible, idle, absorbed with self, he could serve as a moral 
consciousness for the contemporary world. Defiant in a bourgeois 
society, Baudelaire’s dandy admitted the originality and permanence 
of sin; he observed and acquiesced in the modernity of evil. (253)
But as Paterian Aestheticism and, later, the Yellow Book decadence interpellates the 
dandy figure, Baudelaire’s figure of the dandy is inflected by a certain ironic 
determinism. Moers continues:
Baudelaire’s vision of the dandy as the last representative of human 
pride, drowning in a sea of democracy, would find ironic 
confirmation in the last chapter of the dandy’s history. For the dandy 
was to go down to defeat at the hands not of decadence hut of 
vulgarity. The fin de siècle made him over for a mass audience. (283) 
The American flâneur is, unlike his forebears, perhaps the final product of 
modernity, and, ultimately, vulgarity; that is, he is a consumer. This section will 
trace the problem of Gather’s antimodem aesthetic through her depiction of an 
American dandy, Paul.
Gather writes of Paul, that, “in the midst of that smoke-palled city, 
enamoured of figures and grimy toil, Paul had his secret temple, his wishing-carpet, 
his bit of blue-and white Mediterranean shore bathed in perpetual sunshine” (179). 
While the late nineteenth century Aesthete may wish for a place beyond ideology, 
beyond history, “bathed in perpetual sunshine,” Gather firmly situates Paul in the 
industrial, modem age of the early twentieth century. The antimodem allusions to
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exotic times and places firmly opposed to the “grimy toil” of “smoke-palled” urban 
Pittsburgh are not unusual, as Lears demonstrates. Paul, through his dreams, rejects 
the work ethic, but not modernity in its entirety (anymore than Gather ultimately 
does). On Sunday afternoons Paul and his neighbors congregate on their stoops to 
tell stories. Listening to plans to put in electric railway plants in Egypt, “Paul 
snapped his teeth; he had an awful apprehension that they might spoil it all before he 
got there” (178). And yet:
he rather liked to hear these legends of the iron kings, that were told 
and retold on Sundays and holidays; these stories of palaees in 
Venice, yachts on the Mediterranean, and high play at Monte Carlo 
appealed to his fancy, and he was interested in the triumphs of cash 
boys who had become famous, though he had no mind for the 
cashboy stage. (178)
Paul, in rejecting the “grimy toil” of modernity, does not reject the fruits of that toil. 
He is seduced by the “legends” although he has no desire to participate in the work 
ethic. This, of course, does not differentiate him from the European dandy’s history. 
What does differentiate him is that he has no means by which to live out his decadent 
dreams.
Part of what informs the Aesthetic culture of the mid to late nineteenth 
century, at least since Baudelaire, is the urban figure, searching for sensation, 
alienated and wandering; this figure Benjamin calls the flâneur who “curses 
‘progress,’ he loathes the industry of the century, and yet he enjoys the special 
flavour which this industry has given today’s life” (94). In his description Benjamin
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notes that, unlike the dandy who perfected the art of “the cut,” wit, and innuendo, the 
flâneur does not necessarily have the “gift of pleasing” (96). The flâneur as 
Benjamin reads him through Poe and Baudelaire is also closely allied with the figure 
of the amateur detective, furtive, anonymous, voyeuristic, on the margins of the 
criminal world. Benjamin, in The Arcades Project, writes: “Dialectic offlânerie: on 
one side, the man who feels himself viewed hy all and sundry as a true suspect and, 
on the other side, the man who is utterly undiscoverable, the hidden man.
Presumably, it is this dialectic that is developed in ‘The Man in the Crowd’” (420). 
Paul, while an actual criminal who does not want to be caught in his crime, is 
however a very American figuration: a flâneur who does feel himself viewed as 
“suspect,” yet who wishes, like the dandy, to be seen. In this sense, Paul is both 
flâneur and dandy.
While Balzac and Thomas Carlyle misconceived the dandy as someone who 
is more interested in appearances than ideas, comparing, as Balzac did, the dandy’s 
intelligence to “a piece of bedroom furniture,” the tradition of the dandy by the fin de 
siècle in Europe is in reality much more interesting and much more intellectual.
The trajectory of the dandy may be traced from its beginnings in England with 
Brummel to the French interpretation of the figure at least firom Baudelaire to the fin 
de siècle. Baudelaire writes that “Dandyism appears especially in transitional 
periods in which democracy is not yet all-powerful, in which the aristocracy is only 
partially weakened and debased” and, as Pamela Genova notes, “The dandy’s 
striking silhouette on the boulevard spoke out as a vote against the ideological move 
of the end of the century towards the Americanization of Europe and the decadence
222
of French aesthetic sensibility” (76). She adds that by the fin de siècle, the dandy 
had “formulated a subtle, aesthetically-grounded style of cultural terrorism that 
attacked the foundations of art, morality, and convention by consistently questioning 
those very foundations, hoping to weaken them not through direct attacks, but 
through insinuation and innuendo” (75).
At mid-century Baudelaire writes, in “Mon coeur mis à nu”:
At a time when men allow themselves to be dulled by the sole idea of 
utility, I believe that there is no great harm in exaggerating a bit in the 
opposite direction . . .  Other men are subject to taxes, made for menial 
work, that is, for what are called “professions” (352, 649).
While the reader has no reason to think that Paul’s posturing is a deliberate 
intellectual position, his demeanor is described as “exaggerated,” his style as 
affected. He has “no mind for the cash boy stage,” or for the “profession” of clerk 
for which his father and neighbors assume he will settle. In fact, while Baudelaire’s 
rebellion originates from the position of privilege accorded his aristocratic class, a 
class which does not need a “profession” or even an occupation, Paul’s rebellion 
originates from his position in a lower class. His rebellion will take the form of 
mimicking the upper class, some of whom do have a profession. In America, in the 
age of high finance capital, having a “profession” as opposed to being lower middle 
class or working class will afford respectability and enable one to conspicuously 
consume — the most important hallmark of status. Above all, to appear 
“professional” distinguishes those in the middle classes from the working class, 
whether they have much money or not.
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The carnation which Paul wears in his lapel to school (not the dyed green 
carnation of Wilde, but still a “scandalous red”) and his other affectations are 
designed to deliberately provoke his teachers, not by “direct attack” but through 
“insinuation and innuendo” — at least partially by pointing up an imaginary class 
difference. Rather than truly aspiring to a “profession,” Paul aspires to the luxury of 
leisure afforded the upper classes. Paul is not interested in “respectability” but in the 
ability to be identified as one opposing the lower middle class of which he is really a 
part. Paul mistakes pecuniary reputability, just as Flavia does, with cultural capital.
His affectations, his dress, his lurking outside the theatre at night, his late car 
rides to and from downtown, his voyeuristic consumption of the wealth of the upper 
classes in New York, all point to the characteristics of a dandy, but also to 
Benjamin’s flâneur. The one difference is Paul’s desire to be seen, and to be seen in 
a particular way. His flaunting of his dandyism in the face of his teachers and his 
peers is an act of desperation, to remove himself from the confines of lower middle 
class respectability, to identify and to be identified with the wealthy, the consumer 
culture of modernity — not, in the historical dandy tradition of exaggerating the 
extremity of modem decadence in order to critique it, but to participate in it, in a 
very American version of antimodemism. Unlike his European predecessors, Paul 
wants to participate in consumer culture in an attempt to subvert the conformist, 
repressive bourgeois morality of the lower and middle classes and their smug 
“homilies by which the world is run”; unlike the European dandy, Paul does not need 
to lose himself in the crowd to assert the decadence of his culture, he needs to lose
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himself there to assert his belonging to a class to which he can never realistically 
ascend.
Paul’s dandyism is, ironically, his participation in the marketplace as an act 
of protest. Any pretensions to art are simply “mere scenic accessories.” Paul’s 
adoption of “style” may show an affinity to Wildean decadence, but in America it 
simply works differently. No longer a subversive act, except in the context of lower 
middle class life, Paul’s style represents the American obsession with acquisition and 
the appropriation of the individual by capitalism.
Of course late nineteenth century dandies like Wilde depended upon being 
seen in order to shock and scandalize their audiences. But even Wilde had at his 
disposal the wealth of his wife, and his cronies, like most European dandies, were 
typically aristocrats. Conspicuous consumption was not a form of protest in and of 
itself; though, for Baudelaire “evil” was a form of protest, as Wilde’s “style” was 
“truth.” Though Baudelaire as flâneur is seen on the boulevard, he nonetheless leads 
his life voyeuristically, furtively, like Poe’s “Man in the crowd.” As the century 
unfolds, as American bourgeois morality and consumer culture becomes more and 
more intractable, in order to be subversive the dandy must be seen. As the American 
“codes” of class become submerged in democratic materialism, the new dandy must 
develop new ways to remain subversive. His subversion must become, ironically, 
more and more overt and desperate.
Paul, unlike the dandy of the Second Empire in France, is a figuration of a 
different historical moment, the age of finance capitalism in America, that most 
“democratic” of cultures. For the dandy, this means that “vulgarity” has become the
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order of the day. Unlike the original dandy figure, the American dandy is not of the 
aristocratic class. As a member of the “classless class,” the lower middle class of 
clerks, teachers and semi-educated, with aspirations to the upper classes, Paul needs 
to be seen, and in order to differentiate himself from his own class he needs to be 
seen conspicuously consuming. In order to assert his individuality, in order to assert 
his independence from the bourgeois morality his own lower middle class has 
appropriated, Paul must reinvent himself. In a theatrical way, he performs the part of 
a dandy, an Aesthete, informed (in Gather’s representation) by the rebellion of the 
dandy figure from Baudelaire on, but interpellated by the peculiar conflations of 
individualism. Calvinist morality, and consumer culture in America at the turn of the 
century.
In Paul’s attempt to assert his individuality through his self-presentation he 
ironically makes others the arbiter of his value, and those others are those he hopes 
to be like — the wealthy with access to luxury, who conspicuously consume. In 
order to throw off conformity, Paul adopts a new mode of conformity, one which is 
beginning to gain currency in America as the new century begins: the consumer 
mentality. Paul, sitting in the Waldorf-Astoria in New York, in his newly purchased 
clothes with his engraved silver cigarette case:
watched the pageant. The mere stage properties were all he 
contended for . . .  He was entirely rid of his nervous misgivings, of 
his forced aggressiveness, of the imperative desire to show himself 
different from his surroundings. He felt now that his surroundings 
explained him. Nobody questioned his purple; he had only to wear it
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passively. He had only to glance down at his dress coat to reassure 
himself that here it would be impossible for anyone to humiliate him. 
(185)
What Paul needs is for people to see him consuming: art at the theatre, 
wearing pretentious clothing in public spaces, ordering flowers for his room, dining 
on good food among wealthy patrons, taking better accommodations — all aimed at 
differentiating himself from the lower middle class from which he comes. It is 
Paul’s consumption which is, paradoxically, his rebellion. The dandy originally, in 
mid-century France, was able to utilize his dandyism and what Walter Benjamin 
calls “the art of pleasing” as a subversive technique because he had the very access 
to elegance and luxury which Paul does not. Dandyism called attention to the 
perceived excesses of culture by simply taking what existed to an extreme, by 
affectations of boredom and disinterestedness. But dandyism signifies something 
very different as it accompanies the advent of consumer culture in America, even 
though many of the stylistic elements remain in place.
While dandyism was a protest in Europe against the Americanization of 
culture, in America dandyism becomes an assertion of the power of the very material 
mediocrity which has begun to constitute American modernity. It is an assertion of 
that which Baudelaire and Benjamin oppose. In a misguided attempt at basing his 
persona on a European model, Paul ironically becomes less a figure of independence 
and revolt and more a figure of the encroaching crassness and vulgarity of his culture 
which dandyism intended to protest.
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“Everything was quite perfect; he was exactly the kind of boy he had always 
wanted to be,” Paul thinks as he finishes dressing in the evening before his final 
night in the hotel. But Paul’s desire is however perverted and even subverted in its 
aim: far from being a unique, autonomous individual, differentiated fi-om the 
monotony of Cordelia Street society, Paul is forced to merely play out another role.
Within the context of American excess, acquisitiveness and dreams of 
upward mobility, Paul’s dandyism, far from representing a rebellion, merely exhibits 
in extreme form the very progressive values the culture projects. As the lower 
middle class of Cordelia Street expands, its aspirations are less concentrated, as in 
mid-century France, on avoiding bourgeois complacency than on entering in to it, 
and, further, are focused at all costs on avoiding slipping into the working class. 
Being “exactly the kind of boy he had always wanted to be” in this case involves 
rising above his own class into the bourgeoisie which constitutes cultural capital for 
the lower class from which Paul comes. But antimodemist reaction contains two 
parts: and Paul in rejecting the morality of asceticism and self-denial (having no 
mind for the cash-boy stage) still accepts the rhetorical and practical ends of 
capitalism and progressive rhetoric: wealth, luxury and above all, conspicuous 
consumption.
As the class of clerks, teachers, and semi-educated small businessmen 
expands, they still remain what Amo Mayer calls a “half-class of quasi-workers and 
quasi- bourgeois” united in their fears of “proletarianization” and their dreams of
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embourgeoisement.^^ While the dandy was perceived in Europe, as Pamela Genova 
argues, as a kind of cultural “terrorist,” in “Paul’s Case” Paul as dandy is merely 
viewed as aberrant, as irritating, and as someone whom the minister needs to work 
harder to “reclaim.” His sensational excesses need to be reigned in, but not because 
they represent a threat to the bourgeois class (since even the teachers aspire to that), 
but because he is stepping out of line from his own class and its conflicted Calvinist 
morality of self-denial and conformity. While his lower middle class accepts 
bourgeois morality, that morality does not come with the luxuries of the upper and 
bourgeois classes. The desire to consume on Cordelia Street is assimilated but also 
qualified through the “virtue” of self-denial, enabling the “imaginary resolution” of 
its restless ambitions to partake of the American dream with its lower status of 
industrial labor, only one step away from the working class which it fears. Cordelia 
Street represents the ultimate accommodation to modernity through the impetus of 
progressive ideology. Believing a rhetoric which does not serve their own interests, 
the teachers, the minister, and Paul’s father can still claim a compensatory cultural 
capital by adopting bourgeois values, even without the rewards that are supposed to 
accompany them.
When Paul goes out from his hotel in New York he is face to face with 
modernity, and unlike his Romantic predecessors, is not shocked by it. The 
artificiality of it all is what beckons, what entices:
I take this idea from Quentin Bailey’s thesis. Modernism and Class: White-Collar 
Experiences of Education. Empire, and Economv. which outlines Mayer’s ideas 
usefully.
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Here and there on the comers whole flower gardens blooming behind 
glass windows, against which the snow flakes stuck and melted; 
violets, roses, carnations, lilies of the valley -  somehow vastly more 
lovely and alluring that they blossomed thus unnaturally in the snow. 
The Park itself was a wonderful stage winterpiece. (184)
Wilde had noted in the 1880s that being “natural” was a hard appearance to keep up. 
The artificial for the late nineteenth century dandy was the essence of beauty, a 
modem form of beauty, and therefore the only tme beauty. Gather’s writing here is a 
compact and precise example of her impressionistic and sensational aesthetic as she 
describes Paul’s reaction to the scene on Fifth Avenue:
The snow was falling faster, lights streamed from the hotels that 
reared their many stories fearlessly up into the storm, defying the 
raging Atlantic winds. A long, black stream of carriages poured down 
the avenue, intersected here and there by other streams, tending 
horizontally. There were a score of cabs about the entrance of his 
hotel, and his driver had to wait. Boys in livery were mnning in and 
out of the awning stretched across the sidewalk, up and down the red 
velvet carpet laid from the door to the street. Above, about, within it 
all, was the mmble and roar, the hurry and toss of thousands of human 
beings as hot for pleasure as himself, and on every side of him 
towered the glaring affirmation of the omnipotence of wealth. (184) 
Here, in an almost ironic tone, as elsewhere in the story. Gather elides the sensational 
aesthetic of the modem world, the mmble and roar, the streams of carriages
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converging like black rivers in a topography of the metropolis, with the 
“omnipotence of wealth” — skyscrapers in a particularly American figurai 
landscape. The artificial prevails over the natural, even over the raging wind off the 
Atlantic.
Underscoring this point of contact between aesthetics and wealth. Gather 
writes in the next paragraph:
The boy set his teeth and drew his shoulders together in a spasm of 
realization; the plot of all dramas, the text of all romances, the nerve- 
stuff of all sensations was whirling about him like the snow flakes. He 
burnt like a faggot in a tempest. (184)
Paul’s aesthetic, bodily, sensational response to the scene before him and all it 
represents is clear. His aesthetic response is not about art, though wealth and what it 
represents is commodified, consumed, and, in a cheap imitation of Pater’s “burning 
with a hard gem-like flame,” Paul too will bum with intensity of sensation, both 
despite the coldness of wealth swirling around him, and because of it.
The rebellion against bourgeois morality which Paul’s dandyism and his 
criminal behavior represent is undercut by his participation in consumer culture and 
his conspicuous consumption. While he rejects the Protestant banal morality of his 
class, he continues to aspire to the promises of consumer culture, and in fact, flaunts 
his contrived difference from his class. The ambiguity of this position is beautifully 
figured in this piece, and exemplifies the antimodem impulse Lears has described. 
After committing the crime which will get him to New York, Paul “wondered that 
there were honest men in the world at all” and, as he sees the glittering wealth
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around him muses that “this was what all the world was fighting fo r . . .  this was 
what all the struggle was about.” As he sits in the hotel lobby, “he doubted the 
reality of his past”:
Had he ever known a place called Cordelia Street, a place where 
fagged looking business men boarded the early car? Mere rivets in a 
machine they seemed to Paul — sickening men, with combings of 
children’s hair always hanging to their coats, and the smell of cooking 
in their clothes . . .  (185)
The industry of these men — themselves represented as part of the machinery of 
wealth and profit — both defines the age and makes possible the pursuit of luxury.
The work they do is here denigrated, yet the results of it — the wealth they make 
possible for the class to which Paul aspires — is utterly necessary to Paul’s “protest.” 
And, as the passage above shows, these working men are inextricably bound 
up with notions of “family” and all that that represents: the self-made man, self- 
denial, “wholesome advice,” limited expectations, and above all the notion that family 
makes up for the asceticism necessary in the work ethic and that the family can, 
somehow, mediate the negative effects of it all. As the relation between Paul and his 
father elearly shows, this familial conneetion is fatally flawed. The ideal of the 
bourgeois family is simply untenable as a mediating factor to counteract modernity’s 
effects. It is not simply that Paul is motherless; his sisters are barely mentioned and he 
is terrified of his own father.
As Paul sits in the dining room, or in the lobby, or alone in his own room in 
the hotel in New York, his very identity seems hidden, even to himself, and he
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remains anonymous the entire time he is there, even until the very moment of his 
death. He dresses carefully and yet checks himself again and again in the mirror: 
Had he not always been thus, had he not sat here night after night, 
from as far back as he could remember, looking pensively over just 
such shimmering textures, and slowly twirling the stem of a glass like 
this one between his thumb and middle finger. He rather thought he 
had. (185)
Belonging nowhere, responsible to no one, Paul represents the alienation 
modernity calls forth, an alienation that Baudelaire embraced as flâneur during the 
Paris of the Second Empire, but which will drive Paul to despair, to suicide, in 
twentieth century America.
Yet, Paul seems unaware of his alienation. He appears to embrace it. The 
reader is in fact surprised that Paul reacts so strongly at the end of the story. “He 
was not in the least abashed or lonely. He had no especial desire to meet or to know 
any of these people; all he demanded was the right to look on and conjecture, to 
watch the pageant” (185). Benjamin notes: “the flâneur is the observer of the 
marketplace. His knowledge is akin to the occult science of industrial fluctuations. 
He is a spy for the capitalists, on assignment in the realm of consumers” (427). Paul, 
as an American flâneur, has done his espionage well; he has learned how to dress, 
how to eat, how to consume, and how to consume conspicuously enough to keep 
from arousing suspicion that he does not belong to the upper class. The notion of 
double-agent might apply here, for Paul is not only a spy for consumer capitalism, he
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is also spying on another class, the class to which he aspires from his position in the 
lower middle class.
Paul’s escape to New York, his criminality, his obsession with appearances 
and material possessions are, in fact, perversions of the morality which he ostensibly 
rejects, in effect “reinforcing the evasive banality” he attempts to subvert. In “Paul’s 
Case,” we see, in Paul’s posturing, the makings of a very modem consumer culture 
and the culture of instant gratification, values which Gather critiques. The very act of 
flânerie, as Benjamin reminds us, is the “epitomie of the political attitude of the 
middle classes” (420). Though Paul comes from a semi-educated, semi-working 
class — with basically no sense of class-consciousness — conventional, bourgeois 
morality lends a kind of status and respectability, a kind of cultural capital for the 
lower class. By rebelling against the “ugliness and commonness” of Cordelia Street 
and its monotony, Paul jumps from the frying pan into the fire. While modernity has 
created his dilemma, the movement of modernity is accelerating towards the 
consumer culture the flâneur, and the decadent, first oppose and then help to make 
possible. In rejecting bourgeois morality, Paul hopes to replace it with consumerism. 
Gather is clear that this is not enough.
Walter Benjamin writes in “Baudelaire or the Streets of Paris, “The flâneur 
still stood at the margin of the great city, as of the bourgeois class. Neither of them 
had yet overwhelmed him. In neither of them was he at home. He sought his asylum 
in the crowd” (170). Paul’s immersion into the great swirling mass of New York and 
the affluent wealth of Fifth Avenue is, however, only an illusion: in every scene 
where this is described, Paul is spying on it from the window of his hotel. Paul’s
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flânerie is voyeuristic, like all flânerie, but whatever subversive element of cultural 
terror he intends is itself subverted through American consumer culture. The 
impressionistic scene of black lines of carriages in the snow, while a beautiful 
winterpiece, nonetheless serves the same function as art for Paul: he had no especial 
desire to meet the people any more than he had to become an artist. He is outside 
looking in, a spy for the capitalists in the marketplace of taste, on assignment for the 
realm of consumers. Paul uses the “nerve-stuff of all sensation” to propel himself 
away from Cordelia Street, but lacks the literal and perhaps ideological means to 
sustain himself as American dandy.
Paul, modeling himself on the figure of the dandy, is not a “manly” man. 
Since Aestheticism has been renegotiated, post-Wilde, the Aesthetic American male 
is equated with “feminized men.” The anxiety which this provokes is clear in the 
responses of those in authority over Paul. Physical descriptions, as well as 
descriptions of his dress, call attention to Paul’s dandyism and Aesthetic posturing. 
Gather describes Paul in the first paragraph of the story:
His clothes were a trifle outgrown, and the tan velvet on the collar of 
his open overcoat was frayed and worn; but for all that there was 
something of the dandy about him, and he wore an opal pin in his 
neatly knotted black four-in-hand, and a red carnation in his button­
hole. This latter adornment the faculty somehow felt was not properly 
significant of the contrite spirit befitting a boy under the ban of 
suspension. (170)
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Still, despite such bravura, Paul is “always glancing about him, seeming to feel that 
people might be watching him and trying to detect something” (181). His constant 
looking over his shoulder also draws attention to the need he has to be seen, as well 
as to the seeming unreality his own existence has for him. He is much like an actor 
on a stage himself, “his eyes were remarkable for a certain hysterical brilliancy, and 
he continually used them in a conscious, theatrical sort of way, peculiarly offensive 
in a boy” (170), according to his teachers’ observations. They speculate that it is 
belladonna, but Gather notes that that drug does not produce such an effect. Paul’s 
drawing teacher had noticed that when looking at him, one “saw only his white teeth 
and the forced animation of his eyes. One warm afternoon the boy had gone to sleep 
at his drawing-board, and his master had noted with amazement what a white, blue- 
veined face it was . . . the lips twitching even in his sleep” (172). Neuraesthenia, 
the nervous inability to cope with modem life, often diagnosed during this period in 
people outside the bounds of convention, is certainly alluded to in this and other 
descriptions of Paul.
But while Gather’s title may indicate a psychological profiling of Paul, it is, 
however, doubtful that she means him to be an extreme example of neurosis. If 
Gather is attempting to explain Paul’s case in therapeutic cultural terms, she equally 
pathologizes the culture which has created him. The very culture which finds him 
aberrant and would eliminate, control, and repress all that is individual and unique in 
him is the same culture which promotes radical individualism in the pursuit of 
“progress.” I find it unlikely that Gather intended for Paul to be read as an 
individual, psychological aberration whose situation could be managed through the
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banality of therapeutic culture. Her indictment of modem eulture seems clear, and 
the title in this light seems ironic.
Gather opposes Paul’s life on Cordelia Street and at school with what seems, 
at first glance, to be aesthetic experience. Paul works at the theatre as an usher, and 
sometimes as an unpaid assistant to one of the younger male actors. But the only 
reason Paul is allowed to go there is that his father “thought a boy ought to be 
earning a little” (178). The Pittsburgh Carnegie Hall is shabby and so are the actors. 
Paul is not interested in the music. It is only when surrounded by beautiful things and 
people (not engaged in actually listening to music or gazing at a painting per se), 
when “everything was as it should be,” that Paul’s senses are truly “fired.” It is 
when, as he sits gazing at the crowds of well-dressed people in the Waldorf-Astoria, 
or even in the theater in Pittsburgh surrounded by wealthier people than himself, that 
“the nerve-stuff of all sensations” affects him. “The lights, the chatter, the perfumes, 
the bewildering medley of colour” are what Paul responds to most intensely. Gather 
is careful to delineate this from his rather mundane response to actual art. “It was 
not that symphonies as such meant anything in particular to Paul,” Gather tells us 
(173).
Despite “losing himself’ in front of a painting, or fantasizing at the opera, 
Paul nevertheless fails to find much of any real interest in the art itself. It is what it 
sparks in his imagination, not a sublime experience of the art itself, which is the draw 
for Paul. Paul “needed only the spark, the indescribable thrill that made his 
imagination master of his senses, and he could make plots and pictures enough of his 
own. It was equally tme that he was not stage-stmck—not, at any rate, in the usual
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acceptation of that expression.” Paul does not want to be an actor, or a singer, or a 
musician, “He felt no necessity to do any of these things, what he wanted was to see, 
to he in the atmosphere, float on the wave of it, to be carried out, blue league after 
blue league, away from everything” (180). Gather carefully gives us the details of 
Paul’s aesthetic response, and in this, as in her coding of Paul’s dress and other 
behavior, she differentiates between Paul’s experience of art and her own sensational 
aesthetic.
One way in which the reader sees Paul depicted as an Aesthete is in his 
obsession with the lifestyle of the actors and the imaginary glamour of their lives off 
stage. He finds the “world-shine” of the actors and singers irresistible. While still in 
Pittsburgh he hangs about pathetically outside, in the rain, voyeuristically watching 
the players go inside the hotel, fantasizing all the time, creating imaginary affairs 
between members of the cast. As he watches the singer go inside, while the door is 
ajar:
it seemed to Paul that he, too, entered. He seemed to feel himself go 
after her up the steps, into the warm, lighted building, into an exotic, a 
tropical world of shiny, glistening surfaces and basking ease. He 
reflected upon the mysterious dishes that were brought into the 
dining-room, the green bottles in buckets of ice, as he had seen them 
in the supper party pictures of the Sunday supplement. (174)
In this passage, as in many others, the emphasis is on reflected images, on shiny 
surfaces, a type of aesthetic experience but an attenuated one, reflected, imaginary.
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superficial, not that of direct sensation. Paul “seems” to go inside, and the exotic 
world is an imaginary one, a reflection of his imagination.
Paul’s obsession throughout the story with the details of interior decoration is 
telling as well; it is not only his own appearance which matters to him, but the 
appearance of his surroundings. Paul’s negative response to his surroundings is also 
telling. For instance in Pittsburgh:
After a night behind the scenes, Paul found the school-room more 
than ever repulsive; the bare floors and naked walls; the prosy men 
who never wore frock coats, or violets in their button-holes; the 
women with their dull gowns, shrill voices, and pitiful seriousness 
about prepositions that govern the dative. He could not bear to have 
the other pupils think for a moment, that he took these people 
seriously; he must convey to them that he considered it all trivial. 
(180)
Or, when he goes home after a night ushering, Gather says that “in such reactions, 
after one of the experiences which made days and nights out of the dreary blanks of 
the calendar, when his senses were deadened, Paul’s head was always singularly 
clear” (176).
This is such a night, when, after he has left the theatre:
The nearer he approached the house, the more absolutely unequal 
Paul felt to the sight of it all; his ugly sleeping chamber; the cold 
bath-room with the grimy zinc tub, the cracked mirror, the dripping
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experience of life elsewhere was so M l of Sabbath-school picnics, 
petty economies, wholesome advice as to how to succeed in life, and 
the unescapable odours of cooking, that he found this existence so 
alluring, these smartly-clad men and women so attractive, that he was 
so moved by these starry apple orchards that loomed perennially 
under the limelight. (179)
Contained within this passage is a description, repeated elsewhere as well in the 
story, of the very bourgeois and very “artificial” morality Lears describes. The 
“wholesome advice,” the “petty economies” point to the notion of success in life, 
which is opposed to beauty and the appreciation of the aesthetic impulse in life 
throughout the story. Perhaps Paul’s sense of beauty is in fact conditioned by the 
“petty economies” and “wholesome advice as to how to succeed,” artificial values 
which induce an affinity for an artificial beauty.
In fact, Paul does not steal money from his father’s company and flee to 
New York to make more money, to connive and scheme to get richer or more 
famous, but simply to be in beautiM surroundings, surrounded by beautiful people 
and fine clothes, wine and food. Authentic experience has become for Paul elided 
with the “artificial”— the urban, the glamorous, interior decoration and aesthetic 
dress: hallmarks of the Aesthetic lifestyle of someone like Wilde. The fact that in 
order to indulge in these things requires money is incidental, though late in the story 
Paul “knew now, more than ever, that money was everything, the wall that stood 
between all he loathed and all he wanted” (188) as he contemplates the end of his 
days at the Waldorf-Astoria in New York.
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In fact, Paul’s voyeurism, a type of sensual greed, pervades the entire story: 
“his chief greediness lay in his ears and eyes” (186). Even though he is worried that 
his father is coming to find him after reading the account of his theft in the papers, 
“the glare and glitter about him, the mere scenic accessories had again, and for the 
last time, their old potency.” He is, still, a “fortunate being” and “would finish the 
thing splendidly” (187). “He was exactly the kind of boy he wanted to be” as he 
“dress[ed] the part” (186). That Paul is interested in art and sensational experience 
as a way of enhancing his aesthetic appreciation not in the way Pater intended, but as 
a consumer, is seen in his own sense of being an object of consumption. As he gets 
ready to leap before the oncoming train, “once or twice he glanced nervously 
sidewise, as though he were being watched” (189). This is not Pater’s aestheticism, 
not intensity of the actual moment, but of an imaginary, an attenuated moment.
Earlier in the story, his imagination “became the master of his senses” when 
he fantasized about the prima donna: “Paul had often hung about the hotel, watching 
the people go in and out, longing to enter and leave school-masters and dull care 
behind him for ever.” When he is brought up short by a gust of wind, however:
Paul was startled to find that he was still outside in the slush of the 
gravel driveway; that his boots were letting in the water and his 
scanty overcoat was clinging wet about him; that the lights in front of 
the concert hall were out, and that the rain was driving in sheets 
between him and the orange glow on the windows above him. There 
it was, what he wanted — tangibly before him, like the fairy world of 
a Christmas pantomime; as the rain beat in his face, Paul wondered
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whether he were destined always to shiver in the hlack night outside, 
looking up at it. (175)
Here art is elided with the elite, with an upper class, or those who aspire to it. The 
aesthetic sphere is synonymous, for Paul, with having a glamorous lifestyle, with 
having money, with precisely those things which are not available to him on 
Cordelia Street, with its “grimy zinc tub” and “kitchen odours.” But the aesthetic 
sphere Paul desires is artificial, a superficial simulacra of aestheticism. Paul is not 
equipped to tell the difference. Gather implies.
Gather does not deny a class harrier, and uses art as a trope to define the wall: 
Paul never went up to Cordelia Street without a shudder of loathing. 
His was next the house of the Cumberland minister. He approached it 
tonight with the nerveless sense of defeat, the hopeless feeling of 
sinking hack forever into ugliness and commonness that he had 
always had when he came home. The moment he turned into 
Cordelia Street he felt the waters close above his head. After each of 
these orgies of living, he experienced all the physical depression 
which follows a debauch; the loathing of respectable beds, of 
common food, of a house permeated hy kitchen odours; a shuddering 
repulsion for the flavourless, colourless mass of every-day existence, 
a morbid desire for cool things and soft lights and fresh flowers. (175) 
Gather, the impressionist aesthete, here depicts Paul’s obsession with wealth, his 
mistaking of glamour for aesthetic sensation, his conspicuous consumption, as 
“morbid desire.” On his way to the train tracks, he remembered “an actual picture of
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everything he had seen that morning . . .  His mind, unable to cope with vital matters 
near at hand, worked feverishly and deftly at sorting and grouping these images. 
They made for him a part of the ugliness of the world . . Gather writes, as if to 
emphasize the distortion of Paul’s perception, that as he stopped walking, he picked 
up a handful of snow to eat, “but that too, seemed hot.” The “end had to come 
sometime,” and for Paul, it is only after he buries the symbol of his dandyism, the 
red carnation—the one natural adornment he consistently wears — in the snow:
The carnations in his coat were drooping with the cold, he noticed; all 
their red glory over. It occurred to him that all the flowers he had 
seen in the show windows that first night must have gone the same 
way, long before this. It was only one splendid breath they had, in 
spite of their brave mockery at the winter outside the glass. It was a 
losing game in the end, it seemed, this revolt against the homilies by 
which the world is run. Paul took one of the blossoms carefully from 
his coat and scooped a little hole in the snow, where he covered it up . 
..(189).
As Paul kills himself rather than face the banality of Cordelia Street, Gather asserts 
the power of the natural over the artificial, but never manages to locate authentic 
sensational experience anywhere in this story. Fresh flowers, cool lights, and the 
glittering surfaces of American dandyism represent nothing but a “morbid desire” 
which cannot sustain Paul in a spiritually undernourished modem culture. Benjamin 
writes, in 1935, of Baudelaire, cities, and the progression of flânerie:
243
Paris becomes the subject of lyric poetry. This poetry is no hymn to 
the homeland; rather, the gaze of the allegorist, as it falls on the city, 
is the gaze of the alienated man. It is the gaze of the flâneur, whose 
way of life still conceals behind a mitigating nimbus the coming 
desolation of the big-city dweller. . .  The crowd is the veil through 
which the familiar city beckons to the flâneur as phantasmagoria — 
now a landscape, now a room. (40)
Gather’s earliest collection of work, most of it in urban rather than the rural settings 
of much of her later work, is also the work of a flâneur, who, as Baudelaire writes, 
“Everywhere . . .  sought the transitory, fleeting beauty of our present life — the 
character of what the reader has permitted us to call m o d e r n i t y .“Paul’s Case” is 
the record of that search, and the exhaustive excess of seeing which illuminates loss.
Benjamin also comments in “Paris of the Second Empire in Baudelaire,” that 
Baudelaire’s “theory did not come to grips with the renunciation which, in his work, 
appears as a loss of nature and naivete” (49). Part of the loss of nature and the 
organic life encoded in modernity is what Benjamin calls “the cult of the 
commodity,” especially, “fashion.” Benjamin comments: “Fashion stands in 
opposition to the organic. It couples the living body to the inorganic world. To the 
living, it defends the rights of the corpse.” And, “Fashion prescribes the ritual 
according to which the commodity fetish demands to be worshipped.” (“Paris, the 
Capital of the Nineteenth Century,” 36)
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